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State Medicaid Agency Engagement in the Legislative Process
Introduction
State Medicaid programs together comprise the largest public health insurance program 
in the United States. Medicaid pays for health care for over 60 million low-income children, 
seniors, persons with disabilities, and parents, and is a major source of income for safety-net 
health providers (Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured 2012). Medicaid is 
important for states, too, as it accounts for nearly a quarter of state budgets and increasingly 
crowds out funding for other policy areas (Cooper 2011). Working within broad federal 
requirements, states have a great deal of power to determine the shape of Medicaid programs. 
Yet, strikingly, there are major gaps in our knowledge about how states make Medicaid policy 
decisions, especially the processes by which state Medicaid agency staff influence states' 
program design choices.
In this dissertation, I investigate a previously unexplored mechanism for bureaucratic 
influence on Medicaid policy. I focus on bureaucratic activism during the legislative process, 
prior to the agency rulemaking and policy implementation that occur after laws have been 
passed. I take the following as my central questions: Do Medicaid bureaucrats leverage the 
lobbying power of health interest groups in attempts to influence Medicaid legislation? If so, 
under what conditions?
In conducting this research, I contend that it is important to know whether agency leaders 
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engage proactively in policymaking and how they do so. Medicaid bureaucrats possess policy 
expertise, preferences, and many tools for wielding influence different stages of the policy 
development process. Accounting for bureaucrats' preferences, and the likelihood that they will 
act strategically to influence policy outcomes, can help to deepen our understanding of states' 
Medicaid politics and programs. My findings suggest that bureaucrats have more tools for 
influencing policy, and at more stages of the policy process, than commonly thought. 
Existing scholarship has paid very little attention to bureaucrats' involvement in and 
influence on the legislative process, whether in the Medicaid policy arena or otherwise. This 
dissertation thus contributes to both the Medicaid policy and bureaucratic politics literatures. 
Multiple scholars have examined political determinants of Medicaid policy development, 
including characteristics of governors, interest groups, and legislatures (Barrilleaux & Miller 
1988; Grogan 1994; Schneider 1989; see Miller 2005 for a synthesis). State Medicaid agencies—
the institutions most central to this policy area—are not usually included in political-economic 
models of state Medicaid policy outcomes. Research that does explicitly examine agency 
influence on Medicaid policy tends to focus on agencies' administrative choices and 
responsibilities (Schneider, Jacoby & Coggburn 1997; Miller 2006; although see Jacobs & 
Callaghan 2013 for a discussion of how agency planning capacity figures into states' Medicaid 
expansion decisions). I extend the consideration of bureaucratic influence to a different part of 
the policy process, one in which bureaucrats are not usually thought to be proactive. 
With respect to the bureaucratic politics literature, most research focuses on how, and 
how well, elected officials control bureaucrats. These studies imagine bureaucrats to be largely 
reactive to legislative instruction, to the extent that they look unrealistically passive. In contrast, 
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public administration research emphasizes bureaucrats' influence on policy. However, like the 
Medicaid policy studies referenced above, most public administration research focuses on 
agencies' operational decisions, and most examinations of bureaucrats' involvement in the 
legislative process are not systematic. By theorizing and testing a specific mechanism for 
bureaucratic power, I show that prominent models of political control of the bureaucracy are 
incomplete. At the same time, I offer a more precise perspective on what it is that bureaucrats can 
do to influence policy outcomes than many public administration studies. 
In the following sections of this introductory chapter, I situate my argument about 
bureaucrats in the Medicaid context, survey relevant literature on bureaucrats, and summarize 
my research design and key findings. 
State Medicaid Legislation and Bureaucratic Activism
Working within federal guidelines, states have the power to determine the “type, amount, 
duration, and scope of services” in their Medicaid programs (“Medicaid Benefits,” n.d.). For 
example, states can choose whether to cover optional services, such as prescription drugs, and 
optional population groups, such as most non-disabled adults (Kaiser Commission on Medicaid 
and the Uninsured 2011). Even within the federal guidelines dictating mandatory program 
elements, such as physician services for poor pregnant women, states can negotiate important 
program parameters such as provider reimbursement (“Financing & Reimbursement,” n.d.). 
Furthermore, states can request waivers of federal law, granting them increased flexibility in 
program design. 
State control over Medicaid has grown since the 1990s as the federal government has 
increased waiver opportunities and made changes to federal law (Cantor, Thompson & Farnham 
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2013). Since the passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA) and 
the 2012 Supreme Court ruling that made ACA Medicaid expansions optional for states, state 
power has grown further, in at least two respects. First, states can decide whether to take 
advantage of federal matching dollars to expand Medicaid coverage to low-income adults and 
children. Second, the federal government has announced that states will have additional 
flexibility in determining benefits, payment structure, and other program parameters for 
expansion populations (Kaiser Family Foundation 2013). 
I argue, as do other observers of state health politics, that this increase in state power vis-
à-vis Medicaid also increases the importance of understanding state decision-making processes 
to add to our understanding of determinants of state Medicaid outcomes. As Jacobs and 
Callaghan put it, “when the outcome of benefit design, eligibility, and other features are still 
forming or are yet unknown, we need measures that trace the process of implementation through 
executive and legislative branch decisions” (2013, p. 1026). My specific interest is in the ways 
Medicaid agencies participate in and affect these state decision-making processes.
Changes to state Medicaid programs can take many different routes from proposal to 
implementation. Depending on the type and comprehensiveness of a change, states may obtain 
federal permission through amendments to state plans for medical assistance—the federal-state 
contracts that spells out the details of each state's Medicaid program—or, as mentioned above, 
they may apply for waivers of federal law (Kinney 1990; Thompson & Burke 2007). At the state 
level, state laws determine whether Medicaid agencies must secure legislative authorization for 
state plan amendments or waivers (see National Health Law Program & National Association of 
Community Health Centers 2006 for a review). Factors such as the degree of existing program 
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codification in statutes and states' political conditions also affect whether policy changes require 
legislative authorization. 
Hence, in some cases, Medicaid administrators are able to achieve program changes 
without authorizing legislation. They can also use administrative tools to influence policy after 
the passage of legislation. These methods of influence include writing rules, encouraging interest 
group participation in the rules process, implementing policy and enforcing rules with varying 
degrees of speed and enthusiasm, and negotiating program constraints and guidelines with 
federal partners at the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS). 
But major policy changes tend to be decided in the legislative arena, especially where 
there are already relevant substantive provisions in the state code describing Medicaid programs. 
And state budgets, which can bring about significant Medicaid policy changes, always take the 
form of legislation. In this research, I focus on bureaucrats' involvement in legislative 
deliberations about Medicaid. Bureaucrats' engagement in the legislative process is an under-
examined facet of agency behavior and this research sheds light on an important mechanism for 
agency influence. At the same time, focusing on legislative consideration of Medicaid policy 
makes this study of bureaucrats' strategic behavior conditional on legislative attention, which 
helps me guard against over-claiming on the subject of bureaucrats' influence on policy. 
How can Medicaid bureaucrats attempt to influence legislative decision-making? First, 
agency leaders must provide technical and policy information in response to legislators' requests 
for policy advice. Depending on the framing of the advice presented, bureaucrats can influence 
legislative thinking even while maintaining a reactive stance. Second, bureaucrats can engage 
proactively in legislative decision-making, in either of two ways: they can use their personal 
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connections to legislators and legislative staff to lobby directly, or they may ask interest groups 
for lobbying help. This dissertation focuses on the latter method of proactive engagement, which 
I call “indirect bureaucratic lobbying.” To my knowledge, indirect bureaucratic lobbying has not 
yet been the subject of a systematic investigation, either in the Medicaid policy arena or in 
general.
Bureaucrats may want to seek the help of interest groups because, relative to bureaucrats, 
interest groups have more freedom to lobby. In many agencies, staff are discouraged from 
proactive engagement in the legislative process; only an officially designated legislative liaison 
or the department secretary may lobby directly. However, Medicaid bureaucrats at all levels 
communicate frequently with private-sector groups that lobby actively. In fact, federal regulation 
requires state Medicaid agencies to gather community input on policy changes through meetings 
of “medical care advisory committees” that include health service providers and consumer 
groups.1 Thus, there is a certain predetermined minimum amount of bureaucrat – interest group 
interaction in every state. Given that interest groups frequently lobby legislators in order to 
influence Medicaid policy, and given that Medicaid bureaucrats have ongoing relationships with 
interest group members, should we expect that bureaucrats sometimes attempt to manipulate 
legislative outcomes by leveraging these contacts? If they do, can we predict when they may be 
more likely to do so? These questions summarize my logic about bureaucrats and form the basis 
of this project.




In this section I review the major strands of recent research on bureaucrats, first 
discussing the principal-agent framework and studies of political control of the bureaucracy. 
Consistent with the stance taken by George Krause (1996; 1999; 2003; 2010), I contend that the 
legislature-centric perspective underlying most of these works has somewhat suppressed our 
understanding of how bureaucrats strategically interact with legislative principals. Next, I note 
the contrasting approach to understanding bureaucrats' influence on policy in the public 
administration research tradition, and the opportunity to extend this literature in useful ways. 
Finally, I highlight examples of research that bridge the gap between these literatures and how I 
intend to build on those examples.
Political Science Perspectives on Bureaucrats
Debate about the normative value of bureaucrats' policy expertise and the possible 
antidemocratic implications of an “administrative state” dominated 20th-century scholarship on 
bureaucracies. Scholars have worried variously about the significance of bureaucrats' 
professionalization and resulting policy preferences (Mosher 1968), bureaucrats' purported desire 
to maximize the size of their agencies (Niskanen 1971), and their possible capture by interest 
groups (Freeman 1955; Lowi 1979), among many other concerns. At least partly in reaction to 
the scholarly focus on the specter of administrative dominance, more contemporary research on 
bureaucrat-politician relations has focused on an opposing dynamic. The central question about 
bureaucracies has become how, and how well, elected officials control them, so that these 
officials—legislators as well as executives—can direct bureaucratic expertise in desired 
directions.
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Recent research on political control of the bureaucracy typically builds on principal-agent 
theory, developed by economists and first applied to politics by scholars such as Niskanen (1971) 
and Moe (1984) in an effort to understand how politicians can overcome the information 
asymmetry inherent in the bureaucratic-politician relationship. Strands of this research include 
interpretive accounts and theoretical models of political controls (McCubbins & Schwartz 1984; 
McCubbins, Noll & Weingast 1987; Lupia & McCubbins 1994), empirical investigations of 
bureaucratic response to political principals (Weingast & Moran 1983; Wood & Waterman 1991; 
Carpenter 1996; Epstein & O'Halloran 1996; Olson 1996; Bawn 1997; Balla 1998) and studies of 
delegation to agencies (Epstein & O'Halloran 1999; Huber & Shipan 2002; Volden 2002). These 
works all build on principal-agent theory, and all assume that legislators, and other principals, 
determine the direction and scope of bureaucratic activity.2 To a large extent these assumptions 
are reasonable: legislatures generally set the course for bureaucratic action, and James Madison 
specified the dominance of legislatures as a constitutional principle in Federalist 51 (Madison, 
Hamilton & Jay 1987). 
 However, relegating bureaucrats to the role of agents has also limited how most of these 
works conceptualize bureaucrats and their behavior. Specifically, viewing bureaucrats solely as 
agents reduces their actions to reactions and limits their political agency, leaving us with an 
underdeveloped sense of bureaucrats' power to shape both the legislature-bureaucracy dynamic 
and outcomes of the policy process. What are the limits to political controls of the bureaucracy, 
and how, specifically, might bureaucrats evade them? Some of the research that relies heavily on 
the principal-agent framework seems to miss the lessons from earlier studies of bureaucratic 
2 While some of the above studies concern themselves with control of agencies by (or through) the executive 
branch, and some include the courts as an additional principal, the predominant concern is with legislative 
control of the bureaucracy. My focus is on bureaucratic-legislative relations. 
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power (and from contemporary public administration scholarship) and underestimates the ability 
of the agents to step out of their prescribed roles. In particular, theories of ex ante methods that 
enable legislators to constrain future bureaucratic behavior, such as procedural and statutory 
controls, seem problematic when held up against empirical findings on the behavior of 
bureaucrats. Ex ante controls assume, by definition, that the actions of politicians precede those 
of bureaucrats, which may not always be the case.
One of the best known ex ante control theories is a procedural control proposed by 
McCubbins, Noll and Weingast (1987) (often referred to as “McNollgast”). McNollgast assert 
that administrative law can, among other things, ensure that agencies privilege the preferences of 
certain groups during policy implementation or regulatory decision-making (the “deck-stacking” 
hypothesis). In theory, this forces agencies to make decisions consistent with legislators' wishes. 
The idea that administrative law can shift the level of interest group influence on agency 
decisions is plausible, and while McNollgast do not test this, they provide several examples. At 
the same time, their account seems to suggest that bureaucrat – interest group relationships are 
formed anew for each policy implementation or regulatory decision. They do not consider that 
existing bureaucrat – interest group alliances could influence the legislative stage of the policy 
process, and so outweigh or condition any later effects of deck stacking meant to control 
agencies during rule promulgation. 
While later examples of work on procedural controls improve on McNollgast in terms of 
empirical rigor (Balla 1998) and conditionality (Epstein and O'Halloran 1996), they too make 
these same implicit assumptions about the willingness of bureaucrats to wait until rule 
promulgation to influence policy and to interact with the interest groups they are told to interact 
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with. Even public administration researchers, who generally acknowledge higher levels of 
bureaucratic political agency (see below), tend to isolate the idea of bureaucratic participation in 
legislative decision-making from bureaucratic influence in rulemaking as they draw conclusions 
about whether notice and comment procedures allow for the kind of interest group influence that 
might control agencies (West 2004; Woods 2009). Likewise, empirical studies of interest group 
influence on rulemaking—both those grounded in public administration and in the political 
control tradition—do not consider how this might be connected to interest group participation in 
the legislative processes leading to rulemaking (Balla 1998; Golden 1998; Woods 2005, 2009; 
Yackee 2006).
The second main type of ex ante control with which this project is specifically concerned 
is statutory discretion (Ferejohn and Shipan 1990; Bawn 1997; Epstein and O'Halloran 1999; 
Huber and Shipan 2002; Volden 2002). Research on statute specificity has particular relevance to 
this dissertation because I argue that bureaucrats care about the details of policy authorizations 
and should, under certain conditions, act strategically to influence statute language. The most 
important empirical work on statutory controls, as well as the most relevant to this dissertation, is 
research conducted by Huber and Shipan (2002) that examines the effects of variation in the 
distribution of power among actors in state legislative and executive branches on the statutory 
discretion granted to Medicaid agencies. Huber and Shipan allow for the possibility of strategic 
action on the part of bureaucrats; however, they restrict this to a decision to comply with 
legislative directives or not comply. They do test for interest group influence on legislative 
decision-making, but the possibility of agency – interest group relationships that impact 
legislative decision-making lies outside the scope of their analysis and is not examined.
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Scholars interested in statute specificity and procedural controls like deck-stacking are, of 
course, not alone in working from a legislative dominance perspective. Nearly all work on 
political controls assumes that bureaucrats mainly react to legislative direction, whether by 
following instructions or shirking. This research thus assumes that the power to determine the 
nature of politician-bureaucrat interactions rests exclusively or primarily in the hands of 
politicians. As George Krause puts it, “bureaucratic discretion has been treated as a purely 
political choice (supply side) and not an agency choice (demand side)” (Krause 2003, p. 45). The 
emphasis on legislative dominance in the bureaucratic politics literature results in many 
arguments about bureaucrats' behavior that arise from theoretical implications rather than direct 
observation (Krause 1996, 2010). Assumptions about bureaucrats' reactivity, in particular, do not 
line up with the arguments of researchers who focus directly on the ways in which bureaucrats 
exercise policymaking power, including by engaging in the legislative process.
Public Administration Perspectives on Bureaucratic Activism
Scholars writing in the public administration tradition seem to start with an entirely 
different view of bureaucrats, one that highlights bureaucrats' activism. For example, James Q. 
Wilson (1989) argues that bureaucrats strive to manipulate legislative principals “to achieve 
mutually profitable arrangements” (p. 251). Leroy N. Rieselbach (1995) notes that bureaucrats 
involve themselves directly with the policy process, lobbying legislators both on behalf of the 
executive branch and their own interests. Aberbach, Putnam & Rockman (1981), in a 
comparative study, acknowledge the existence of “political” bureaucrats who tend to involve 
themselves in the policy process, both by making contacts with legislators and clientele groups. 
Similarly, Abney & Lauth (1986), in their survey of department heads in 50 states, gather 
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evidence of both direct legislative lobbying by bureaucrats and indirect lobbying via alliance-
building between agencies and interest groups. Glenn Abney (1988) points out similarities in the 
behavior of private-sector lobbyists and agency lobbyists in Georgia. Bowling and Wright 
(1998), analyzing data from the 50-state American State Administrators Project, describe state 
agency executives as intrinsically involved in politics—survey respondents devote only half their 
time, on average, to administration, and devote significant resources to policy development, 
originating legislation, building public support, contacting legislators, and other activities we 
might consider “political.” And Nicholson-Crotty and Miller, who note that “research that 
directly addresses the question of bureaucratic influence over legislative outcomes is rare” (2012, 
p. 350), show that state legislators perceive bureaucrats to be more directly influential where 
agency capacity, or professionalism, is higher.
While these studies might offer useful correctives to the view that bureaucrats are passive, 
reactive, or not involved in the policy process prior to the rules stage, they tend to proceed by 
noting examples and making assertions, and they usually do not speak directly to the literature on 
political controls. Much as the political science literature on political control underestimates 
bureaucratic agency, the traditional public administration literature underplays the role of 
political influence. The idea of politically active bureaucrats that public administration research 
promotes does not preclude the accuracy of the principal-agent framework: legislators might 
consciously choose to delegate to active bureaucrats, and bureaucrats might anticipate legislators' 
future demands as they engage in the political process. In addition, there are numerous findings 
that political controls have some effect on agency behavior. Few public administration studies 
acknowledge these issues. There are exceptions; for example, Abney and Lauth (1986) conclude 
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that agency – interest group alliance building does not subvert political controls, but this is a rare 
mention of the concept, and their slightly vague test looks only at levels of agency 
appropriations. Nicholson-Crotty and Miller (2012) provide a more significant exception to 
shortcomings in the public administration literature—their examination of bureaucratic influence 
on legislators is systematic in its design and accounts for legislative power. 
Integrating the Legislator- and Agency-Based Perspectives
I take as inspiration for this research a few key works that consider the power of both 
legislators and bureaucrats and that offer more nuanced accounts of bureaucratic activism. One 
useful example of research that integrates the political science and public administration 
perspectives discussed above is George A. Krause's (1996; 1999) dynamic systems model of 
bureaucrat-politician relations. Krause theorizes and tests an interactive, multi-directional, 
conditional model of policy influence that incorporates politicians and bureaucrats as roughly 
equal players, focusing on the interplay between administrative outputs and politicians' 
budgetary signals. I draw inspiration from this work while looking more directly at bureaucrats' 
efforts to influence legislators, rather than at policy outputs. I also depart from Krause's 
framework by incorporating interest groups, asking how their characteristics might condition 
bureaucrats' strategic engagement in legislative decision-making. 
A second example, and a more direct inspiration for and predecessor to this dissertation, 
is Daniel P. Carpenter's (2001) investigation into sources of agency autonomy during the 
Progressive Era. Carpenter argues that certain agencies have purposely cultivated reputations for 
expertise and have been able to use their reputations to position themselves in diverse political 
networks that serve as a source of power. Autonomous agencies build support coalitions that 
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politicians don't want to challenge; instead, politicians defer to expertise of those agencies. 
Multiple empirical studies build on aspects of Carpenter's theory. These include studies 
on the effects of agency autonomy on innovation (Verhoest, Verschuere & Bouckaert 2007) and 
on the effects of agencies' concern for their reputations on their efforts to seek publicity (Moffitt 
2010), to improve customer service (Roberts 2004; Corrêa d’Almeida & Klingner 2008), or to 
deliver high-quality policy advice (Krause & Douglas 2005). Alcañiz (2010) examines 
bureaucrats' network formation in technical agencies in Latin America, but restricts these 
networks to transgovernmental linkages with other expert bureaucrats. And Nicholson-Crotty 
and Miller (2012) ask how agency reputation conditions the ability of state-level bureaucrats to 
influence legislators, as mentioned above. 
Of the research that draws on Carpenter's framework, Nicholson-Crotty and Miller's 
study is the most directly related to my research. It also provides another example of a successful 
integration of public administration and political science perspectives on bureaucrats. The 
authors' success in this respect is partly a result of their variable selection: they gauge 
bureaucratic influence as perceived by legislators themselves, using data from a survey of state 
legislators. Their main interest is in determining whether bureaucrats in states with higher 
average agency capacity are perceived to be more influential according to this measure. They 
find that this is indeed the case (although, surprisingly, they find no evidence that legislative 
professionalism moderates the effect of agency capacity on perceived bureaucratic influence). 
My approach to investigating bureaucratic power is similar in that I ask how state institutional 
capacity affects agency-legislature dynamics. However, my research directly examines 
bureaucrats' behavior—I conceptualize and measure bureaucrats' requests for interest group 
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lobbying as a very specific mechanism of (indirect) influence on legislatures. In contrast, 
Nicholson-Crotty and Miller ask the reader to imagine the mechanism at work in their study, 
arguing at one point that agency reputation works through interest groups to influence legislators 
yet measuring something closer to legislators' perceptions of direct bureaucratic influence.
To my knowledge, there are no studies that take up Carpenter's idea that agencies can 
increase their influence by building and/or leveraging private-sector coalitions. This may partly 
result from the fact that Carpenter's standard for expert, reputable, autonomous agencies is 
difficult to meet. I build on the idea that bureaucrats can increase their political power by forging 
alliances with the private sector while departing from Carpenter's work in a few key respects. 
First, rather than characterize entire agencies as autonomous or not-autonomous, I investigate the 
everyday use of coalitional strategy by individual bureaucrats in agencies of varying reputations. 
Second, I focus on how bureaucrats use their relationships with lobbyists in an issue-contingent 
way to achieve their policy objectives. This idea has the advantage of making bureaucrats' use of 
private-sector contacts slightly more predictable than the way they might build coalitions over 
the long term (Carpenter) or engage with fluid, cloud-like issue networks (Heclo 1978). Third, I 
focus on state-level bureaucrats in the current era to understand how institutional arrangements 
condition bureaucratic behavior. 
Figure 1.1 provides a visual representation of the bodies of research discussed here—with 
the addition of the lobbying literature—and the power relationships they focus on. The dashed 
line, leading from bureaucrats to legislators through interest groups, represents the dynamic 
Carpenter outlines: the ability of agencies to leverage interest group power in order to influence 
legislative decision-making. I argue that this dynamic is understudied, and that individual-level 
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bureaucrat-lobbyist linkages can work in a similar way.
Figure 1.1: Diagram of relevant bodies of research and power relationships
A Theory of Indirect Bureaucratic Lobbying
Building on Carpenter's work, I consider how strategic alliances between bureaucrats and 
interest groups facilitate bureaucratic engagement in the legislative process, thereby potentially 
influencing the responsibilities delegated to them. I begin by developing a theory in Chapter 2 
that considers the benefits and costs to modern-day state-level agency staff of engaging 
proactively in legislative decision-making. I argue that these benefits and costs shape Medicaid 
bureaucrats' decisions about both whether, and how, to engage. The major benefit of activism is 
that it can increase the likelihood that bureaucrats realize desired Medicaid policy outcomes, 
whereas the major cost is that bureaucratic activism can anger political principals. Principals in 
both the executive and legislative branches are capable of levying serious consequences for what 
they see as inappropriate bureaucratic behavior. Given the potential benefits and costs of 
proactive engagement in the legislative process, bureaucrats must weigh carefully any decision 
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to engage. 
In general, while direct legislative lobbying may be a more straightforward approach, 
bureaucrats may be able to amplify their influence and avoid angering principals if they lobby 
indirectly, by asking interest groups for help. If this is the case, why wouldn't bureaucrats always 
lobby indirectly? I argue that a set of conditions at the level of policies and groups (micro-level) 
and at the level of state institutions (macro-level) affect each bureaucrat's decision calculus, 
changing the likelihood of indirect bureaucratic lobbying compared to no activism at all, or to 
direct lobbying. 
In brief, I predict that higher policy agreement between bureaucrats and interest groups 
and higher interest group power should both increase the likelihood of indirect bureaucratic 
lobbying. As part of my discussion of importance of policy agreement, I consider whether 
various theories of legislative lobbying accurately describe indirect bureaucratic lobbying, and I 
carry this theme through the empirical analysis. I also predict that bureaucrats should be more 
likely to lobby indirectly where legislative and agency resources are lower, conditional on the 
existence of bureaucrat-lobbyist policy agreement. Finally, I predict that gubernatorial power and 
governor-bureaucrat agreement should affect both the likelihood and type of indirect 
bureaucratic lobbying. These predictions generate a set of testable hypotheses for conditions 
under which we are more likely to see evidence of indirect bureaucratic lobbying. In addition, I 
extend my predictions (and related findings) about the effects of agreement to a qualitative 




I pursue a mixed-methods approach to investigating Medicaid bureaucrats' policy 
activism. This project combines a set of exploratory, unstructured interviews with an original 
telephone survey that asked both closed- and open-ended questions about Medicaid bureaucrats' 
behavior. These survey data enable both quantitative and qualitative analyses. 
Mixed-methods approaches to social and health questions are becoming increasingly 
common (Bryman 2006; Bronstein & Kovacs 2013). This approach is particularly useful for this 
dissertation because I am interested both in exploring a new line of inquiry about bureaucrats and 
in testing specific explanations for indirect bureaucratic lobbying (Bronstein & Kovacs 2013; 
Cresswell 2014). I focus the bulk of my empirical analysis on quantitative survey data, including 
numerically coded open-ended survey responses. These data both illuminate the frequency of 
indirect bureaucratic lobbying in my sample population and help me to test my hypotheses about 
factors that increase the likelihood of this bureaucratic behavior. Yet qualitative analyses serve 
several important purposes in this project. First, the initial unstructured interviews refined my 
theory and informed the design of the survey instrument. Second, the qualitative information 
contained in answers to open-ended survey questions illustrate quantitative findings, uncover 
unpredicted relationships in the data, and ground my analyses in the Medicaid context. Overall, 
this mixed-methods approach enhances both completeness and contextualization. Completeness 
is a frequently cited rationale for mixed-strategy research (Bryman 2006). Contextualization is a 
more unusual rationale but is one that makes sense for questions about a particular policy area.
In the first stage of the research, I conducted a set of eleven relatively unstructured 
interviews on the topic of bureaucrats' role in policymaking. I conducted about half of these 
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interviews in person and half by telephone. I interviewed two health department bureaucrats and 
two consumer advocates in each of two Midwestern states. I also spoke with a Medicaid director 
in a Western state and a former Medicaid director in a Western state with additional experience in 
several other states. In addition, I spoke with an official with the National Association of 
Medicaid Directors (NAMD). I discuss the ways in which these conversations supported theory 
development in Chapter 2, and the ways in which they helped me plan for a systematic study in 
Chapter 3. 
As I note in Chapter 3, two of the themes that emerged from the interviews had major 
survey design implications. One theme was that interview participants who were interest group 
leaders were more comfortable acknowledging and discussing bureaucratic activism in the 
legislative arena than bureaucrats themselves. The other theme was that there is variation across 
states in the level, or position, of any Medicaid bureaucrats conducting indirect bureaucratic 
lobbying. For these reasons, I designed a survey that asked state interest group leaders about 
their legislation-related communications with Medicaid bureaucrats at various levels of seniority. 
I surveyed interest group leaders in 25 states and collected 106 complete, usable survey 
transcripts. This survey design has the added benefit of making information about bureaucrats' 
behavior slightly more objective than it would be if I had surveyed bureaucrats themselves. In 
addition, I re-contacted a small set of these original respondents to ask for clarifications that help 
me to assess the applicability of different lobbying theories. I gathered 9 responses to this follow-
up survey.
Key Findings and Contribution
The most important finding of this dissertation is that indirect bureaucratic lobbying 
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occurs regularly: about half of my survey respondents acknowledged being asked by a Medicaid 
bureaucrat, at some point in the recent past, for lobbying assistance. Thus, in contrast with 
Carpenter's work, I show that bureaucrats' ability to take advantage of private-sector power is 
widespread—indirect bureaucratic lobbying is an influence strategy that is available to most 
bureaucrats rather than only those working in autonomous agencies with outstanding reputations 
for expertise. Furthermore, everyday indirect bureaucratic lobbying does not necessarily create 
(or result from) agency autonomy; in fact, it is more likely to be a function of bureaucrats' 
knowledge that legislators may not defer to them and that they need extra help to affect 
legislative deliberations. 
My finding that indirect bureaucratic lobbying is fairly typical contributes to our 
understanding of the ways in which bureaucrats can be activist, without ignoring the importance 
and centrality of legislatures in state policymaking. This has significant implications for research 
on political control of the bureaucracy since it implies that ex ante controls may be more limited 
than previously realized, or at least that their effectiveness is conditional in different ways than 
previously investigated. More generally, by providing systematic evidence of bureaucrats' 
attempts to influence the legislative process—and specific examples of the theorized mechanism 
for influence—this research addresses a major gap in scholarship. Political science has largely 
left the question of bureaucratic influence on legislatures unexamined.
I also find support for several hypotheses about the conditions that make indirect 
bureaucratic lobbying more likely. In particular, I find that bureaucrat-lobbyist agreement is, in 
most cases, an important predictor. I discuss the meaning of this finding for lobbying theory, 
along with the themes from my re-contacting conversations, in Chapter 6. And I find suggestive, 
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although not definitive, evidence supporting the idea that bureaucrats are more likely to ask for 
help from more powerful interest groups. Which groups are powerful depends in part on party 
control of state legislatures.
My results provide mixed support for my predictions about the effects of institutional 
characteristics. As expected, and again in contrast with Carpenter (2001)—and with Nicholson-
Crotty and Miller (2012)—I show that bureaucrats are more likely to lobby indirectly where 
agency capacity is low, perhaps because they are better able to wield direct influence where 
agencies have better reputations. My findings on the effects of legislative professionalism are 
unexpected; they do not straightforwardly support the idea that bureaucrats should be more likely 
to lobby indirectly where legislative capacity is low. And while I find support for my prediction 
that bureaucrats who agree with governors on Medicaid legislation are more likely to solicit 
lobbying support as gubernatorial power decreases, I also find evidence suggesting the 
possibility that bureaucrats who disagree with powerful governors may lobby indirectly to 
subvert those governors. 
These findings about conditions that both dampen and encourage bureaucratic activism 
extend the public administration and political science literatures on bureaucrats because they 
help make nuanced statements about bureaucratic power. These findings also contribute to the 
Medicaid literature because they add to our understanding of bureaucratic involvement in states' 
policy decision-making. Policy research can benefit from careful consideration of bureaucrats' 
relative power and relationships with other actors, as well as how these factors may affect their 
influence in the legislative arena. In addition, I build on my findings about the conditions that 
make indirect bureaucratic lobbying more likely—specifically, those related to policy agreement 
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and governors—by conducting additional qualitative analysis that accounts for the policy content 
of Medicaid legislation. This analysis suggests that Medicaid agencies are relatively activist 
around legislation than authorizes program management strategies—compared to legislation that 
authorizes cuts or expansions—and that this is particularly true of agencies that have political 
identities that are separate from governors. This approach to investigating proactive bureaucratic 
behavior further grounds my findings in the Medicaid context and reveals unexpected but 
interesting intra-executive branch dynamics.
The remainder of this dissertation proceeds as follows. In Chapter 2, I elaborate on the 
theory of indirect bureaucratic lobbying that I sketch above. I note the ways in which previous 
literature and the exploratory interviews inform my predictions about conditions that increase the 
likelihood of indirect bureaucratic lobbying, and I offer a set of testable hypotheses. In Chapter 
3, I provide details on the design of the original telephone survey of interest group leaders and 
describe the process of conducting the survey. Chapter 4 provides details on the survey data as 
well as independent variables from other sources. I explore the data in this chapter, presenting 
descriptive statistics and a series of bivariate relationships. Chapter 5 presents the results of the 
quantitative analyses that test my hypotheses, and Chapter 6 focuses on investigating the 
applicability of different lobbying theories. In Chapter 7, I present a thematic qualitative analysis 
of information contained in open-ended survey questions. This analysis accounts for Medicaid 
policy content and helps to contextualize the analysis of bureaucratic behavior in my policy area 
of interest. Finally, Chapter 8 summarizes the dissertation and suggests multiple avenues for 
future research.
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Chapter 2: A Theory of Indirect Bureaucratic Lobbying
In this chapter, I elaborate a theory of indirect bureaucratic lobbying based on the costs 
and benefits to bureaucrats of political engagement. I define “indirect bureaucratic lobbying” as 
bureaucrats' attempts to leverage interest group lobbying power, whereas “direct lobbying” refers 
to bureaucrats' own legislative lobbying. I focus on bureaucrats' behavior surrounding Medicaid 
policy proposals taken up by state legislatures, regardless of where they originated and regardless 
of the nature of federal approval. 
When engaging in the legislative process, Medicaid bureaucrats face two related 
decisions: whether to engage reactively or proactively, and how to exert influence on legislative 
deliberations. Bureaucrats may react to legislative activity by explaining the agency's position on 
Medicaid legislation, by providing testimony or other presentations, or otherwise responding to 
legislators' requests for information. If bureaucrats also engage in the legislative process in a 
proactive way, they may do so indirectly, by mobilizing interest groups, or directly, by lobbying 
legislators. The choice to behave proactively may be an independent one, or it may be a response 
to the encouragement of superiors in the executive branch who would like to see a certain 
legislative outcome. 
In practice, bureaucrats' “reactive” and “proactive” communications may constitute 
significantly different modes of behavior or they might be observationally equivalent. A clear 
example of proactive direct lobbying might be a bureaucrat's recommendation to a legislator that 
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she vote a certain way on a bill. In contrast, a conversation in which a bureaucrat emphasizes the 
expected benefits of a policy might be either reactive or proactive, depending on who initiated 
the conversation and other intangibles. Many bureaucrats are very careful to publicly maintain a 
reactive stance. Interestingly, while the view that bureaucrats should not attempt to influence 
legislative policy is widespread, it appears to arise from norms rather than codified rules at the 
state level. In some states, these norms are so strong that they are mistaken for laws. As one of 
my survey respondents said, “State agency heads and employees are restricted in the state from 
advocating. That's in the Constitution.” However, the state's constitution makes no mention of 
this, and neither does the state's code.1 
Likewise, a large body of political science research takes for granted the idea that 
agencies are essentially reactive entities. From a principal-agent perspective, purposefully 
exerting influence on the legislative process is outside of bureaucrats' contractual bounds. The 
foundational assumption in this literature is that legislatures influence agencies, not the other 
way around (Weingast 1984; Weingast & Moran 1983). Legislatures pass laws to direct 
bureaucratic activity; the degree and limits of agency policy authority are, theoretically, for 
legislators (and other principals) to determine (Bawn 1997; Epstein & O'Halloran 1996; Huber & 
Shipan 2002). 
In contrast, public administration research emphasizes bureaucratic power—mainly with 
respect to policy implementation—and frequently notes bureaucratic involvement in the 
1 Federal law restricting the political behavior of executive branch agencies is generally interpreted to prohibit 
federal bureaucrats from using government funds to lobby, and from conducting “substantial grassroots lobbying
—campaigns using telegrams, letters, or other forms of communication that directly or indirectly encourage the 
public to contact members of Congress in support of, or in opposition to, legislation” (USDA Ethics Webmaster). 
Whether indirect bureaucratic lobbying by state Medicaid bureaucrats would be considered “substantial 
grassroots lobbying” is unclear, as is the degree to which this particular law applies to state bureaucrats. And as 
the USDA guidance notes, “the Department of Justice, responsible for enforcing 18 U.S.C. 1913, has not 
prosecuted anyone since the statute was enacted in 1919” (ibid).
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legislative process as well (Aberbach, Putnam & Rockman 1981; Abney & Lauth 1986; Bowling 
& Wright 1998; Rieselbach 1995; Rourke 1984; Wilson 1989/2000). And there are a growing 
number of political science studies on agency-legislative relations that speak directly to the 
principal-agent literature and the “legislative dominance” perspective. These studies detail 
different ways in which bureaucrats influence legislative policy and the level of discretion 
granted to their agencies (Carpenter 2001; Eisner 1993; Krause 1996, 1999, 2003; Nicholson-
Crotty & Miller 2012). It is within this latter group of studies that I situate my research.
The chapter proceeds as follows: I first detail the costs and benefits of bureaucrats' 
political activism in general and then discuss the probability that bureaucrats incur these costs 
and benefits by conducting indirect lobbying. Next, I consider the ways in which micro-level 
factors (policies, groups) and macro-level factors (state institutions) may affect bureaucrats' cost-
benefit calculations about indirect lobbying. In general, the micro-level factors help to explain 
which interest groups are likely to be the targets of indirect bureaucratic lobbying, whereas the 
macro-level factors help to explain which bureaucrats are likely to engage in this behavior. 
Where applicable, I also note how my findings from a set of eleven in-depth interviews with 
state bureaucrats and lobbyists informed or supported the theory. I interviewed two health 
department bureaucrats and two consumer advocates in each of two Midwestern states. I also 
spoke with a Medicaid director in a Western state and a former Medicaid director in a Western 
state with additional experience in several other states. In addition, I spoke with an official with 
the National Association of Medicaid Directors (NAMD). These interviews also helped me plan 
for a systematic study; I detail interview findings related to survey development in Chapter 3.
25
Benefits and Costs of Political Engagement
Benefits to Bureaucrats
Given the strength of the norms that define the boundaries of acceptable behavior for 
most bureaucrats, why would a bureaucrat attempt to influence her legislative principals? The 
most general benefit of proactive engagement in the legislative process is the increased 
likelihood of desired policy outcomes. Medicaid bureaucrats are, relative to other actors in state 
politics, experts on Medicaid policy; I assume that they care about the details of Medicaid 
programs and that this factors into choices about whether and how to engage in the legislative 
process. In making this assumption, I generalize about Medicaid bureaucrats since the strength 
and source of policy motivation undoubtedly vary at the individual level. Possible individual 
motivations for influencing policy may include ideology or professional norms (Wilson 
1989/2000), or career ambition (Teodoro 2007), among others. I assume that these individual 
motivations are heterogeneous in source and intensity. 
Bureaucrats' preferred outcomes may take a number of legislative forms: bureaucrats may 
want to kill non-preferred bills, increase the chances of passage for preferred bills, or change 
certain legislative language. For example, preventing the passage of non-preferred legislation 
could help bureaucrats avoid implementation of bad policy. Bureaucrats do have alternatives to 
helping to prevent the passage of legislation, such as implementing policies slowly or partially, 
but these alternatives carry their own political risks. More generally, bureaucrats may also want 
to prevent the passage of legislation in order to help them maintain policy autonomy. The idea 
that agencies are interested in maintaining high degrees of administrative discretion—and, by 
extension, lower levels of political control over their activities—is consistent with the conception 
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of bureaucracies in multiple strands of the literature. Both scholars who emphasize the benefits 
of bureaucrats' expertise (e.g., Heclo 1974; Mashaw 1985) and those who emphasize the dangers 
of “administrative dominance” (e.g., Niskanen 1971; Lowi 1979) focus on bureaucratic control 
over policy.
Conversely, working toward the goal of passing particular statutory language or budget 
allocations can provide bureaucrats with the resources or authority they need to implement 
desirable policies. Codification in statute can also make desired policies more permanent because 
a statute is generally more difficult to change than an administrative rule. Increased permanency 
may be desirable where bargaining environments are more adversarial or budgetary pressures 
more acute since political principals may be tempted to react by slashing programs. The idea that 
bureaucrats might actively pursue legislative direction in the form of statutory language is much 
less frequently discussed than the idea that they desire freedom from legislative direction. But 
Rieselbach (1985) points out that agencies have reason to lobby both against legislative 
proposals they oppose and for proposals they support. And Krause (2003; 2010) discusses 
several scenarios under which agencies might want less discretion rather than more. However, he 
focuses on agencies' desire to avoid risk to the agency under conditions of policy uncertainty or 
agency stress. All else equal, it may indeed be politically safer for Medicaid agency leaders to 
obtain legislative authorization for certain policies rather than rely on their own administrative 
authority, especially since Medicaid programs are constantly buffeted by budgetary pressures and 
ideological conflict. However, Krause does not consider that Medicaid leaders might also be 
concerned with risk to the policy—in his view, agencies demand either more or less agency 
discretion rather than the absence or presence of specific policy authorizations. I depart from this 
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slightly in that I focus on Medicaid leaders' policy motivations as I consider their propensities to 
involve themselves in legislative decision-making.
Costs to Bureaucrats
Costs of attempting to influence legislative decision-making include the potential to 
anger principals, the opportunity cost involved in political activity, and the cost of spending 
political capital on a particular policy issue. By far the most important of these is the risk of 
angering principals, of being seen as insubordinate. This risk could accrue to either the agency as 
a whole or to the individual bureaucrat. And while my research focuses on bureaucrats' attempts 
to influence legislative policy, bureaucratic political engagement has the potential to anger either 
legislators or principals in the executive branch. 
Depending on state norms for bureaucratic behavior and governors' preferences for 
controlling the legislative process, bureaucratic engagement in the legislative process may not be 
welcome even if it supports proposals preferred by members of the executive branch. The risk to 
individual bureaucrats of angering superiors in the executive branch is straightforward: if the 
bureaucrat is appointed, there is a clear risk of dismissal. However, even where there are strong 
civil service systems and the bureaucrat is not appointed, political engagement that angers 
superiors could result in demotion, missed opportunities for promotion, loss of responsibility and 
authority, or simply conflict and discomfort at work. 
The risks to individual bureaucrats of angering legislative principals are less 
straightforward. It is easy to see that costs of political engagement can accrue to agencies since 
legislators have the power to reduce agency autonomy and budget allocations if they deem 
bureaucratic behavior inappropriate. Reputational losses within the statehouse could be 
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exacerbated by corresponding loss of reputation among interest groups, or through negative 
media coverage, or both. Loss of agency reputation clearly makes it more difficult for 
bureaucrats to realize their preferred policy outcomes. With respect to individual bureaucrats, 
legislators cannot force a bureaucrat to resign just because they feel she has overstepped her 
bounds. On the other hand, executive branches may be less inclined to support bureaucrats who 
have cost themselves their effectiveness in the legislature. As Krause (1996; 1999) shows in his 
examination of securities and antitrust regulation, legislative and executive controls over 
agencies are interdependent, at least when it comes to budgetary controls—it is plausible to 
assume that this interdependence could extend to other types of controls. In addition, there is 
some evidence to suggest that oversight hearings have an effect on agency behavior (Furlong 
1998; Wood & Waterman 1991; 1993). Embarrassment in oversight hearings (or hearings on 
pending legislation) may also impose significant personal and professional costs for individual 
bureaucrats.
In addition to the potential to anger principals, less severe costs include the opportunity 
cost of political engagement and the cost of spending political capital. Simply stated, time spent 
on political activity is time not available for program management. For many Medicaid 
administrators, heavy workloads combined with the unpredictability of legislative politics may 
mean that engagement in the legislative process is a bad risk, to be undertaken when policies are 
of extreme importance or not at all. Similarly, bureaucrats—like any political actor—must 
choose their fights wisely. Political partnerships that build trust through successful teamwork or 
the exchange of favors can increase political capital in the long-term. In the short term, specific 
requests for support for a particular policy from legislators (direct lobbying) or interest groups 
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(indirect lobbying) can alert those actors to policy outcomes of mutual interest. On the other 
hand, specific requests for support can also use up available capital in the short term. Bureaucrats 
must consider carefully which legislative issues are worthy of time and political capital 
expenditures.
Focusing on Indirect Bureaucratic Lobbying
The potential to realize the benefits and incur the costs discussed above holds for both 
direct and indirect forms of bureaucratic influence. However, there are several reasons to expect 
that, all else equal, the probability of reaping benefits is higher for indirect lobbying and the 
probability of incurring costs is lower. First, the majority of indirect bureaucratic lobbying occurs 
when Medicaid bureaucrats ask interest groups to support executive branch positions. This type 
of indirect lobbying is akin to coalition lobbying, whereby engaging lobbying partners can 
diversify the information available to legislators (Phinney 2010). Coalition expansion can make 
the case for or against a policy more convincing, or provide legislators with political cover for a 
decision they already want to make. This strategy may be especially important in the Medicaid 
context: previous research has shown that forming alliances is a key lobbying strategy for 
interest groups that work on social welfare and citizen issues (Hojnacki 1997; Phinney 2010). As 
a simple example, if legislators know that the Medicaid agency supports a policy and they also 
hear that influential interest groups support it, the probability that they authorize the policy will 
increase.2 
Second, indirect lobbying can also amplify bureaucrats' power to counteract or support 
executive branch proposals. Political science research often bundles governors with the agencies 
2 Legislators' awareness of a Medicaid agency's position is not necessarily the result of direct bureaucratic 
lobbying—it may be a result of information that bureaucrats provide in a reactive way. 
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they oversee (e.g., Huber & Shipan 2002), in part because estimating their respective preferences 
is very difficult. But viewing the executive branch as a monolithic entity can elide important 
differences in the way bureaucrats and executive branch leaders approach Medicaid. In 
particular, governors may care more about how Medicaid fits into overall state budgets and the 
politics of Medicaid proposals, whereas Medicaid bureaucrats may be more likely to have 
policy-centric preferences that take complex operational details into account. These differing 
viewpoints and priorities create the potential for policy conflict between governors and Medicaid 
bureaucrats. In the event that governors make policy or budget proposals that bureaucrats dislike, 
individual bureaucrats have little power to directly lobby legislators to vote down a policy 
proposal. Yet bureaucrats may still be able to solicit private-sector lobbying support for their 
position. 
Medicaid bureaucrats are not only more likely to realize policy success through indirect 
lobbying than direct lobbying, but are also less likely to incur high costs. This is mainly because 
bureaucrats' requests for interest group support are less likely to be visible to unsupportive 
political principals than direct bureaucratic lobbying. Even if some principals encourage or 
support bureaucrats' engagement in the legislative process, not all of them do. Principals on the 
same side of a policy issue may think bureaucratic engagement is inappropriate, and principals 
on the opposing side will not want bureaucrats to actively oppose preferred policies.3 Proactive 
engagement in the legislative process is therefore inherently risky, but bureaucrats may be able to 
issue subtle requests for interest group support that go entirely unnoticed by political principals.
Given the higher likelihood of realizing success and avoiding costs by engaging in 
3 There is some (qualitative) evidence from my survey suggesting that certain governors are very interested in 
controlling interbranch bargaining and do not support proactive agency behavior regardless of the agency's 
position on a policy. I touch on this theme in Chapter 5 and elaborate on it in Chapter 7.
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indirect lobbying—as compared to direct lobbying—why wouldn't bureaucrats always choose to 
lobby indirectly? The answer is that benefits are never assured, risk is usually present, and 
multiple factors affect each bureaucrat's assessment of the benefits and risks associated with 
indirect lobbying on a particular bill. These factors include characteristics of Medicaid policies, 
interest groups, governors, legislatures, and Medicaid agencies. For example, where bureaucrats 
work in agencies with very good reputations, direct lobbying may be relatively effective and 
efficient, so we should be less likely to find evidence of indirect lobbying. Where bureaucrats 
and interest groups disagree on particular policies, it may be difficult for bureaucrats to ask for 
interest groups' support. In the remainder of this chapter, I discuss the ways in which I expect 
each of these factors to affect bureaucrats' estimates of the benefits and costs associated with 
indirect lobbying, and the resulting effect these conditions should have on the likelihood that 
bureaucrats engage with legislatures in this way.
Micro-Level Factors
In this section, I consider characteristics of Medicaid policies and interest groups. These 
factors largely affect which interest groups are likely to become the targets of bureaucrats' 
requests for lobbying support. I focus first on bureaucrat-lobbyist alignment on policy and then 
on interest group power. 
Mutual Policy Goals
If Medicaid bureaucrats are willing to solicit lobbying support from interest groups, 
which groups should we expect them to ask for help? Here I consider three different models of 
interest group lobbying, discussing the extent to which they are likely to accurately describe 
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indirect bureaucratic lobbying. Sorting through the applicability of these models helps to predict 
both which groups will be the targets of bureaucrats' requests for support and how bureaucrats 
attempt to elicit that support. One contribution of this research to the literature on bureaucratic 
power is that it proposes and tests a specific mechanism for influence. Therefore, in this 
discussion and the related empirical analyses, in Chapters 5 and 6, I attempt to be as specific as 
possible about the lobbying mechanism at work in indirect bureaucratic lobbying. 
The first question is whether bureaucrats tend to target groups who agree with them or 
whether they approach undecided or opposing groups, consistent with the theory that lobbyists 
persuade legislators to vote their way (Austen-Smith & Wright 1994; Hansen 1991; Wright 
1996/2003). In a persuasion story, Medicaid bureaucrats would use technical or programmatic 
information to convince uncertain, uncommitted, or even opposed interest group leaders to 
change their preferences, and to lobby legislators on that basis. In other words, if the persuasion 
model fits I would expect to see bureaucrats approach interest group leaders who are neutral or 
opposed. While recent lobbying scholarship has moved away from persuasion, this model is not 
merely a strawman in this context. We know that Medicaid bureaucrats do talk to lobbyists who 
don't agree with them: federal regulations require that Medicaid bureaucrats meet regularly with 
stakeholder groups to discuss proposed policy changes, and Medicaid policy is frequently 
contentious. If Medicaid information is significant enough and interest groups do not have strong 
preferences on a particular issue, then bureaucrats may be able to change lobbyists' minds. This 
scenario is easier to imagine if the interest group is not routinely involved in Medicaid policy—
for example, a chamber of commerce rather than a hospital association. In the case that 
bureaucrats successfully persuade a group like a chamber of commerce to lobby on a preferred 
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Medicaid policy, the payoff may be much higher than if bureaucrats secure lobbying support 
from an ally already primed to lobby. 
However, effectively targeting “fence-sitters” or interest groups with opposing 
preferences is likely to be a rare opportunity for bureaucrats. Health lobbyists are not equivalent 
to low-information legislators with committee assignments in multiple policy areas, dependent 
on outside information in order to develop opinions. Given that health lobbyists typically already 
have well formed opinions, changing their preferences should be difficult. In addition, 
approaching non-allies should also be more costly for bureaucrats than targeting allies. This is so 
not only because persuading is hard work, but also because there is a higher risk of paying costs 
associated with having their political engagement exposed by non-ally interest groups. 
Furthermore, persuading a non-ally group may use up more of bureaucrats' political capital than 
making a request of an ally if the group sees their lobbying as a favor or concession to 
bureaucrats. Given the uncertainty of achieving a high payoff and the potentially high costs 
associated with persuasion, I expect to see that bureaucrats usually target lobbyists who share 
their objectives.
If it is true that policy alignment usually characterizes bureaucrat – interest group 
lobbying alliances, identifying areas of agreement can help us predict which groups bureaucrats 
will ask for support. I have systematic data on policy agreement and am therefore able to test its 
prevalence in indirect bureaucratic lobbying (Chapters 5 and 6). But deciding that bureaucrats 
usually contact allies still does not tell us what bureaucrats do when they approach those allies, 
or, in other words, how they elicit lobbying support. There are two main theoretical possibilities 
for the mechanism at work here: information subsidy and activation.
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First, I consider the information subsidy theory of lobbying developed by Hall and 
Deardorff (2006). Previous lobbying theories—notably those focused on persuasion, as discussed 
above, and on the exchange of campaign contributions for legislative activity (Snyder 1992, 
McCarty & Rothenberg 1996)—did not fully explain why lobbyists generally target their 
legislative allies. Hall and Deardorff make sense of the puzzle of “friendly” lobbying by arguing 
that lobbyists target those who (strongly) agree with them about particular policies: “[t]he 
proximate objective of this strategy is not to change legislators' minds but to assist natural allies 
in achieving their own, coincident objectives” (69). They argue that lobbyists can mobilize 
legislative allies by providing policy or political information that increases legislators' ability to 
act on behalf of a mutually preferred policy.
 Does this theory extend to indirect bureaucratic lobbying, a two-stage lobbying process in 
which bureaucrats ask interest groups to lobby legislators (put another way, they lobby lobbyists 
to lobby)? If so, we should see Medicaid bureaucrats attempting to partner with lobbyists where 
there are higher levels of bureaucrat-lobbyist agreement on particular policies. We should also 
see that Medicaid bureaucrats share information with lobbyist allies, or in Hall and Deardorff's 
terms, that Medicaid bureaucrats somehow supply a “matching grant,” offering policy 
information or political intelligence that helps to offset the requested lobbying effort. 
Theoretically, bureaucrats are capable of providing policy information to lobbyists—after all, 
relative even to lobbyists who specialize in health issues, Medicaid bureaucrats are policy 
specialists in Medicaid. Provider and consumer groups may have several different focus areas 
within health policy, but Medicaid staff focus on Medicaid more exclusively. They also have 
more exclusive access to federal officials at the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
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(CMS), which sets guidelines for operating and changing state Medicaid programs. Medicaid 
bureaucrats may also be able to supply lobbyists with political intelligence, for example by 
reporting that certain legislators are opposed to a preferred policy. 
Providing interest groups with substantial information subsidies, however, may not 
always be necessary for indirect bureaucratic lobbying around Medicaid. One reason that 
information subsidies are an important tool in the context of interest groups' legislative lobbying 
is that subsidies can shift legislative priorities by increasing legislators' ability to work on a 
particular policy. In contrast, in the context of indirect bureaucratic lobbying, Medicaid policy is 
already a key priority for many interest groups. Moreover, many resource-rich groups (like 
hospital associations) may possess more political and policy information than bureaucrats. Thus, 
in some circumstances, interest groups may be both willing and able to lobby in partnership with 
Medicaid bureaucrats in the absence of information subsidies from those bureaucrats. Therefore, 
while I expect that policy agreement between bureaucrats and interest groups should almost 
always be present in indirect bureaucratic lobbying, information subsidies may not be. In other 
words, while I expect to see that agreement is generally necessary for indirect bureaucratic 
lobbying, it is not yet clear whether information subsidies are also necessary.
What would Medicaid bureaucrats' subsidy-free requests for support from ally interest 
groups look like? The third possible lobbying model, after persuasion and information subsidy, is 
a simple activation (or mobilization) story. I define “activation” in this context as bureaucrats' 
requests for interest group lobbying support where bureaucrats and groups agree on policy but 
where bureaucrats do not provide information subsidies to groups. The possibility that this 
accurately describes indirect bureaucratic lobbying presents some theoretical challenges in that it 
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departs somewhat from the extant literature on legislative lobbying. Most lobbying theories 
focus either on how lobbyists make legislators more willing (via incentives or persuasive 
information) or more able (via information subsidies) to work on behalf of lobbyists' priorities. 
Other than Hall and Deardorff, researchers observing that lobbyists often contact legislative 
allies have not specified a mechanism for what lobbyists do to elicit support (e.g., Hoijnacki & 
Kimball 1998; 1999).4,5 To my knowledge, there are no existing models that clearly outline a 
specific mechanism underlying subsidy-free mobilization of interest groups' legislative allies. 
Yet I argue that the idea that bureaucrats can sometimes activate like-minded interest 
groups is realistic: where bureaucrats and interest groups agree on desired policy outcomes, it is 
in their mutual interests to coordinate their engagement with legislators because legislators are 
the key decision-makers; coordinated advocacy can thus increase the chances of realizing the 
preferred outcome. The mutual dependence of Medicaid bureaucrats and health interest groups in 
the legislative arena—over the short or long term—means that Medicaid bureaucrats can simply 
ask for allied interest groups' help. Certainly, some groups may already be primed to lobby the 
same issue, but bureaucrats may not be certain of their intent to lobby or the degree of planned 
4 One could argue that Austen-Smith and Wright (1994) provide another plausible theory to explain why lobbyists 
contact legislative allies. Austen-Smith and Wright argue that lobbyists lobby allies in order to counteract the 
lobbying of groups on the other side of an issue. However, they build this argument on a foundation of 
persuasive lobbying. In their story, the lobbyists doing most of the mobilizing are not the allies of legislators but 
rather the persuaders. 
5 Another explanation for the preponderance of evidence showing that lobbyists contact allies is that proposed by 
Kollman (1997), who shows that interest groups working in a particular issue area have ideologies similar to 
those of the legislative committees they work with most closely. Thurs, agreement does not reflect lobbyists' 
choice of which legislators to contact as much as it reflects the bias of both legislators and lobbyists working in a 
given policy area. Kollman interprets this finding as evidence of the subgovernment model of policymaking, 
although he does not test the ideologies of bureaucrats, the remaining actors in subgovernments (or “iron 
triangles”). My research has many similarities to the subgovernment model, in which bureaucrats, legislators, 
and interest groups working together in a policy area have significant influence on policy outcomes. However, I 
argue that the ideological consonance Kollman finds between interest groups and legislators is unlikely to 
explain bureaucrats' requests for interest group support in the Medicaid context. As I discuss above, 
disagreement between bureaucrats and interest groups about Medicaid policy is a real and common occurrence; 
indirect bureaucratic lobbying is more likely to reflect bureaucrat-lobbyist policy agreement than ideological 
similarity.
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effort, so it still makes sense for bureaucrats to mention to interest groups that a particular policy 
needs private-sector support. Subsidy-free activation of interest group allies may be very simple 
in practice, consisting only of statements such as “this bill is going to be a heavy lift” or “we 
need your help on this policy.” I provide real-world examples of such requests in Chapter 6.
The idea that mutual dependence on policy outcomes shapes lobbying relationships is 
related to (but not a perfect match for) Ainsworth's (1997) model of “lobbying enterprises.” 
Ainsworth argues that legislators structure “semi-institutionalized” lobbying groups that rely on 
long-term relationships to “reduce the ubiquitous uncertainty and costliness associated with 
ongoing interactions” between lobbyists and legislators (p. 518). Long-term relationships and 
some degree of mutual dependence between Medicaid agencies and health lobbyists are also 
important in the indirect bureaucratic lobbying context, although I argue that bureaucrat-group 
coordination on Medicaid advocacy depends on a host of factors and is inherently less stable 
than the enterprises Ainsworth proposes. Medicaid lobbying enterprises may indeed structure 
relationships over the long term but are not likely to determine, for example, whether a 
bureaucrat asks a hospital association for help on a particular bill, because policy agreement on 
that bill is still the overriding determining factor dictating whether indirect bureaucratic lobbying 
occurs. Thus, I argue, short-term mutual dependence is more important.
 If information subsidy and activation are both realistic as mechanisms for indirect 
bureaucratic lobbying, how can we predict when bureaucrats are likely to use one versus the 
other? One way to distinguish these strategies might be to ask whether bureaucrats are likely to 
have more policy information at their disposal than their interest group allies. That is, if groups 
have relatively low information resources, we might expect bureaucrats to subsidize them when 
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they ask for lobbying support. If groups have relatively high information resources, which is 
likely to be the case for certain provider associations, we might expect bureaucrats to simply 
activate them. Interest groups of all types are equally likely to have political information about 
the legislation they are interested in, so here I focus on access to technical or legal information 
about Medicaid. I do not have systematic survey evidence on the presence of information 
subsidies, although I do have some illustrative information that I use to explore the possibility of 
group resources as a distinguishing factor (Chapter 6). By extension, it also seems possible that 
Medicaid agencies with higher professional capacity are more likely to be able to provide 
subsidies of policy information to all types of interest groups; whether this is true is a question 
for future research.
Turning to interview responses related to the nature of bureaucrat-group coordination on 
advocacy, the interviews generally support the idea that policy agreement matters. There were no 
contradictory views expressed, and no characterizations of persuasion. One provider association 
executive in a Midwestern state described legislative strategy sessions in which agreement 
between the two parties was assumed as existing or potential. And while one of the bureaucrat 
respondents in a different Midwestern interview state generally denied that collaborating with 
interest groups on legislative policy is important, he also said that in rare cases, a “Navy Seals” 
approach to important legislation is required. In those instances, he might call a powerful ally, 
like a major provider association, to coordinate on lobbying strategy. Such a phone call would be 
placed on the assumption that there is agreement between the interest group and bureaucrat: 
“[t]he agency already knows where [the provider association] is.” It is not clear from this 
description whether this is an example of information subsidy or activation.
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The comments of interview participants provide some support for the idea that 
information subsidies are not always present (as do survey transcripts, detailed in Chapter 5). 
Unsurprisingly, all four advocates I spoke with feel that they have more political information 
than bureaucrats, including more information on where particular legislators stand on a policy. 
Most of the advocates I spoke with also do not feel that they need bureaucrats for policy 
information. On occasion, the advocate interview subjects trade policy and political information 
with bureaucrats, but bureaucrats were not the first source they mentioned. Other sources of 
policy information mentioned include advocates' own expertise, experience, national groups, 
observations in other states, and advocacy coalition partners. For example, when I asked a 
provider association leader in one of the Midwestern interview states about what the Medicaid 
agency brings to the table when agency staff request his help, he acknowledged that sometimes 
they bring policy information. But this respondent asserts that the agency more often comes to 
this group with hat in hand: 
But sometimes they're bringing requests for help – modeling financial scenarios. In the 
old days, the department would do the modeling of a policy or payment change. Now 
they try to outsource it to us. We have the resources for that and they don't anymore.
In his view, there has been pressure on the state to reduce staffing and other overhead and a 
corresponding exodus of experts from the bureaucracy. 
In summary, each of the three relevant models of lobbying—persuasion, information 
subsidy, and activation—might sometimes accurately describe indirect bureaucratic lobbying. 
Persuasion surely happens, although I expect this to be the least common mechanism employed 
by bureaucrats to elicit interest group lobbying. Instead, I expect that indirect bureaucratic 
lobbying is more likely to occur where there is policy alignment between bureaucrats and interest 
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groups. In Chapters 5 and 6, I conduct systematic tests of Hypothesis 1: 
Bureaucrats are more likely to solicit interest group lobbying on a particular policy if 
bureaucrats and interest groups agree on that policy. This effect will hold regardless of 
states' institutional characteristics.
This hypothesis test can rule out the widespread use of persuasion, but it cannot distinguish 
between the information subsidy theory or a simpler activation scenario. In Chapter 6, I also 
present preliminary evidence on the existence of information subsidies. I expect that bureaucrats 
are more likely to extend information subsidies where groups have fewer resources or the policy 
is relatively simple. In addition, tests of Hypothesis 1 shed light on whether agreement is always 
important, or only at certain levels of institutional capacity. 
Interest Group Power
 State-based interest groups that lobby on Medicaid issues generally fall into two 
categories, representing either commercial entities (whether for-profit or non-profit) or 
consumers. Health service provider associations are the most common type in the former 
category, although individual providers, insurance companies, and other business associations 
like chambers of commerce also lobby on Medicaid. On the consumer side, most active 
consumer advocacy groups active on Medicaid represent the interests of poor, but some, like 
state AARP branches, represent wider cross-sections of the people residing in a given state.
Bureaucrats' solicitation of lobbying support should depend not only on agreement with 
interest groups on particular Medicaid policies, as discussed above, but also on the type of group. 
Provider associations typically have more lobbying power than consumer advocacy groups 
because provider associations, and other associations of commercial entities, have more 
resources. Provider associations are also uniquely able to make policy arguments on the basis of 
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both business considerations and consumer or social considerations, whereas consumer advocacy 
groups are usually restricted to making arguments about the needs of the poor. Hospital 
associations in particular represent organizations that are large employers and key drivers of 
local economies; most also have political action committees that help to finance legislators' 
election campaigns. If provider associations have more power with legislators, then, bureaucrats 
are more likely to realize the benefit of preferred policy outcomes if they rely more heavily on 
provider groups' lobbying than consumer advocates' lobbying. However, consumer groups 
should have more lobbying power with Democrats because they are likely to be ideologically 
aligned. Therefore, I expect that where legislatures are controlled by Democrats, provider groups 
and consumer groups should both be important targets for bureaucrats' requests for assistance. 
Where state legislatures are controlled by Republicans, bureaucrats should rely on provider 
groups more than consumer groups. Hypothesis 2 summarizes these expectations: 
Bureaucrats are more likely to request the help of provider groups than consumer 
advocacy groups, except where at least one branch of state legislatures is controlled by 
Democrats. 
It follows from this that we should also see greater use of activation than information subsidies in 
states with Republican control, although I do not have a way to test this systematically.
My interviews supported the idea that group power matters. Two of the interview 
participants, both advocates, actually emphasized group power over agreement as a reason they 
feel they are targets for indirect lobbying. Without first being asked about group power, one 
interview participant, the leader of a very liberal consumer group, stated that the Medicaid 
agency approaches him because of his effectiveness with the legislature. He stated that this was a 
more important reason for being approached than agency-group policy alignment. In particular, 
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he described being approached by the Medicaid agency for lobbying help because of the power 
his group wields with liberal legislators. Of course, this is his interpretation of the motivations of 
the Medicaid agency, rather than some objective truth, but it is consistent with my expectations 
about the ideological alignment of consumer advocacy groups and Democrats.
Macro-Level Factors
I have theorized that bureaucrat-lobbyist policy agreement and interest group power both 
facilitate indirect bureaucratic lobbying. These micro-level factors increase the likelihood of 
bureaucrats' requests for interest group lobbying because they increase the probability of benefits 
to bureaucrats. They also lower the potential costs of political engagement, since making 
requests of non-ally and/or low-power groups expends bureaucratic resources with a lower 
likelihood of payoff. These micro-level factors help me make predictions about which interest 
groups bureaucrats will target, on which legislative policies, within a given state. But across 
states, macro-level factors—states' institutional and political characteristics—should also affect 
bureaucrats' behavior, explaining which bureaucrats (i.e., in which states) are likely to engage in 
indirect bureaucratic lobbying. In this section, I consider how agency capacity, legislative 
capacity, and gubernatorial power might alter the likelihood of bureaucrats' indirect lobbying.
State Agency Capacity
Multiple scholars have argued that agency capacity is a necessary conceptual and 
analytical component of any thorough examination of agency-legislature relations (Eisner 1993; 
Krause & Woods 2013). Carpenter's (2001) research shows that Progressive Era agencies' 
reputations for expertise, in combination with their relationships with interest groups, increased 
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the agencies' independence from Congress. More recent research by Nicholson-Crotty and Miller 
(2012) takes up Carpenter's arguments and applies them to state agencies and legislatures. 
Nicholson-Crotty and Miller compare data from a survey of state legislators with data on state 
agency capacity, finding that legislators see agencies as more influential in the legislative arena 
where overall state agency capacity is higher. These works are clear on the link between high 
agency capacity and direct influence on legislators. 
But is high agency capacity a requirement for indirect lobbying? Interest groups may be 
less interested in lobbying on behalf of low-capacity Medicaid agencies. On the other other hand, 
interest groups in a particular state do not have a choice of Medicaid agencies with which to 
work, and there may be high-performing individual bureaucrats even in low capacity agencies. 
For these reasons, agency reputation may not be the factor that determines bureaucrat-interest 
group partnerships. In addition, a certain amount of agency-group interaction is predetermined 
by the federal regulations requiring Medicaid agencies to meet regularly with interest groups, so 
bureaucrats in all Medicaid agencies have opportunities to request lobbying support. 
Furthermore, bureaucrats working in lower-capacity Medicaid agencies may be more 
likely to solicit interest groups' support if they are less able to pursue direct influence strategies. 
Indirect lobbying may be the best or only way for bureaucrats to influence legislative decision-
making. Conversely, high-capacity Medicaid agencies may have more credibility with interest 
groups, but they also have more credibility with legislatures, reducing the need for bureaucrats to 
spend political capital with interest groups. On balance, then, we should see that individual 
bureaucrats are more likely to leverage individual relationships with lobbyists where agency 
capacity is low.
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However, the effect of agency capacity on indirect bureaucratic lobbying should also 
depend on the existence of bureaucrat-lobbyist agreement on policy. Where agency capacity is 
low but bureaucrat-lobbyist agreement is also low, bureaucrats are unlikely to attempt to leverage 
interest group power because they do not have interest group allies. This should be true 
regardless of whether bureaucrats subsidize interest groups when they ask for help, or merely 
activate, or both. The interdependence of agency capacity and bureaucrat-lobbyist policy 
agreement gives rise to Hypothesis 3: 
Bureaucrats are more likely to solicit interest group lobbying in states where agency 
capacity is low, but this effect is conditional on high bureaucrat-agency agreement.
 
This hypothesis therefore makes a slightly different prediction about the effect of agreement than 
Hypothesis 1. I state this conditional prediction in another way using Table 2.1.












Next, I consider the possible effect of legislative capacity on bureaucrats' propensities for 
indirect lobbying. In states where there is low legislative capacity—measured by session length, 
legislative staff, term limits, and other factors—legislators should be more dependent on external 
sources of policy expertise, including both bureaucrats and interest groups. Medicaid policy is 
complex, and making judgments about statutory language, budget requirements, and policy 
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effects is costly for legislators (Huber & Shipan 2002). Where legislative capacity is low, 
bureaucrats should be motivated to intervene in legislative decision-making order to forestall bad 
decisions and/or increase the likelihood of preferred policy. Again, this should be true regardless 
of whether bureaucrats subsidize interest groups when they ask for help, or merely activate, or 
both—either way, lobbyists will use their relatively high information levels to subsidize 
legislators.6
As with agency capacity, the effect of low legislative capacity on indirect bureaucratic 
lobbying should depend on the existence of bureaucrat-lobbyist agreement on policy. Where 
legislative capacity is low but bureaucrat-lobbyist agreement is also low, bureaucrats may want 
to increase legislators' information levels but do not have lobbyist allies from whom they can 
request help. Bureaucrats are most likely to ask interest groups for assistance if legislative 
capacity is low and if there is bureaucrat-lobbyist agreement on policy. Where legislative 
capacity is high and agreement is high, bureaucrats and interest groups may agree on policy, but 
increasing legislators' information levels is less crucial. Hypothesis 4 summarizes these 
predictions: 
Bureaucrats are more likely to solicit interest group lobbying in states where legislative 
capacity is low, but this effect is conditional on high bureaucrat-lobbyist agreement. 
I state these predictions another way in Table 2.2.
6 Although I do not examine direct lobbying in this dissertation, we should, for the reasons discussed above, also 
expect that bureaucrats in states with low legislative capacity conduct more direct lobbying. We might further 
expect the degree of direct bureaucratic lobbying in low-capacity legislatures to depend on agency reputation. 
However, in their examination of state-level bureaucrats' influence on legislators, Nicholson-Crotty and Miller 
(2012) find no support for their hypothesis that legislative capacity conditions the positive effect of agency 
capacity on legislators' perceptions of bureaucratic influence.
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On the other hand, we might expect that the effect of bureaucrat-lobbyist agreement 
outweighs the macro-level effect of legislative capacity. In this case, where legislative capacity is 
high and there is also high bureaucrat-lobbyist agreement, bureaucrats may issue requests for 
support simply because legislative policy is important and because lobbyist allies are available to 
help them influence it, rather than because there is a particularly big information vacuum in the 
legislature. In other words, there may be an effect of agreement independent of the effect of 
legislative capacity, consistent with Hypothesis 1. I show this prediction in Table 2.3.












Finally, characteristics of governors should also have discernible effects on bureaucrats' 
political behavior. Public administration scholars have long observed that state executive 
leadership does not exhibit the hierarchical management structure typical of other organizations
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—there are distinct limits to gubernatorial control of state agencies (Abney & Lauth 1983; 
Brudney & Hebert 1987). However, to varying degrees, governors can establish policy priorities 
(Beyle & Ferguson 2008), marshal media attention and public opinion (Brudney & Hebert 1987), 
and influence agencies through rule review (Woods 2004). In addition, gubernatorial budget and 
veto powers have generally increased since twentieth-century reforms (Beyle & Ferguson 2008) 
and states are increasingly establishing program evaluation offices that provide executives with 
detailed information about agency performance (Boerner 2002). Recent scholarship on 
gubernatorial power has shown that even the weakest governors are successful with a proportion 
of their policy initiatives, and that governors have a great deal of influence over state budgets 
(Kousser &Phillips 2012). State agency staff surely are aware of these powers even where they 
are somewhat insulated by strong merit-based personnel systems.
My pre-survey interviews supported the idea that governors' preferences and power 
strongly influence bureaucrats. One of the bureaucrats in a Midwestern interview state 
spontaneously offered the thought that governors and their preferences should influence 
bureaucrats' political communications to a larger extent than any other factor. This respondent 
has observed party-based differences in governors' tolerance for agency-interest group 
relationships, but also said that in his experience governors in general do not want agency staff 
being politically active (he put this in terms of “talking to legislators”). A different (former) 
bureaucrat stated that he has seen wide variation in governors' comfort with staff being “out in 
front” and that this should matter for indirect bureaucratic lobbying.
My theory about the influence of gubernatorial characteristics on indirect bureaucratic 
lobbying is based on the idea that formal gubernatorial powers relative to legislatures vary 
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widely across states (Beyle & Ferguson 2008; Krupnikov & Shipan 2012; Kousser & Phillips 
2012). In particular, variation in gubernatorial power relative to legislatures affects the likelihood 
that governors' policy and budget proposals succeed. I expect that where gubernatorial power is 
low relative to legislatures, the executive branch needs more political support from interest 
groups to achieve its policy objectives. Where gubernatorial power is low and agreement 
between bureaucrats and governors is high, governors should be more comfortable with 
bureaucratic activism and bureaucrats should be motivated to request support from interest 
groups. Where gubernatorial power is low and bureaucrats agree with governors on policy, 
indirect bureaucratic lobbying increases the probability of benefits to bureaucrats. Indirect 
bureaucratic lobbying is also less costly to bureaucrats than direct lobbying on gubernatorial 
proposals, since legislators should prefer to maintain their power relative to governors and might 
be intolerant of agency activism.
In contrast, where gubernatorial power is high and bureaucrat-governor agreement is 
high, bureaucrats should be less likely to lobby indirectly because there is less need for interest 
group support and asking for political favors is costly. Where gubernatorial power is high and 
agreement is low, bureaucrats might want to subvert governors, but are more likely to remain 
silent than risk the costs of insubordination. Hypothesis 5 summarizes these predictions: 
Bureaucrats are more likely to solicit interest group lobbying if gubernatorial power is 
low and bureaucrats agree with governors.
I state these predictions another way in Table 2.4.
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I expect these predictions to hold regardless of party control of state government. This 
may be a somewhat unorthodox position for a comparative study of state politics, but prominent 
studies that foreground the effects of divided government look at policy outputs (e.g., Huber & 
Shipan 2002), whereas I am interested in the bargaining leading up to those outputs. More 
importantly, I suspect that there is a certain baseline amount of interbranch tension inherent in 
managing Medicaid. Medicaid constitutes a huge and growing portion of state budgets (Cooper 
2011) and creates enormous policy challenges for all states. Therefore, I expect the effects of 
gubernatorial power and governor-bureaucrat agreement on indirect bureaucratic lobbying on 
Medicaid to be the same regardless of whether there is unified or divided government.
Lastly, I expect that governor-bureaucrat agreement matters for the openness of 
bureaucrats' requests for lobbying. Conditional on the existence of bureaucrats' requests for 
lobbying support, requests should be open if agency preferences are aligned with the governor's, 
and surreptitious if preferences are not aligned. Bureaucrats should be unlikely to conduct any 
indirect lobbying at all if they disagree with governors. But if they do lobby, and they also 
disagree with governors, we might assume that they are working to undermine gubernatorial 
proposals. In that case, I would expect them to issue very quiet appeals for lobbying help rather 
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than risk paying costs associated with insubordination. Where bureaucrats agree with governors 
and there is evidence of indirect lobbying, I expect that evidence to reveal more explicit requests 
for help. Although bureaucrats still risk angering legislators by being explicit, the risk of 
angering governors is much lower since governors and bureaucrats are working toward a 
common goal (for that matter, governors might even encourage indirect lobbying). The benefits 
of being direct about the need for lobbying in such a situation should outweigh the risk of paying 
costs associated with angering legislators. These expectations give rise to Hypothesis 6: 
Bureaucrats should request interest group support more openly if their preferences are 
aligned with governors' preferences.
Hypotheses
To summarize, I list all hypotheses about the factors I expect to condition bureaucrats' 
requests for lobbying support, based on the theory elaborated in this chapter. Hypothesis 1 makes 
a different prediction about the effect of agreement than Hypotheses 3 and 4, which predict that 
agreement and state characteristics are interdependent. I test these hypotheses against each other 
in Chapter 5.
H1: Bureaucrats are more likely to solicit interest group lobbying on a particular policy if 
bureaucrats and interest groups agree on that policy. This effect will hold regardless of 
legislative capacity or agency capacity.
H2: Bureaucrats are more likely to request the help of provider groups than consumer 
advocacy groups, except where at least one house of state legislatures is controlled by 
Democrats.
H3: Bureaucrats are more likely to solicit interest group lobbying in states where agency 
capacity is low, but this effect is conditional on high bureaucrat-lobbyist agreement.
H4: Bureaucrats are more likely to solicit interest group lobbying in states where 
legislative capacity is low, but this effect is conditional on high bureaucrat-lobbyist 
agreement.
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H5: Bureaucrats are more likely to solicit interest group lobbying if gubernatorial power 
is low and bureaucrats agree with governor. 
H6: Bureaucrats should request interest group support more openly if their preferences 
are aligned with governors' preferences.
 
In conclusion, this chapter presents a theory of indirect bureaucratic lobbying based on 
the costs and benefits to bureaucrats of political engagement. I discuss several micro-level and 
macro-level conditions that I expect to affect bureaucrats' likelihood of conducting indirect 
lobbying because they change the costs and/or benefits of doing so. In the next chapter, I use the 
survey data to test all hypotheses. 
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Chapter 3: Survey Development and Process
In order to test the hypotheses developed in Chapter 2, I created a novel dataset 
containing information on legislation-related communications between state Medicaid 
bureaucrats and state health lobbyists over the 2011 and 2012 state legislative sessions. I 
collected these data through a telephone survey of lobbyists in 25 states. The resulting dataset 
forms the centerpiece of my dissertation. In this chapter, I describe the process of developing and 
fielding the survey: first, I present findings from a set of preparatory in-depth interviews and then 
I provide details on the survey itself.
Interviews
In Chapter 2, I discuss the theory-refining evidence that I gathered from a series of in-
depth interviews with state health bureaucrats and advocates. These interviews also had an 
important practical purpose: to assess whether indirect bureaucratic lobbying is common enough 
to warrant systematic study, and, secondarily, to determine the feasibility of different survey 
strategies. In this section I present interview evidence that informed survey design. 
As described in Chapter 2, I interviewed two health department bureaucrats and two 
consumer advocates in each of two Midwestern states. I also spoke with a Medicaid director in a 
western state and a former Medicaid director in a western state with additional experience in 
several other states. I addition, I spoke with an official with the National Association of Medicaid 
Directors (NAMD). Thus, in total, I had eleven conversations with subject matter experts. 
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A Recognizable Phenomenon?
The main premise that I sought to clarify through interviews is that indirect lobbying is a 
common part of agency work and that bureaucrats should recognize and be able to talk about it. 
However, one of my initial key findings was that, of my interview subjects, lobbyists were more 
willing than bureaucrats to discuss their political communications or participation in legislative 
strategy. While half of the bureaucrat interview subjects acknowledged proactively collaborating 
with lobbyists on legislative advocacy, the other half rejected the idea of this practice (although 
one of these described occasional communications that could be interpreted as proactive 
collaboration). There was also was a mismatch, in terms of perceptions of this type of behavior, 
among the lobbyists and bureaucrats within interview states: while bureaucrat interview 
respondents in an interview state disavowed this activity, lobbyists in the same state reported that 
they engaged in it. Following I provide details on this theme from the interviews. 
 Among the (current and former) bureaucrat interview subjects, three out of six insisted 
that partnering with advocacy groups on legislation is not important and is not a meaningful part 
of their jobs. In one Midwestern interview state, the Medicaid director stated that he is able to get 
the policies he wants without the legislature.1 He has a great deal of administrative latitude since 
the program is not codified in state statute and he does not need legislative permission to create 
policy, other than through the heavily politicized budget process. He has a good relationship with 
certain interest groups, but he does not feel that he needs them to reach his policy goals.
In the other Midwestern interview state, both of the Medicaid bureaucrats I spoke with 
1 This statement, of course, does not invalidate the applicability of the principal-agent framework or negate the 
idea that this situation is of the legislature's choosing. The legislature in this state may purposely delegate a great 
deal of policy authority to this Medicaid agency. This interview subject's statements do mean, however, that he 
need not coordinate with advocates on legislative strategy—if he proactively attempts to shape policy outcomes 
he may do so at different stages of the policy development process.
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(one current, one former) do not involve themselves in the particulars of legislation, and do not 
see it as their jobs to work with advocates on legislation. The current bureaucrat in that state 
explained that bureaucrats do talk to interest groups, but “this is not an important dynamic.” He 
also explained that his agency's agenda is mainly defensive: “agency activity is mostly around 
trying to fend off random legislative activity.” However, he focuses his policy activism on the 
rules process rather than engaging in the legislative process: “I can make a law 90% different 
through rulemaking.” 
The former bureaucrat in the same state explained that the legislative liaison for the 
agency might call a legislative person at an interest group, but that he (as the Medicaid director) 
would have been unlikely to do that. He said, “I used to call interest groups on legislation and 
would just talk in terms of principles. I didn't see it as my job to reference bill numbers.” He 
further explained that these phone calls were “more about sharing information than lobbying. 
The agency already knows where the interest group is. The legislative people know. Phone calls 
are to people who know those people would agree.” This bureaucrat emphasized that he did not 
see the occasional exchange of information with advocates as an important tool for his job. 
There is some ambiguity in this respondent's statements, in that he gave examples of 
behavior that sound like indirect bureaucratic lobbying but also took pains to emphasize that he 
does not coordinate on legislation with interest groups. This may have been partly a result of the 
general way in which I asked about his communications. As Beckmann and Hall (2010) point 
out, political insiders “may not even provide accurate summary descriptions of their behavior” 
(p. 3, emphasis in the original), let alone explain it cogently. It is difficult to know exactly how to 
interpret this ambiguity; therefore, I took his disavowals at face value for the purposes of 
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informing my survey strategy. In addition, I note that some of this respondent's statements could 
be interpreted as reflecting the extension of information from the bureaucrat to the interest group 
to facilitate interest group lobbying, consistent with Hall and Deardorff's (2006) theory of 
lobbying as information subsidy, but it is not clear which way the information traveled or what 
kind of information was discussed.
In contrast with the three bureaucrat respondents who said that they generally do not 
engage in legislative strategy with interest groups, the other three bureaucrat respondents 
acknowledged doing so. One, in answer to my question about whether she communicated with 
advocacy groups during the legislative process, described the process of negotiating the agency 
budget prior to the introduction of the actual budget bill: “Yes, we work with gazillions of 
advocacy groups to find out what they want. It's an interactive process. There's information 
sharing in back rooms, while sitting dutifully at our jobs during the day.” However, this 
bureaucrat also described vote-counting, “plotting” with advocates, and “war rooms” in which 
she discusses legislative strategy with advocates after the introduction of bills. She gave an 
example of a policy authorization that she worked on proactively, saying “the committee stage is 
more important than floor. The allies counted committee votes. The war room [for an effort like 
this] would be a group I could trust.”
The other two bureaucrats who acknowledged this behavior were the current and former 
Western-state Medicaid directors. One agreed that indirect lobbying is a recognizable and 
common part of agency work, saying that this research would help “pull back the curtain on the 
process.” The other referred to “coordinating” and “collaborating” with interest groups on 
legislation, expressing surprise that all of my interview subjects did not describe instances of 
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coordinating with interest groups:
Respondent: Medicaid agencies have to be politically proactive. Even if there 
aren't policy authorizations, the budget process is never passive, can't be passive. 
Medicaid constrains so many other budgets, it touches everything, since it's an 
entitlement program. I have a hard time believing that there isn't collaboration, or 
at least some coordination, with private sector groups.”
Interviewer: Do you think this would be as much the case for policy authorizations 
as it is for appropriations?
Respondent: Yes.
In total, then, bureaucrat interview subjects' acknowledgments of strategic collaboration with 
interest groups were mixed. Enough of these bureaucrats described something like indirect 
bureaucratic lobbying to reassure me that the phenomenon exists, although it may not be 
something that bureaucrats are happy to discuss with a researcher. In some states it may not 
occur at all, if bureaucrats—like two of the above respondents—focus their strategic energy on 
rulemaking rather than legislation. Ultimately, any acknowledgement of this behavior runs 
counter to the conventional wisdom about bureaucrats and to the literature on political control of 
the bureaucracy.
Among the interest group respondents, three out of four acknowledged coordinating with 
bureaucrats on legislative policy and furthermore that this coordination is sometimes initiated by 
bureaucrats. In one of the Midwestern interview states, one advocate did not acknowledge this 
kind of strategic communication with bureaucrats. This respondent did, however, describe sitting 
down with the Medicaid director to discuss current policy issues and prepare for each meeting of 
the Medicaid Community Advisory Council, which she chairs. In a separate statement, she also 
said that the Council often advocates for policies discussed as part of its agenda. Taken together, 
these behaviors look a lot like “coordination” with the agency on legislative policy, although the 
respondent asserted that the Council does not rely on the Medicaid director's agreement to 
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engage in advocacy. The other advocate I spoke with in that state described two recent instances 
of coordinating with the Medicaid agency on legislative policy. One of these seemed to center on 
the policy content of legislation and the other on coordinating political strategy, although the 
respondent did not explicitly make that distinction. He did say that “the arrow goes both ways” 
in terms of the interest group approaching the agency and vice versa. 
In the other Midwestern interview state, in contrast with the disavowals from bureaucrats, 
both interest group respondents freely acknowledged strategic communications with bureaucrats 
about legislation. One recalled being approached by the secretary of the entire health department 
(encompassing the Medicaid agency), who asked for support on a major Medicaid budget bill. 
The other, a human-services interest group leader, said that information usually flows the other 
way. He will bring demands to the agency or governor's office or let the agency know about a 
legislative action, but “six-person” meetings on legislation are often initiated by agency directors 
and he also has relationships with (exactly) four lower-level bureaucrats who will phone him 
with information in confidence. He is sometimes asked where his coalition members stand on a 
policy, or to lobby one of his own coalition members, or to have a conversation with a 
(Democratic) member of the legislature.
Perhaps it should not be surprising that more lobbyists than bureaucrats acknowledged 
engaging in strategic communications related to legislative advocacy. After all, this is a typical 
activity for lobbyists, a central component of their work. For bureaucrats, depending on the state 
and the rules or norms proscribing bureaucratic activism, this may be quite risky to do or 
acknowledge doing, even in a confidential research interview.
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Which Bureaucrats?
Related to my initial idea that high-level Medicaid bureaucrats would be willing and able 
to discuss proactive collaboration with interest groups, I also began the interview process with 
assumptions about which bureaucrats in state Medicaid agencies would be most likely to do this
—namely, Medicaid directors and legislative liaisons. However, according to interview subjects, 
the communications and relationship-management functions of Medicaid agency staff vary by 
state.
In one of the Midwestern interview states, both bureaucrat subjects said they feel that 
engaging on legislation is both above and below their pay grade: above in that this is the 
responsibility of directors and the governor’s office, and below in that the agency hires 
legislative liaisons who get their hands dirty with political hackery so longer-term bureaucrats 
don’t have to. They see the agency's legislative liaisons as low-level political operatives rather 
than policy experts. They described Medicaid directors and the senior staff as “brain people” and 
the legislative liaisons as “mouth people.” In that same state, the two consumer advocates I 
spoke with both said they've been approached by department secretaries, and one of these also 
discussed being approached in strict confidence by lower-level Medicaid bureaucrats. 
In the other interview state, the Medicaid director said that he has a long-term collegial 
relationship with a particular provider association, but that he does not think that his own senior 
staff would go out to dinner with leaders of that association, as he does, or maintain the 
relationships in general. He seemed to characterize his staff as unconnected technocrats. 
My personal experience as a Medicaid legislative liaison in a western state slightly 
contrasts with the norms in both of these states. Unlike the legislative liaisons in the first 
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interview state mentioned above, I was expected to be a source of policy expertise, and I had 
technical and managerial responsibilities as well as communications responsibilities. In contrast 
with the second interview state, I was also responsible for maintaining certain interest group 
relationships even though I was a subordinate of the Medicaid director. 
I concluded from the variation in these interview responses that responsibility for 
legislative strategy and interest group communications is somewhat idiosyncratic across states, 
and that the titles of any agency staff with these responsibilities may be at least partly a function 
of agency culture, bureaucrats' work histories, and other difficult-to-quantify factors. 
Implications for Survey Plan
The two findings described above can be summarized as follows: first, some Medicaid 
bureaucrats may generally be reluctant to discuss this facet of their work and others may not 
engage in strategic legislative communications at all; second, only a few bureaucrats within 
Medicaid agencies are likely to solicit lobbying assistance, if any, and it may not be possible to 
predict which bureaucrats those are. At first it seemed as though these findings would make 
systematic research very difficult. However, while they may have steered me away from further 
in-depth interviews of bureaucrats, upon reflection it seemed that variation in bureaucrats' 
experience fit my theoretical expectation, and that bureaucrats' disavowals in two states did not 
necessarily constitute disconfirming evidence. Furthermore, the perceptions of lobbyist interview 
respondents provided encouragement for further systematic study.
Taken together, these findings led me to design a survey of state-level lobbyists who 
work on Medicaid. Given that it would be difficult to predict which bureaucrats engage with 
advocates, it became clear that a more efficient survey would ask interest groups whether they 
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discuss legislation or legislative strategy with agency staff or leaders at any level, and, if so, who 
approaches whom. The study would remain neutral on which level of the bureaucracy is most 
likely to contact advocacy groups. I also decided to survey interest groups about coordination 
with bureaucrats on both policy authorizations and Medicaid appropriations, because that 
approach allows me to account for the sporadic nature of major authorizations and the variation 
in program codification in state statute. In addition, in order to avoid the kind of ambiguity 
displayed by interview respondents' statements (to the extent possible) the survey questions 
would be about lobbyists' communications on a single, specific Medicaid bill. This approach is 
consistent with Beckmann and Hall's (2010) recommendations for elite interviewing: they point 
out that “interviews with elite informants work best when designed to extract systematic 
information about practitioners' actual behaviors on specific cases in the recent past” (p. 4, 
emphasis in the original), as opposed to when researchers ask elite informants to generalize 
about their own behavior.
Survey
Based on the interview findings described in the previous section, I developed and fielded 
a telephone survey of state health interest group leaders in 25 states. The survey process yielded 
106 complete and usable survey transcripts; I provide details below on how I reached that 
number. The survey protocol is included in the Appendix to this chapter.
Sample of States
I developed the sample of states by listing combinations of high and low legislative and 
agency capacity. I used Squire's professionalism index (2007) as a legislative capacity measure; 
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the index incorporates legislator salaries, session length, and presence of legislative staff. For 
agency capacity, I used an index of state administrative performance that reflects “performance-
enhancing changes in the delivery of government services” (Burke and Wright 2002, p.12). 
Burke and Wright construct this index using American State Administrators Project data on 
agency characteristics such as use of performance benchmarks and existence of quality 
improvement programs. Table 3.1 shows the list of survey states.










































*CA is excluded from ASAP rankings but shows up as in the top half of agency capacity rankings on two 
other measures: the U.S. Census 2010 Annual Survey of Public Employment and Payroll (2012) measure 
of full-time equivalent employees in the public welfare sector and the measure created by Randall (2012), 
which is adjusted for Medicaid enrollment and the mean of other states' Medicaid staffing and enrollment. 
Squire's index does not include term limits in the way it measures legislative 
professionalism—nor does any other legislative capacity index—but term limits may matter for 
the amount of expertise legislators are able to build in specific policy areas. Therefore I doubled 
up on the high-high states in order to create a separate category of states with term limits. I did 
this for the high-high category only because low legislative capacity states are already low, 
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whereas the presence of term limits in states ranked as high may mean that legislative capacity is 
actually lower than the rankings indicate. Doubling up on the high legislative capacity states in 
this way allows for a comparison of those states with and without term limits. Such a comparison 
is likely to be more revealing than a comparison of low legislative capacity states with and 
without term limits.
I was unable to field surveys in three states that I initially selected for the sample: 
Alabama, Alaska and Pennsylvania. In Alaska and Alabama I was unable to get a response from 
either the hospital association or primary care association, so I switched to other states rather 
than work without the participation of these key organizations in the original states. In 
Pennsylvania, potential survey respondents were willing to participate, but there has been no 
recent Medicaid legislation due to a state law (Act 22 of 2011) that granted authority to the 
Department of Public Welfare to change Medicaid policy without the usual legislative oversight. 
Advocacy energy was therefore directed toward the agency rather than toward the legislature 
during the two legislative sessions included in the survey timeframe.
I selected replacements for all three of these states in the same capacity categories with 
an eye toward even geographic distribution of the states in that category. In other words, for each 
replacement, if there were two or three reasonable choices with respect to the rankings (for 
example, states that were both high on one list and low on the other), I chose the state that would 
be the most helpful in avoiding geographic clustering in that category. To replace Alabama, I 
chose South Dakota; to replace Alaska, I chose Arizona; and for Pennsylvania, I chose Iowa. 
Figure 3.1 provides a visual representation of the geographic distribution of survey states.
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Figure 3.1: Map of survey states
Sample of Lobbyists within States
Within each state, I began the survey with a purposive sample of health service provider 
groups that are comparable across states. These provider groups are reliably involved in 
Medicaid advocacy because they depend on Medicaid for reimbursement. They include state 
hospital associations, primary care associations (which represent community health centers), and 
long-term care associations. I then used snowball sampling—that is, asking respondents for 
referrals—to identify additional provider groups involved in Medicaid advocacy. For example, 
these included medical societies (which represent physicians) and dental associations. I also used 
a snowball technique to identify consumer advocacy groups involved in Medicaid. 
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In each state, I first called the hospital association and the primary care association, so the 
referral chains began in a similar way across states. I once worked closely with both of these 
groups in a certain state and I explained that in my solicitation emails, making it easier break into 
each state by starting with these groups. Moreover, these groups were credible sources of 
referrals to other potential respondents, which is important for snowball sampling (Biernacki and 
Waldorf 1981). I conducted survey phone calls as potential respondents were identified, rather 
than attempt to construct a within-state sampling frame and sampling within that. I thereby 
avoided having to make screening phone calls and re-contacting survey calls.
There is a danger that the snowball sampling strategy I employed is a source of bias in 
this study. Given that I identified a high proportion of respondents by referral, respondents were 
more likely to be included if they had a larger list of contacts or were more active lobbyists 
(Kalton and Anderson 1986). Therefore, my results may not generalize to all relationships 
between Medicaid bureaucrats and health lobbyists. However, I am not greatly concerned by the 
possibility that this approach led me to find more evidence of lobbyist-bureaucrat collaboration 
than a more representative sample of lobbyists would have. Theoretically, if Medicaid 
bureaucrats solicit interest group assistance at all, they are likely to approach a select handful of 
groups, based on relationships, political power, and relevance for a particular policy. Therefore, 
expanding the sample of lobbyists to many additional respondents unlikely to report strategic 
collaboration with bureaucrats would not materially change the relative proportion, or 
distribution, of reports of collaboration by lobbyists across states. 
Likewise, while this analysis highlights the possibility of bureaucrat-lobbyist partnerships 
in other policy areas (and at other levels of government), my results should be extended beyond 
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Medicaid only very cautiously. My results may be most applicable to other policy areas that are 
both highly technical and controversial, and where bureaucrats have sources of legal or other 
policy information that are difficult for other actors to access.
Ideally, in order to minimize selection bias, I would have been able to use a probability 
sample of lobbyists using an established sampling frame. However, as argued above, the 
population of interest is rare, and no such frames were available: potential interest group 
respondents were required not only to work on Medicaid policy in a general way but to have 
discussed specific recent pieces of state legislation with other state actors. Because the 
population was so rare, it would have been difficult to find out which groups were involved in 
Medicaid policy without asking for recommendations. This was especially the case for consumer 
advocacy groups since, unlike certain provider associations, these are not generally equivalent 
across states (AARP is one exception) and there are very few publicly available lists of those 
working on health policy.2 
The response rate for the survey was 72%, which is fairly high. In seven cases, a potential 
respondent explicitly declined to participate. About half of these gave no reason, but the others 
gave reasons including that they were not involved with Medicaid legislation closely enough to 
be able to answer questions. Most refusals were passive; the potential respondent never returned 
contact. In most of those cases I made at least two attempts to solicit participation before giving 
up. If a different respondent in that state confirmed that a non-responder was involved in 
Medicaid lobbying, I left up to three messages, and this sometimes paid off. In a few cases I 
could not get past a gatekeeper, but in general even high-level hospital association executives 
2 Community Catalyst (communitycatalyst.org) publicly lists health advocacy partners in each state (if any). This 
is the only such organization I know of.
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were willing to correspond directly. I was unable to complete the survey for several willing 
respondents because they were too new in their jobs to be able to discuss prior legislative 
sessions or because they were exclusively focused on rulemaking rather than legislation. My goal 
was to complete at least 100 surveys in the time I had scheduled for this portion of the project; 
with 106 complete and usable surveys I slightly exceeded this goal.
In the majority of cases I made initial contact by email with a staff person identified on 
organizations' Web sites as having responsibility for government relations, and I followed up by 
phone. About half the time, potential respondents wrote back to my initial email and no follow-
up calls were required. Potential respondents who did not have publicly available email 
addresses were generally much harder to reach. This could have been because my email 
solicitations were more appealing than voicemails or simply because those without publicly 
listed email addresses are less interested in being reached by strangers. If there was no 
government relations staff person identified on organizational Web sites, I emailed or called 
executive directors or the most likely-looking vice president, depending on the information 
available about the organization, and asked to be assigned to the person responsible for state-
level advocacy. In several cases I worked entirely through assistants to schedule a survey phone 
call.
Survey Questions
The focus of the surveys is the piece of Medicaid legislation considered by respondents to 
be the most significant in the past two legislative sessions. Although there was a risk of inducing 
recall bias by asking about communications on a bill from two sessions ago, I asked about the 
past two years on the recommendation of one of my interview subjects. He explained that in his 
67
state, most Medicaid-related bills are “admin bills,” introduced by the agency to establish 
consistency between new legislation and agency operations rather than introducing a new 
initiative. These bills “tend to be more boring.” He therefore recommended that I give “a lot of 
latitude” when asking about bills that received attention from interest groups. If there was no 
recent important policy authorization, the default for the survey was the most recent Medicaid 
appropriation bill. These are sometimes stand-alone, and sometimes part of an omnibus budget 
bill. Subsequent to beginning the survey, I realized that offering a two-year timeframe was also 
important because some states pass biennial budget bills. For these states, the most recent (at the 
time of the survey) and most concentrated Medicaid policymaking occurred in the course of 
negotiating agency budgets in 2011. In total, there were 13 budget bills and 12 stand-alone policy 
authorizations in the survey. I provide more detail on the types of bills in Chapter 4 and the 
policy content of the bills in Chapter 7.
The first survey respondent in each state (either a hospital association or primary care 
association staff member) identified the bill that then became the survey topic for each 
subsequent respondent. This approach usually worked out, in that respondents identified 
significant bills that received widespread lobbying attention, although in a couple of states a 
hospital association identified a fairly narrow bill. This had the effect of constraining my sample 
of lobbyists in that state.
Asking survey respondents to identify the Medicaid legislation for survey purposes is 
another selective aspect of the research design. In particular, where respondents chose bills that 
were fairly narrowly tailored to their own interests, there are two separate reasons to be 
concerned about the implications for my data. One source of potential bias is that narrower bills 
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resulted in a smaller pool of respondents in that state, making the pool less representative of all 
Medicaid lobbyists in a given state. I struggled with this in one small state, where the first 
respondent identified a narrow bill and I was unable to expand the sample of respondents beyond 
two (also the total number of potential respondents). Another potential source of bias is that 
narrower bills are more likely to be initiated by the private sector, in comparison to budget bills 
or other major Medicaid legislation, thereby reducing the chances that bureaucrats were 
interested in soliciting lobbying support and resulting in overly conservative estimates of indirect 
bureaucratic lobbying. I am less concerned about this possibility since the proportion of reported 
indirect bureaucratic lobbying on a particular type of narrow bill often initiated by the private 
sector (hospital assessments) is fairly high (reported in Chapter 4 under “Patterns by Type of 
Bill”). 
One alternative to the approach that I employed would have been to identify the bill for 
each state myself, ahead of time. Another would have been to ask respondents in all survey states 
to discuss budget bills. I discarded these approaches because it would have been difficult to 
guess which Medicaid bills lobbyists considered to be most important and which received the 
most widespread lobbying attention. In some states the majority of Medicaid-related legislative 
policymaking is achieved through appropriations bills, and major stand-alone Medicaid policy 
authorizations are rare. In other states, appropriations language is restricted to line items with 
associated money amounts, and no other policy may be legislated in those bills. Therefore, 
drawbacks notwithstanding, relying on lobbyist expertise was the best way to identify the most 
important recent Medicaid legislation and attempt to gather higher numbers of responses.3
3 I received conference feedback from a congressional scholar that allowing the focus of the surveys to vary 
among policy authorizations and Medicaid appropriations is problematic because of the vast procedural 
differences for these bill types. To clarify, state-level legislative procedure is not necessarily comparable to 
congressional procedure, and the very fact that state processes are so different from each other as to be 
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 Once the bill for the survey focus was identified, I asked the health lobbyist to describe 
his or her perspective on the bill, and his or her communications about that bill with a variety of 
actors in terms of frequency, agreement, and who initiated conversations. For most states I 
included four levels of the executive branch in this list of actors: Medicaid directors, senior staff 
under the directors, cabinet secretaries over the directors, and anyone in the office of the 
governor. In three states (South Carolina, Mississippi, and Arizona) the Medicaid director is at 
the level of cabinet secretary, so there were only three executive branch levels in the survey list. I 
included other interest groups and legislators in the list of actors, which helped me to disguise 
my specific interest in bureaucrats. At the end of the survey I also asked an open-ended question 
about whether bureaucrats at any level asked the survey respondent (the lobbyist) to coordinate 
on legislative strategy for that bill or on any other bill, and if so how the request was phrased and 
how explicit or implicit it was. In the next chapter, I describe the dependent and independent 
variables yielded by these survey questions. 
I transcribed all surveys by typing on a laptop computer in real time, as conversations 
were ongoing, rather than record the respondents. I asked many clarifying questions not reflected 
by the standard probes in the survey protocol in the appendix, and I noted my own interjections 
with parentheses in the transcripts. This technique facilitated my subsequent use of illustrative 
quotations as well as interpretation of respondents' answers to open-ended questions.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have described key findings from a series of in-depth interviews with 
essentially incomparable was an argument in favor of allowing this variation in the survey topic. Some states 
achieve a great deal of policy change via budget bills, and in other states budget bills may not include any policy 
details—only line items with dollar amounts. By allowing the survey to remain neutral about the form of the 
legislation I was better able to capture information about communications around important policy changes. 
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Medicaid bureaucrats and lobbyists, how these findings affected my survey plans, and the final 
design and implementation of a telephone survey of health lobbyists. Specifically, the interviews 
suggested that while lobbyists are generally comfortable describing their legislation-related 
communications with bureaucrats, bureaucrats are less comfortable discussing their 
communications with lobbyists. Second, not all bureaucrats actually approach lobbyists to 
collaborate on legislative strategy. Some devote the majority of their strategic attention to the 
rules process, and some avoid engaging in legislative strategy because more senior or more 
junior staff within the same agency take on that role.
 Among its strengths, the resulting survey of bureaucratic behavior takes advantage of 
lobbyists' relative comfort with discussing legislative advocacy and general willingness to 
recommend other lobbyists for me to contact. The survey design introduced two potential 
sources of bias, in that I do not use a probability sample of subjects and was unable to ensure that 
respondents selected bills that garnered widespread attention in all 25 survey states. I argue, 
however, that the advantages of these design elements outweigh the drawbacks: the survey was 
practical and efficient, and took advantage of lobbyists' superior knowledge of the important 
Medicaid-related policymaking activity in their states. The snowball (or referral-chain) sampling 
strategy likely contributed to the high response rate; overall, the survey yielded enough responses 
to enable systematic cross-state analysis of bureaucrat-lobbyist communication. In the next 
chapter I provide details about the data gathered through the survey and begin to explore 




 I am conducting a study of the networks of people who are involved in state Medicaid 
policy. I would like to ask about your experience working on Medicaid-related legislation and 
your communications with other organizations.
 Using the list of groups and individuals on your interview handout, I want to ask a set of 
questions about your communications related to a single piece of legislation. These questions 
focus on a Medicaid policy authorization that had, or would have had, a significant impact on the 
Medicaid budget for state fiscal year 2012 or 2013. If there was no piece of legislation in your 
state that fits that description, I would like to ask about your involvement with the most recent 
annual Medicaid appropriations bill.
1. First, was there a major Medicaid policy authorization that you were involved with, this 
year or last year?  If so, what was the name or bill number? If no bill fitting that 
description comes to mind, I would like to focus on the Medicaid appropriations bill for 
the upcoming state fiscal year. [Asked only of first respondent in each state.]
2. Could you tell me a little bit about your organization's position on this legislation?
3. Now, focusing on your work on this one piece of legislation, please tell me whether you 
discussed the bill with any of these groups or people. I will step through this list one by 
one. For each group or person, please tell me whether you had any discussions with them 
about the legislation, either about content or strategy, including on the phone, in a formal 
or public meeting, or in an informal or private meeting. Please use the categories none 
(0), a few (1-5), many (6-10), or a lot (>10).
a. State hospital association 
b. State nursing home association
c. State association of community health centers
d. Disability rights group or independent living association
e. Dental association
f. State Medicaid director
g. Deputy Medicaid director or other senior Medicaid staff
h. Health department secretary or other senior staff
i. Governor's office
j. Members of appropriations/finance committee(s)
k. Members of House health committee
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l. Members of Senate health committee
m. Legislative staff – budget or health policy
4. Who else did you work with in the advocacy or lobbying community on this bill? And 
how many times did you discuss the bill with them?
5. Looking back at the entire list of groups and people (including the ones we added, if any), 
to what degree did you agree with them about the contents of the bill? Please use a scale 
of 1-5, where 1 is disagree and 5 is completely aligned. I will step through the list and 
record your answers again.
6. Looking at the list of the groups and people you did talk to about the bill, please tell me 
who initiated most of those conversations, you or them? I will step through the list. [If 
“us” for agency members, always us?]
7. Regarding your conversations about this bill with agency staff, did your discussions 
primarily take place in an official or committee setting or an informal setting, or both? 
8. Were any of these groups or people taking the initiative on the lobbying effort, or was the 
effort very fragmented?
9. Thank you. This is my last question. When you discussed the bill with the Medicaid 
agency, did you have the sense that they wanted to coordinate on advocacy strategy with 
you, or did they share information in order to change your advocacy emphasis?  [Probes: 
If not on this bill, what about on other bills? If yes to either, how was that phrased? Who 
in the agency did that come from?]
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Chapter 4: Measuring Indirect Bureaucratic Lobbying
In this chapter, I provide detailed information about the dependent and independent 
variables I collected through the survey described in Chapter 3. I discuss coding procedures, 
strengths, and limitations for the dependent variables I use in my quantitative analyses. I also list 
and explain the additional independent variables collected from sources outside of the survey. 
Next, as a prelude to hypothesis testing, I analyze basic relationships in the data, providing a 
series of tables and scatterplots that combine dependent variables and other variables of interest, 
such as type of Medicaid legislation, level of Medicaid bureaucrat, and state-level characteristics.
Data
Dependent Variable: Requests
The survey data yield two options for dependent variables, each of which has advantages 
and disadvantages. The first dependent variable, Requests, reflects whether the lobbyist survey 
respondent reported that he or she was asked for lobbying support—phrased as “requests to 
coordinate on legislation”—by Medicaid bureaucrats at any level. There are 106 observations, 
equal to the number of respondents. There are two versions of the variable: the first reflects 
whether respondents reported that bureaucrats requested lobbying support on the bill that is the 
survey focus. If survey respondents answered that they did not receive a request for lobbying by 
the Medicaid agency, I asked whether that had occurred on any other recent Medicaid legislation. 
Hence, the second version of this dependent variable is reported requests for lobbying on other 
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bills. For most analyses I use a version of this variable reflecting whether respondents reported 
receiving a request for lobbying support on either “this bill” or “other bill;” I refer to this version 
as Requests on “any bill.” 
Several respondents described requests for lobbying support that came exclusively from 
governors' staffs. I coded these separately in order to be able to distinguish the actions of agency 
leaders from those of governors. Thus, the main “this bill” and “other bill” request variables 
reflect only those requests from agencies: Medicaid directors, Medicaid agency staff under 
directors, or department secretaries senior to Medicaid directors or their staff members. 
The responses to the open-ended survey question about whether bureaucrats solicited 
lobbying support were often rich in detail. There are exceptions, as in one observation for which 
the entire answer was “No.” Usually there was sufficient rapport with the respondent and 
remaining survey time for several follow-up probes, such as what level of the bureaucracy 
requests came from, how requests for lobbying were phrased, and how overt or covert the 
request was. In many cases the initial question required a clarification or example before I could 
elicit a response. In a few cases respondents seemed to struggle to put into words the work that 
they do without a great deal of ongoing analysis (as one respondent said, “I'm thinking through 
this stuff that I don't normally think about”). More often the lack of initial understanding seemed 
to result from a sense that asking for lobbying support is not something bureaucrats are supposed 
to do—it is not in their typical job description. Many respondents initially interpreted the 
question as being about direct lobbying on the part of bureaucrats. My clarification attempts 
usually consisted of questioning whether respondents had the sense that the Medicaid agency 
asked them to lobby or not lobby, shared information with them in order to affect their lobbying, 
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or otherwise tried to affect interest group behavior around Medicaid legislation. At that point in 
the conversation most respondents gave clear answers. 
In a minority of cases respondents remained confused or otherwise gave abrupt or unclear 
answers. For example, one consumer advocate seemed to interpret the question as being about 
her own lobbying and whether she asked the agency for support, instead of the other way around. 
This respondent worked on a rather narrow issue that was part of the annual agency 
appropriation and wanted to convince the agency to support that particular part of the bill.
Respondent: I would say yes. Thinking back on one of my most recent conversations 
with the cabinet secretary. He let me know that he found [the policy] an appealing issue. 
He got it, he understands cost effectiveness. He would support it, and that gave a boost to 
our effort. With other Medicaid staff we had some disputes about cost impact. We had to 
deal with number crunchers to get on the same page.
This excerpt could also be read as a report of the cabinet secretary soliciting support from the 
respondent, but given the context of the respondent's policy description, her wording in 
describing “a boost to our effort,” and the fact that I was unable to clarify who asked whom for 
support, this was coded this as “no request.”
Other respondents answered the question but issued warnings about how controversial or 
dangerous the question was. For example, one respondent, a lobbyist for a primary care 
association, told me that my research could become a “lightning rod for the right-wing media.” 
Several others requested reassurances that the survey was confidential, some jokingly and some 
in a serious way, even though I had already carefully discussed confidentiality. For example, one 
consumer advocate said, “Yes. [Laughed.] This is anonymous, right? Because I have developed 
very strong working relationships with health department staff. They definitely use me in that 
respect, and I them.” The impression among some respondents that the question was 
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controversial may have depressed open reporting of requests. 
 I developed a coding scheme to code these answers as no (which takes a value of 0), yes-
implicit (1), and yes-explicit (2). Where respondents denied the existence of indirect bureaucratic 
lobbying altogether or described bureaucratic information-sharing that they saw as purely neutral 
or technical, answers were coded as “no.” An example is: 
Respondent: They're very good about not doing that. No, they've always just toed the 
line. They've never tried to influence me one way or another. Its been more information-
sharing and reiterating the party line. It's very formal. You feel like you're going to be 
arrested in that building – you're escorted to meetings.
Answers were coded as yes-implicit if respondents viewed bureaucratic information-sharing as 
strategic or as something that affected their lobbying. An example is: 
Respondent: Definitely. That came up with the line items for the administrative staff and 
for the money for the ACA implementation. They would put the budget out and we would 
advocate for it at the statehouse. 
Interviewer: Did you strategize on advocacy with them?
Respondent: In the advocates meeting we would talk about it. 
Interviewer: Were Medicaid people there?
Respondent: Yes. 
Interviewer: So was it more a matter of you saying how you were going to work it, or did 
they make any suggestions? 
Respondent: The former – they didn't tell us how to do our jobs, but they released the 
budget information to us and knew what we were going to do with it.
Answers were coded as yes-explicit if respondents felt that anyone in the Medicaid agency or the 
health departments containing Medicaid agencies verbalized a request for lobbying. For 
example: 
Respondent: Absolutely. They'll say, 'If I were doing this, this might be something I 
would look at.' That direct. They're really good. Like back on the adult dental piece, it's 
very clear. They'll say to keep on working this. We get encouragement. It's pretty blunt.
Survey respondents described several kinds of bureaucratic political behavior that did not 
fit a strict definition of requests for lobbying help with state legislatures and were therefore 
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coded as no (0). First, several survey respondents described bureaucrats' requests for expressions 
of support directed toward CMS rather than state legislators. For example: 
Respondent: They wanted us to support what they sent CMS and they worked to let us 
know that they needed us to support it even if we had some objections. Support in 
concept even if we had specific objections. They let us know [...] that it was very 
important to the governor. 
Second, several respondents described direct lobbying by Medicaid agencies and explained that 
bureaucrats were unlikely to approach interest groups on policy or legislation because they had 
their own relationships with legislators.1 Third, there were several instances in which bureaucrat-
lobbyist policy alignment was so high that no lobbying request from bureaucrats—even an 
implicit one—was necessary for interest group action to occur. In one state, for example, this was 
a direct result of joint bureaucrat – interest group development of a policy proposal. When the 
time came to secure legislative authorization, it was understood that interest groups would take 
the lead on communications; the groups themselves felt a great deal of ownership of the policy 
due to their involvement in its development and were sufficiently motivated to lobby without 
extra encouragement. In summary, even though all three of these categories of behavior were 
coded as “no” for Requests, they nonetheless revealed political activism or at least political 
awareness on the part of bureaucrats.
I hired two masters students in the School of Public Health to code Requests and used 
majority rule after coding these variables once myself. I calculated Krippendorff's alpha as a 
measure of intercoder reliability because it can be used with multiple coders and for ordinal 
variables. It is also viewed as more conservative than percent agreement (Lombard, Snyder-Duch 
& Bracken 2010). Krippendorff's alpha calculates the agreement on assignment of values by 
1 I did not probe for reports of bureaucrats' direct lobbying in a systematic way, although if I were to conduct a 
similar study in the future I would do so for the sake of comparison with reported indirect lobbying. 
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independent coders. A two-coder version of Krippendorff's alpha, calculated for an ordinal 
variable, is equivalent to Spearman's rank correlation coefficient (see Hayes & Krippendorff 
2007 for a concise explanation of the differences in how measures are calculated). One drawback 
of using this measure is that it is difficult to calculate, but I was able to locate a Web utility for 
this (Freelon 2010). 
For the “this bill” version of Requests, Krippendorff's alpha for ordinal data is 0.643. For 
the “other bill” version, Krippendorff's alpha is 0.687. While the alpha for the “other bill” 
variable meets the reliability standard for data that can be used to draw tentative conclusions 
(0.800 > α ≥ 0.667), the alpha for “this bill” does not (Krippendorff 2004). However, the alpha 
for “this bill” is close to the desired threshold, and the coding disagreements existed primarily 
among the two assistant coders, who have less familiarity with the subject matter. There were 
only three observations for which the two assistants agreed with each other and not with me; for 
two of these I allowed myself to be overruled, and in one case the coding assistants 
misinterpreted the survey content for technical reasons. Therefore, while I would like the alpha 
for “this bill” to be higher, the use of the majority rule for the final coding means that in almost 
all cases my own codes were in the majority and the use of coding assistants served as a check 
on my own interpretation. As another measure of coding reliability, albeit using a more liberal 
indicator, the average pairwise coding agreement for “this bill” was 80.5%; for the two assistant 
coders the pairwise agreement for “this bill” was 74.5%.
 Table 4.1 shows the distribution of different versions of Requests, where “any bill” is 
coded as yes if there was an affirmative report for either “this bill” or “other bill.” If respondents 
described requests for lobbying for both “this bill” and “other bill” those requests were described 
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as being the same type (implicit versus explicit), with only two exceptions in the data. Reading 
across the table, the “this bill” and “other bill” columns do not add to “any bill”—the “any bill” 
column reflects whether there was a reported request for either “this bill” or “other bill,” or both.2
  
    Table 4.1: Distribution of Requests
This bill Other bill Any bill
No 78 65 52
Yes-implicit 7 8 13
Yes-explicit 21 33 41
Total 106 106 106
In general, reports of implicit bureaucratic lobbying requests were rarer than explicit 
requests. This is unsurprising, given that implicit solicitation may be hard for interest groups to 
identify. If bureaucrats are very good at leveraging interest group power without seeming to—for 
example by sharing information in an apparently neutral way—interest groups may not perceive 
the implicit request. Reports of implicit requests for lobbying may also be slightly suppressed in 
the data because, as discussed above, several survey respondents described situations in which 
bureaucrats are able to leverage interest group power in seemingly passive or non-political ways. 
Bureaucrats (and lobbyists) often know what position a group will take on an issue, and so 
bureaucrats have opportunities to rely on interest groups that they know will lobby in the absence 
of any kind of request. Where the respondent clearly described his or her group as the more 
active partner in this dynamic, the interaction was coded as not having involved a request for 
lobbying from a bureaucrat.
2 If I were to replicate or expand on this research in the future, I would ask all respondents whether they received a 
request for lobbying on “other bill,” not just those who did not report a request for “this bill.” Such a strategy 
would allow me to add the values to create “any bill” rather than code “any bill” responses as reflecting requests 
on either “this bill” or “other bill.”
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Both versions of Requests have weaknesses with respect to measurement and analysis. 
The “this bill” version of reported requests for lobbying is useful because it is more likely to 
accurately reflect policy agreement (between bureaucrats and lobbyists and between bureaucrats 
and governors). This is because survey respondents assigned policy agreement scores to 
individual bureaucrats with respect to their opinions on the bill that was the survey focus. When I 
use “any bill” (all reports of requests, whether “this bill” or “other bill”) I use policy agreement 
for “this bill” as a proxy for “any bill.” The “any bill” version of Requests is therefore somewhat 
limited in its ability to reflect the effect of policy agreement.
In addition, interpretation of the “any bill” version is not straightforward because 
respondents surveyed over an unknown number of bills in their memories and work experience 
when I asked whether they had received a request for support on other recent legislation. In order 
to partially overcome this weakness, I re-coded the “other bill” values as zero where the 
respondents reported a request for lobbying support by the Medicaid agency but clearly referred 
to communication that occurred during a previous administration. This makes the “other bill” 
observations slightly more comparable with each other. 
The “any bill” version of Requests has the advantage when it comes to assessing the 
effect of state-level variables. Requests on “this bill” are a function of both the general political 
environment of a respondent's state and the politics of one particular bill, which may or may not 
be generalizable to that state. The combined “any bill” version is more likely to reflect the 
overall political dynamics in the Medicaid arena in a given state, making analyses of the effect of 
institutional variables more accurate.
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Dependent Variable: Contacts
The second dependent variable is the number of contacts reported by the lobbyist with 
four (sometimes three) state actors. I defined “contacts” for respondents as conversations about 
the surveyed bill during the legislative session, whether formal (e.g., in a meeting with an 
agenda) or informal (e.g., in a hallway), and whether about bill content or legislative strategy. 
This is an ordered categorical variable that gave respondents the choice of none, “a few” (1-5), 
“many” (6-10), or “a lot” (over 10). Grouping contacts in this way helped respondents to 
overcome recall problems. It is difficult to remember the exact number of conversations one may 
have had on a particular topic last year, or the year before, especially if that number is more than 
one or two. Table 4.2 shows the distribution of Contacts across all levels of Medicaid agencies (I 
split out the distribution by bureaucracy level in Table 4.6, below):
Table 4.2: Distribution of Contacts
Contacts Observations
None (0) 52
A few (1-5) 137
Many (6-10) 74
A lot (10+) 150
Total 413
I have a fairly large number of observations for Contacts, although because each lobbyist 
respondent assigned a number of contacts to several bureaucrats, they are not independent 
observations. In other words, Contacts is clustered at the level of the lobbyist, and lobbyists are, 
in turn, clustered by state. One advantage of using Contacts is that I can more accurately analyze 
bureaucrat-lobbyist conversations about legislation as a function of agreement scores assigned to 
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individuals, rather than averaging over several individuals in an agency.
The major weakness of this variable is that Contacts is not equivalent to lobbying, as it is 
in more traditional lobbying research. Because Medicaid bureaucrats are legally required to 
communicate with advocates, these conversations could be instances of lobbyists lobbying 
bureaucrats, bureaucrats lobbying interest groups (whether explicitly or implicitly), or more 
politically inert presentations of policy information. I had initially planned to control for these 
possibilities by including a survey question about conversation initiation, on the assumption that 
contacts initiated by bureaucrats more accurately reflect solicitation of lobbying support. 
However, given the frequency of standing meetings between bureaucrats and lobbyists, for 
example the meetings of state Medical Care Advisory Committees, bureaucrats' requests for 
lobbying support may occur during conversations not initiated by bureaucrats. Given the 
weaknesses of Contacts, I use this variable only as a way to perform robustness checks on the 
estimated explanations for Requests.
Independent Variables
In order to test the effect of policy alignment on bureaucrat-lobbyist coordination on 
advocacy (Hypothesis 1), I need to measure that alignment. I asked lobbyist survey respondents 
to assign agreement scores, on a scale from 1-5 where 1 is disagree and 5 is complete alignment, 
to four levels of the state Medicaid bureaucracy: Medicaid directors, senior Medicaid staff under 
directors, cabinet secretaries above Medicaid directors (if any), and governors. The score given 
to governors sometimes reflected agreement with gubernatorial staff or the office of the governor 
generally. Respondents chose agreement scores with respect to the bill that was the focus of the 
surveys in each state. Where complex bills contained numerous provisions, survey respondents 
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sometimes assigned a 2, 3, or 4 as an average of their agreement with state actors across several 
provisions where alignment differed on individual provisions.
As discussed above with respect to dependent variables, I can use agreement scores 
assigned to individuals when using Contacts. Requests, conversely, has one observation per 
lobbyist, so I average the agreement scores given to the three agency actors and create a variable 
called Average bureaucrat-lobbyist agreement. Specifically, I add the agreement scores assigned 
to Medicaid directors, Medicaid staff, and cabinet secretaries (excluding gubernatorial staff) and 
divide by three. 
In order to estimate agreement between Medicaid bureaucrats and governors, I take the 
absolute value of the difference between average bureaucrat-lobbyist agreement and the 
agreement scores that respondents assigned to governors, and then reverse the values. This is a 
continuous variable with a range from 0 to 4, where 0 indicates agency disagreement with 
governors about the surveyed bill and 4 indicates strong agreement. For example, if the lobbyist 
respondent assigned a 5 to agency officials (on average) and a 5 to governors, Estimated 
governor-bureaucrat agreement takes a value of zero. When I flip the scale, this becomes a 4, the 
maximum value, meaning that the governor and the agency were in alignment. If the lobbyist 
assigned a 3 to the governor and a 4 (on average) to agency officials, the difference indicates 
some discord. Since there were five cases in which respondents could not assign an agreement 
score to governors, there are 101 observations for analyses that include estimated governor-
bureaucrat agreement. 
There is a possibility that this method of estimating governor-bureaucrat disagreement 
causes some error. In particular, if the average bureaucrat-lobbyist agreement score is less than 5 
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and the agreement score assigned to the governor is less than 5—for example if they each equal 
3—it is possible that the lobbyist respondent disagrees with bureaucrats for quite different 
reasons than she disagrees with the governor. It is even possible that these reasons for 
disagreement would be so disparate that the lobbyist would place herself in the middle of a 
policy alignment continuum, and that she would place the agency on one extreme and the 
governor on the other. In this hypothetical case the actual estimated governor-bureaucrat 
disagreement should be 6: instead of subtracting 3 from 3, I should, instead, add them to create 
the total distance between governor and agency. While I acknowledge the possibility that I 
mismeasure in this way, I think it is unlikely because lobbyists typically want more liberal 
Medicaid policies or more conservative policies. It is unlikely that lobbyists are centrists on 
Medicaid policy, correctly situated between extremist governors on one ideological pole and 
extremist agencies. Therefore, I issue this measurement caveat but forge ahead with analyses that 
include estimated governor-bureaucrat disagreement.
Consumer group designates the surveyed interest group as a consumer advocacy group 
or, conversely, a provider association.3 Among provider associations, the type of provider is self-
evident from organizational Web sites, which spell out the name of the group (e.g., “[State] 
Hospital Association,” “[State] Medical Society,”). The “consumer advocacy group” designation 
bundles many different types of advocacy organizations, including membership-driven 
organizations, public interest law firms, and charities (see Phinney 2010 for a review of technical 
differences among organizations that represent the interests of the poor). I do not distinguish 
among these types because those that work on Medicaid policy all represent the interests of 
3 There were also four business associations among the survey respondents. These associations include providers 
among their members, as is typical for chambers of commerce. They also include many non-health-related 
businesses. I include these business groups in the provider category.
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Medicaid participants or groups of participants. That the groups are consumer advocacy groups 
of some type is also generally apparent from groups' Web sites (e.g., “AARP [State]”). 
All other independent variables are from sources outside of the survey. Legislative  
capacity is from Squire's Index (2007), coded from 1 – 50.4 I reversed the original ranking so that 
lower-capacity states have lower numbers. Legislative staff is an alternative measure of 
legislative capacity (presence of staff is one component in Squire's Index). The legislative staff 
measure here is count of total session staff (temporary session staff plus permanent year-round 
staff) from the National Conference of State Legislatures. 
Likewise, I use two different measures of State agency capacity (or “performance”) for 
comparison purposes.5 The first is from an index of state administrative performance developed 
by Burke and Wright (2002), based on data from the 1998 American State Administrators Project 
(ASAP). Burke and Wright rank states from 1 – 50.6 I reversed the original ranking so that lower-
capacity states have lower numbers. The second measure is from the Government Performance 
Project (GPP) and is based on letter grades assigned to states for overall management capacity. 
Following Nicholson-Crotty and Miller (2012) I convert the GPP letter grades to numbers, where 
F = 0, D- = 1, and so on. Thus, this measure does not assign a unique ranking to each state; 
instead, states are clustered by grade. Both the ASAP and the GPP measure performance across 
agencies in each state and are not specific to health departments or Medicaid. 
4 I use the state rank rather than the index value because the index values are fairly skewed, whereas the rank 
values are more symmetric. The correlation of the rank and index values is ρ = 0.85. After dropping California, 
which is an outlier on the index, the correlation is ρ = 0.91. Future work should use the index.
5 Burke and Wright (2002) provide an extended discussion of the comparability of these measures.
6 Again, I use the rank rather than the original index. The ASAP does not include an index value for California, 
and while I cannot formulate my own index value for California, it makes sense to use the rank of the index 
values and to assign California the highest position—as mentioned in Chapter 3, California shows up at the top 
of two alternative indices. The correlation of rank and index is very high, at ρ = 0.99. Future work should explore 
the use of the original index. In addition, use of the state-wide measures in this research highlights the need for 
additional agency-specific capacity measures as well as a measure of the variation in agency capacity across the 
agencies within each state. 
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Finally, State population is from the 2010 Decennial Census, coded in thousands. Party  
control of legislatures and Party of governors are from the National Council of State Legislatures 
(ncsl.org). Gubernatorial power is a measure constructed by Krupnikov and Shipan (2012), 
based on surveys conducted by the National Association of State Budget Officers (NASBO). 
These are coded from 1 – 5, where 5 is the highest gubernatorial budget power relative to 
legislatures. I chose to use these NASBO-based scores because they emphasize budget power. 
Other gubernatorial power scores bundle several different types and sources of gubernatorial 
power (e.g., the index detailed in Beyle & Ferguson 2008). Some of these sources of power, such 
as tenure potential, are less germane to Medicaid policy development. Although scholars of 
gubernatorial power tend to make distinctions between policy power and budget power (Kousser 
& Phillips 2012), Medicaid policy changes have a disproportionate impact on state budgets, and 
are often made for this very reason. The policy-budget distinction is sometimes a fuzzy one in 
practice as well: many of the Medicaid bills that were the topics of my survey phone calls were 
budget bills that had significant impacts on Medicaid policy. Some of these budget bills were the 
only recent Medicaid-relevant legislation in those states. For these reasons gubernatorial budget 
power is the most appropriate power index for my analysis.
In Table 4.3 I present descriptive statistics of all variables described in this chapter.
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   Table 4.3: Descriptive statistics for variables used in quantitative analyses
Variable Unique Obs. Range Mean S.D.
Requests, “this bill” 106 0, 1, 2 0.46 0.81
Requests, “any bill” 106 0, 1, 2 0.90 0.94
Contacts 413 0 - 3 1.78 1.07
Lobbyist-bureaucrat agreement 396 1 - 5 3.01 1.31
Average lobbyist-bureaucrat agreement 106 1 - 5 3.09 1.26
Estimated governor-bureaucrat 
agreement
101 0 - 4 0.44 0.67
Consumer group 106 0,1 0.35 0.48
Legislative capacity 25 1 - 50 28.4 15.6
Legislative staff 25 106 - 2,751 786 702
ASAP state agency performance rank 25 2 - 50 30.4 17.0
GPP state agency performance grade 25 3 - 10 7.0 1.7
State population, in thousands 25 833 - 38,041 8,777 8,605
Party of legislature
(1=Repub.; 0=Dem. or mixed)
25 0, 1 0.67 0.47
Party of governor (1=Rep.) 25 0, 1 0.65 0.48
Gubernatorial power 25 1 - 5 3.4 1.0
Exploring the Data
In this section, I present tables and scatterplots that show basic relationships between 
dependent variables and other variables, including legislation type, state-level characteristics, 
level of government actor, and interest group type.
Patterns by Type of Bill
There were thirteen budget bills, four provider assessment bills, two managed care 
expansion bills, three “other” bills, and three bills related to the budget that were not the main 
budget bill. Table 5.4 shows reported requests for lobbying, where 0 = none, 1 = implicit, and 2 = 
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explicit, on any recent Medicaid bill, by type of bill. This table also shows the proportion of 
requests for lobbying to no reported requests by type of bill.
         
Table 4.4: Reports of bureaucrats' requests for lobbying by type of bill
The proportion of lobbyists reporting a request for support from a bureaucrat (of either type, 
implicit or explicit) varies by type of bill. For most types the proportion of reported requests for 
lobbying for that bill type is around 50%. The managed care expansion bills are an exception, 
with a lower rate of reported coordination on lobbying between bureaucrats and interest groups. 
This may reflect the fact that Medicaid managed care remains controversial in many states; in 
particular, consumer advocates worry about the effect of managed care on fragile populations. 
Political partnerships between bureaucrats and interest groups may be less likely because 
managed care expansions are controversial. Another exception is the provider assessment bills, 
which have a higher than average rate of lobbying coordination. These bills, often initiated by the 
provider associations themselves, allow the providers (typically, but not always, hospitals or 
nursing homes) and the state to take advantage of additional federal Medicaid matching funds. 
They establish accounting procedures whereby the state collects a tax (or “assessment”) from 
certain providers. The state then uses the money collected through the provider tax to pay for 




TotalNone (0) Implicit (1) Explicit (2)
 Budget bill 28 7 25 0.53 60
 Provider assessment 5 0 8 0.62 13
 Managed care expansion 7 2 0 0.22 9
 Other 7 2 5 0.50 14
 Budget-related (e.g., rates) 5 2 3 0.50 10
Total 52 13 41 106
  Proportion   
1 or 2
Medicaid funds at the state's federal medical assistance percentage (FMAP) rate (Miller & Wang 
2009; National Conference of State Legislatures 2013). These arrangements usually increase the 
providers' Medicaid reimbursement rate and use the rest of the new funds for some specified 
purpose in the state's Medicaid budget. Thus, these provider assessments are usually in the 
interests of both providers and Medicaid agencies, so it makes sense that we should see a slightly 
higher level of political coordination around them.
Patterns in Executive Branch Communications
Table 4.5 shows the frequency and percent of different levels of the executive branch that 
issues requests for interest group lobbying. The number of total requests here is higher than in 
other tables in this section because four requests from governors' offices are included—I did not 
include these governors-only requests in the count of agency requests that I use in all other 
analyses because I focus on bureaucrats as distinct actors, with behavior and preferences 
distinguishable from governors. While four may seem like a surprisingly low number of requests 
for lobbying from governors, governors were also mentioned in the “multiple levels” category. 
Table 4.5: Level of executive branch issuing lobbying request
In the majority of cases, requests are from the Medicaid director and/or Medicaid staff. 
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Request Level Frequency Percent
 Medicaid director or staff 41 71%
 Department secretary 5 9%
 Governor's office 4 7%
 Multiple levels 8 14%
Total 58
The relative proportions of requests from Medicaid agencies versus department secretaries may 
be skewed in this table because I did not code requests as coming from the offices of cabinet 
secretaries unless respondents explicitly referred to secretaries. If respondents referred to “they” 
or “the department” I coded the request as coming from Medicaid. However, even if the true 
proportion of requests from Medicaid directors and staff is slightly lower, these would still 
constitute the majority of cases. 
On one hand, this is surprising because department secretaries have more political power 
than Medicaid-level bureaucrats, so their requests for lobbying support might have more power 
to influence interest groups. On the other hand, department secretaries often oversee multiple 
programs in addition to Medicaid and may not involve themselves in Medicaid legislation unless 
it pertains to a major gubernatorial initiative. Medicaid directors and staff also tend to have 
higher expertise about policy details, especially if they are career bureaucrats rather than political 
appointees. Theoretically, these bureaucrats may have relatively greater abilities to share policy 
information with groups in a way that appeals to groups' self-interest. This is largely conjecture, 
however; there were no survey responses describing a clear-cut division of labor in which a 
department secretary issued a blunt, influence-based request for help and Medicaid staff provided 
technical information to accompany the request.
Perhaps most importantly, it is also the case that Medicaid bureaucrats are legally 
required to share policy information with interest groups and other community stakeholders.7 
They are therefore more likely than cabinet secretaries to have close working relationships with 
lobbyists as well as the opportunity to discuss legislation and other policy matters. Indeed, many 
7 As explained in Chapter 1, federal regulation requires all states to maintain a “medical care advisory committee” 
that meets regularly. The regulation number is 42 CFR 431.12. See http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/granule/CFR-
2011-title42-vol4/CFR-2011-title42-vol4-sec431-12/content-detail.html 
91
of the reports of bureaucrats' requests for lobbying consisted of a simple “we need your help on 
this” without an accompanying exchange of information, indicating either that alignment was 
presumed or that any information-sharing occurred previously. 
The idea that Medicaid directors and staff issue more requests for lobbying assistance 
than cabinet secretaries at least partly because they have closer working relationships with 
interest groups is borne out by Table 4.6, which shows the number of Contacts with interest 
group survey respondents by type of state actor. Contacts are in categories: “none” = 0, “a few” = 
1-5, “many” = 6-10, and “a lot” > 10. The number of cabinet secretaries is not the same as the 
other actors because the Medicaid director is at the cabinet level in three states. 
Table 4.6: Contacts with survey respondents by level of executive branch
Table 4.6 indicates that there were more reports of high numbers of contacts with Medicaid 
directors and staff than with cabinet secretaries or gubernatorial staff. Cabinet secretaries had the 
highest number in the no-contacts category, and Medicaid staff had the lowest number of no 
contacts.
Patterns in Type of Interest Group
Table 4.7 shows the number of reported lobbying requests, where 0 = none, 1 = implicit, 
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Contacts
State Actor none a few many a lot total
 Medicaid directors 12 33 18 43 106 
 Medicaid staff 9 28 23 46 106 
 Cabinet secretaries 17 29 16 33 95 
 Governors' offices 14 47 17 28 106 
Total 52 137 74 150 413 
and 2 = explicit, on any recent Medicaid bill by type of interest group. The table also shows the 
proportion of reported requests for lobbying (out of all lobbyists surveyed) by type of group.
Table 4.7: Requests for lobbying by type of interest group 
My expectation was that provider groups would be subject to more frequent requests for 
lobbying than consumer advocacy groups because they have more lobbying power. As discussed 
in Chapter 2, provider groups like hospital associations often have political action committees 
and employ a large number of state residents. Hospital and physician associations are also 
uniquely placed to make both business-based and consumer advocacy -based arguments, thereby 
potentially appealing to both sides of the aisle. Consumer advocates, on the other hand, usually 
have fewer resources, and may not be as persuasive with conservative legislators. Community 
health center associations are very active in Medicaid policy but have fewer resources than other 
provider groups: their members are exclusively nonprofit and serve largely low-income 
populations. Thus, the basic finding that hospital and physician groups are subject to more 
bureaucratic solicitations for lobbying support than consumer advocates and community health 
center associations fits my expectations. The low proportion of reports of bureaucratic lobbying 





None (0) Implicit (1) Explicit (2)
 Hospital associations 9 3 13 0.64 25
 Community health centers 8 2 6 0.50 16
 Medical society (physicians) 4 3 3 0.60 10
 Other provider group 8 1 5 0.43 14
 Consumer advocacy group 19 4 14 0.49 37
 Business association 3 0 1 0.25 4
Total 52 13 41 106
 Proportion  
1 or 2
power of business lobbies, but the sample of business groups in this survey is very small. 
Term Limits
In Chapter 3, I explained that I doubled up on the sample of states with both high 
legislative capacity and high agency capacity in order to include a group of states with legislative 
term limits and a group without. Squire's index, the measure of legislative capacity that I use, 
does not include term limits. Yet it seems likely that term limits reduce the average amount of 
policy expertise within legislatures, increasing the chances that bureaucrats conduct indirect 
lobbying in order to help fill legislative information gaps. In order to determine whether term 
limits might make a difference among states with high legislative and agency capacity, I provide 
a side-by-side comparison of those with and without term limits, and the percentage of reported 
requests for lobbying out of all responses for each state.8 I anonymize the states to protect 
respondent confidentiality. 
Table 4.8: Proportion of Requests in 
high-high states, by presence of term limits
Three states with term limits have a low percentage of reported requests. Term-limited, high 
capacity states do not appear to warrant being treated as other than high capacity.
8 Although it looks odd that the percent of respondents reporting Requests is exactly 50% for four non-term-
limited states (see Table 4.8), there were four respondents in each of these states. In each of these states, two 
respondents reporting one or more requests for lobbying.
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No Term Limits Term Limits
State % 1 or 2 State % 1 or 2
1 50% 1 20%
2 50% 2 50%
3 50% 3 0%
4 50% 4 67%
5 33% 5 20%
State Patterns
I do not provide a list of the proportion of requests by state in order to protect the 
confidentiality of respondents. However, I note that reported requests by state range from 0% (no 
requests for lobbing reported on any bill by any respondent) in one state to 100% in one other 
state. The modal percentage is 50%, reflecting how typical it was for respondents within a single 
state to report different bureaucratic behavior. Even in the two states for which I only have two 
respondents, views about bureaucratic communications differ by respondent. In all but two states 
with reports of implicit requests there were also reports of explicit requests (there are two states 
for which requests were only implicit). This could either indicate that respondents perceive 
similar behavior differently, or more likely that bureaucrats treat different lobbyists in different 
ways. The intrastate variation in reported requests for interest group support may reflect the fact 
that lobbying is at least partly dependent on personal relationships. There may be a very small set 
of lobbyists that bureaucrats feel comfortable asking for support. And, as discussed in Chapter 2, 
I expect both policy agreement and group power to affect which groups receive a request for 
lobbying; these factors may also affect the proportion of requests reported within states. I explore 
the effect of these factors on overall requests for lobbying in Chapter 5.
In order to further explore state-level relationships in the data, I created a binary indicator 
variable taking a value of 1 for either implicit or explicit agency requests for lobbying, and 0 
otherwise. I collapsed the dataset to 25 observations, one per state, with the mean of the dummy 
variable reflecting agency requests for lobbying on “this bill,” and, separately, any recent 
Medicaid bill (reports for “this bill” and “other bill” combined). The means of these variables are 
interpretable as the proportion of the lobbyists in each state reporting agency lobbying requests 
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out of all lobbyists surveyed in that state. I provide a series of scatterplots with regression lines 
that help to show which states have Medicaid bureaucrats that tend to engage more in indirect 
lobbying and comparing the average requests for lobbying to state-level characteristics.
First, in Figure 4.1, I plot the mean of reported requests on “this bill” by the natural log of 
state population, followed by the mean of reported requests on any recent Medicaid bill by the 
log of state population. I use the log of population because state population is skewed. I want to 
see the distribution of Requests by state population because I suspect that policy development 
processes may be more formal in large states, discouraging bureaucratic political activism. The 
state institutional capacity variables I am interested in correlate with population (at ρ = 0.57 for 
legislative capacity and population), perhaps reflecting that large states devote proportionally 
more resources to state government. If policymaking institutions are more professionalized, they 
may also be more formal and there may be more distinct boundaries around bureaucrats' roles. In 
small states, conversely, the number of important actors may be smaller and policy processes less 
formal, which may make personal relationships relatively more important and indirect 
bureaucratic lobbying more feasible. This is largely conjecture but worth exploring as a 
comparison to the plots of the relationship between Requests and institutional capacity measures. 
Figure 4.1 shows, however, that there is no relationship between the log of population and 
requests on “this bill.”
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     Figure 4.1: Mean of Requests for lobbying on “this bill” by state population
In Figure 4.2, I plot the relationship between requests for lobbying on any recent Medicaid bill 
and the log of population. It makes sense that there is a stronger (negative) relationship with 
population for any Medicaid bill than for “this bill,” since the combined reports of bureaucrats' 
requests for lobbying on “this bill” and “other bill” are more likely to generalize to states. Since 
the proportion of agency requests for lobbying by state is a continuous variable, I can use 
ordinary least squares to test the relationship: the coefficient on the log of state population is 
-0.08, the standard error is -0.04 and the p-value is 0.06. Consistent with my conjecture, this 
result tells us that Medicaid bureaucrats in less populous states are more likely to request 
lobbying assistance from interest groups. The actual number of people living in a state is unlikely 
to be the cause of this behavior, but institutional characteristics associated with state size may be 
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    Figure 4.2: Mean of Requests for lobbying on any bill by state population
Next, I plot the relationship between requests for lobbying and measures of agency 
capacity. I reverse the coding of the agency capacity variables to make interpretation more 
intuitive: in the re-coded variables, as rank increases so does agency professionalism. I expect to 
see a negative relationship between requests for lobbying and agency capacity. As explained in 
Chapter 2, state agency capacity has been shown to matter for direct bureaucratic influence 
(Nicholson-Crotty & Miller 2012) but should not affect bureaucrats' likelihood of soliciting 
interest group support in the same way. 
First, in Figures 4.3 and 4.4, I plot the ASAP measure of state agency capacity against 
Requests, on “this bill” and “any bill,” respectively.
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Figure 4.3: Mean of Requests for lobbying on “this bill” by agency capacity (ASAP)
   Figure 4.4: Mean of Requests for lobbying on any bill by agency capacity (ASAP)
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for lobbying on “this bill” (Figure 4.3). However, for “any bill” (Figure 4.4), the relationship is 
significant, with a regression coefficient on agency capacity of -.007, a standard error of 0.002 
and a p-value of .006. As expected, the relationship is not positive; in fact, there is a striking 
downward trend. These bivariate relationships provide initial support for my hypothesis that 
Medicaid bureaucrats are more likely to request interest group support in states with lower 
agency capacity (conditional on bureaucrat-lobbyist agreement) (H3). It may be the case, then, 
that not only is high agency capacity not required for indirect bureaucratic lobbying, but that 
bureaucrats are more likely to use this as a political influence mechanism where they cannot rely 
on agency capacity to grant them direct influence with legislatures. I investigate this further in 
the next chapter. 
In Figures 4.5 and 4.6 I plot the relationship between the GPP measure of agency 
professionalism and requests for lobbying, on “this bill” and any recent Medicaid bill.
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   Figure 4.6: Mean of Requests for lobbying on any bill by agency capacity (GPP)
Figures 4.5 and 4.6 also show a negative relationship between requests for lobbying and agency 
capacity. In contrast to the other state-level variables examined in this section, there is a stronger 
and more significant relationship between the explanatory variable of interest and requests on 
“this bill” than between that variable and requests on “any bill,” although the differences are 
slight. For “this bill,” the coefficient on the GPP measure of agency capacity is -0.044, with a 
standard error of 0.03 and a p-value of 0.096. For “any bill,” the coefficient on agency capacity is 
-0.040, with a standard error of 0.03 and a p-value of 0.126.
Perhaps more importantly, all four of the plots of the relationship between requests for 
lobbying and agency capacity show a negative relationship. While this is somewhat surprising 
given that the ASAP and GPP measures are not especially highly correlated (ρ = 0.52), the 
similarity of the relationship of these measures with requests for lobbying lends credence to the 
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because its greater variance makes quantitative analysis more tractable.
Next, I plot the relationship between reported requests for lobbying and measures of 
legislative capacity. Figures 4.7 and 4.8 show this relationship for “this bill” and any recent 
Medicaid bill, respectively. I reversed the coding of the legislative capacity index to make 
interpretation more intuitive. The original legislative capacity ranking codes the highest-ranking 
states with the lowest numbers (e.g., California and Massachusetts have low numbers, indicating 
their high rank). In the reversed coding, the highest-ranking states receive the highest numbers. 
Consistent with the theory elaborated in Chapter 2, I expect to see a negative relationship 
between Requests and legislative capacity. This is because lower-capacity legislatures may have 
lower levels of Medicaid expertise and bureaucrats should be motivated to influence policy by 
asking their interest group contacts for help. However, any relationship between Requests and 
legislative capacity is more likely to show up in Figure 4.8, since observations for “any bill” are 
more likely to generalize to respondents' states.
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   Figure 4.7: Mean of Requests for lobbying on “this bill” by legislative capacity
   Figure 4.8: Mean of Requests for lobbying on any bill by legislative capacity
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hypothesis that bureaucrats are more likely to solicit interest group lobbying in states where 
legislative capacity is low (conditional on bureaucrat-lobbyist agreement) (H4). However, the 
regression coefficient on legislative capacity just falls short of conventional levels of statistical 
significance. This potentially indicates that bureaucrats routinely issue requests for interest group 
lobbying in states with higher legislative capacity as well, or the effect of legislative capacity is 
conditional. I investigate this further in the next chapter. I also note that there appears to be an 
outlier in the upper right quadrant; when I drop this state the bivariate regression results in a 
significant coefficient. However, I have no theoretical justification for dropping this state and 
since there are only 25 states I do not pursue this further. 
I also note that the arrangement of states in Figure 4.8 looks somewhat similar to that in 
Figure 4.4, the plot of requests for lobbying on any bill and agency capacity. However, high 
agency capacity states are not necessarily high legislative capacity states: the correlation of 
Squire's index of legislative capacity and the ASAP measure of agency capacity is ρ = 0.24.
Finally I plot the relationship between reported requests for lobbying and legislative staff 
for “this bill” (Figure 4.9) and “any bill” (Figure 4.10). Legislative staff is coded as the total 
number of permanent and temporary staff during the legislative session in each state. I plot this 
relationship in order to be able to visualize the effect of legislative staff size as distinct from the 
legislative capacity index as a whole.
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Figure 4.9: Mean of Requests for lobbying on “this bill” by legislative staff
   Figure 4.10: Mean of Requests for lobbying on any bill by legislative staff
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absence of staff is a theoretically important element in the index of legislative capacity: staff who 
are expert in health policy may be able to fill legislators' information gaps, at least partly 
obviating legislators' need for information from lobbyists or bureaucrats. As expected, Figure 
4.10 shows a negative relationship, although a handful of states with disproportionately large 
legislative staffs may be the cause of the slope of the line. This distribution of states by 
legislative staff is similar to the distribution of states by population before I log-transform 
population. Indeed, population and legislative staff are highly correlated (ρ = 0.86). The 
regression coefficient on legislative staff is -0.01 but this fails to meet conventional level of 
statistical significance with a standard error of 0.006 and a p-value of .10. In the analyses in 
Chapter 5 I use the legislative capacity rank rather than isolating staff.
Conclusion
In summary, the first section of this chapter provided information on my data and the 
second presented preliminary explorations of the data. In the first section, I discuss the two 
different dependent variable options: survey respondents' reports of Medicaid bureaucrats' 
requests for lobbying support (Requests) and conversations between lobbyist survey respondents 
and individual members of state Medicaid bureaucracies about Medicaid legislation during 
legislative sessions (Contacts). Requests is coded as none, yes-implicit, and yes-explicit, 
although for many analyses in this and the following chapters I collapse implicit and explicit to 
create a binary variable taking the values of no and yes. Contacts is coded as none (0), a few (1-
5), many (6-10), and a lot (over 10).
Both variables have strengths and weaknesses with respect to measurement and analysis. 
Requests is a more direct measure of the bureaucratic behavior of interest, so I rely on that 
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variable for the preliminary investigation into bivariate relationships with explanatory variables 
presented in this chapter. I also rely on Requests for the hypothesis tests in Chapter 5. The main 
limitation of Requests is that it has two versions, “this bill,” for which I also have a direct 
measure of lobbyist-bureaucrat policy agreement, and “any bill,” which is more likely to 
generalize to states. Therefore, Requests on “this bill” are more likely to accurately reflect the 
effect of lobbyist-bureaucrat agreement and Requests on “any bill” are more likely to reflect the 
effect of the institutional and political variables of interest. At the same time, Requests is a better 
measure than Contacts, because Contacts may reflect instances of indirect bureaucratic lobbying 
as well as more neutral conversations. For that reason, I use Contacts only for a robustness check 
on the effect of policy agreement in Chapter 6.
In the second part of the chapter, I presented a series of tables and plots that explore 
relationships in the data. The most important finding in this section is that Requests on any recent 
Medicaid bill were reported, on average, by half of the lobbyist respondents in the survey. While 
this may seem like a simple statistic, it is important because it presents a contrast with the 
research by Carpenter (2001) that provided theoretical inspiration for this project. Carpenter 
argues that autonomous agencies are influential because they have excellent reputations for 
expertise and are grounded in networks of private-sector groups. My data show, in contrast, that 
bureaucrats take advantage of private-sector networks in order to influence Medicaid policy in 
all survey states but one, and that on average bureaucrats do this with about half of the lobbyist 
respondents in each state. Thus, indirect bureaucratic lobbying appears to be an influence 
strategy that is available to most bureaucrats rather than only those working in autonomous 
agencies with outstanding reputations for expertise.
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The series of plots of bivariate relationships between Requests and institutional variables 
show that, in general, there are stronger relationships with the “any bill” version of Requests, 
presumably for the reasons discussed above. In all cases, these relationships for “any bill” are in 
the expected direction. For example, I see the hypothesized negative relationships with both 
legislative capacity and agency capacity. However, for legislative capacity, the regression 
coefficient is not statistically significant. In the next chapter, I estimate multivariate regression 
models in order to learn more about the effects of legislative capacity (and agency capacity), and 
whether these effects are moderated by intervening variables like policy agreement. 
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Chapter 5: Hypothesis Tests
This chapter presents the results of quantitative tests of the hypotheses listed in Chapter 2, 
using the data detailed in Chapter 4. I begin by estimating a comprehensive model that tests 
together the effects of all factors—micro-level and macro-level—that I expect to increase the 
likelihood of indirect bureaucratic lobbying. Next, I conduct robustness tests on the effects of 
gubernatorial power and provide qualitative illustrations from the survey transcripts. Finally, I test 
my predictions about the effects of governors on bureaucrats' decisions to request lobbying 
implicitly versus explicitly. 
General Model of Indirect Bureaucratic Lobbying
What factors increase the likelihood of indirect bureaucratic lobbying? In this section I 
analyze any attempts by bureaucrats to leverage interest group lobbying, whether explicit or 
implicit. I use the Requests dependent variable as a binary indicator, where observations of yes-
implicit or yes-explicit both take the value of one. This allows me to take the relatively simple 
approach of estimating a model using logistic regression with clustered standard errors by state. I 
include requests on any bill, including both the Medicaid bill that was the survey focus and other 
recent Medicaid legislation. I center all continuous variables used in interaction terms by 
subtracting the mean from each value. I do so in order to create versions of these variables that 
take 0 as their average value—this makes interpretation of interaction terms easier because the 
“main effect” of one variable is interpretable as the effect on the outcome when the other variable 
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in the interaction equals 0, its average value. I create an indicator for group type that takes the 
value of 1 if the lobbyist works for a clientele or consumer advocacy group (“consumer group”), 
and 0 otherwise. I also create an indicator for party control of state legislatures that reflects 
whether Democrats control the state house, senate, or both, because my theoretical prediction is 
that bureaucrats rely on the power of consumer groups more where Democrats control at least one 
house of the legislature than where Republicans control both houses. All other variables are 
explained in Chapter 4. 
The general model in this section tests the first five hypotheses developed in Chapter 2: 
H1: Bureaucrats are more likely to solicit interest group lobbying on a particular policy if 
bureaucrats and interest groups agree on that policy. This effect will hold regardless of 
legislative capacity or agency capacity.
H2: Bureaucrats are more likely to request the help of provider groups than consumer 
advocacy groups, except where at least one house of state legislatures is controlled by 
Democrats.
H3: Bureaucrats are more likely to solicit interest group lobbying in states where agency 
capacity is low, but this effect is conditional on high bureaucrat-lobbyist agreement.
H4: Bureaucrats are more likely to solicit interest group lobbying in states where 
legislative capacity is low, but this effect is conditional on high bureaucrat-lobbyist 
agreement.
H5: Bureaucrats are more likely to solicit interest group lobbying if gubernatorial power 
is low and bureaucrats agree with governor. 
























































































The first column of Table 5.1 excludes the controls, and the second includes all variables. I 
state p-values for all estimates because it can be difficult to quickly assess the meaning of standard 
errors for odds ratios. Inclusion of controls does not materially affect the odds ratios for the 
variables of interest; therefore I refer to the estimates in column (2) throughout this section. 
111
   Table 5.1: Logit models of requests for lobbying on recent Medicaid bills
(1) p-value (2) p-value





agency capacity      0.96***(0.008) 0.000
     0.96***
(0.009) 0.000







legislative capacity 0.99(0.01) 0.55
0.99
(0.01) 0.66
legislative capacity * bur.-lob. agreement    1.04**(0.01) 0.006
   1.04**
(0.016) 0.007
H2
Democratic control, one or both chambers 0.74(0.27) 0.41
0.70
(0.31) 0.43
consumer group 0.62(0.24) 0.21
0.62
(0.24) 0.22






gubernatorial power    29.11**(29.72) 0.001
   29.13**
(29.46) 0.001
governor-bureaucrat agreement 0.58(0.21) 0.13
0.58
(0.21) 0.14
gubernatorial power * gov.-bur. 
agreement
     0.42**
(0.12) 0.002





ls population (in thousands, logged) ---
0.98
(0.23) 0.94





   Coefficients are odds ratios. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered by state. 
   ***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05; +p<.10. 
I first discuss the estimated effects of the controls and then address each hypothesis test. 
Institutional capacity and state population are correlated (ρ = 0.57 for legislative capacity and 
population), so there may be some attribute of large states—such as more formal policy 
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development processes or political communications norms—that discourages bureaucrats' political 
activism. However, controlling for population does not reduce the effect of institutional variables in 
column (2). I also control for unified political control of state government to find out whether 
political control has an effect on bureaucratic activism or whether it significantly moderates the 
effects of other variables. As explained in Chapter 2, I expect that even where there is unified 
government, there is a certain baseline amount of conflict and interbranch tension inherent in 
managing such a costly program, and that political control of state institutions should not materially 
affect the likelihood of bureaucrats' activism (the type of groups bureaucrats ask for help is a 
different story). Indeed, I find that this is the case; the odds ratio for unified government is not 
significant. 
I now turn to discussions of each hypothesis test, following the order of hypotheses as 
discussed in Chapter 2. First, I consider Hypothesis 1 (Bureaucrats are more likely to solicit interest 
group lobbying on a particular policy if bureaucrats and interest groups agree on that policy. This 
effect will hold regardless of legislative capacity or agency capacity). The odds ratio for bureaucrat-
lobbyist agreement (top row, second column) is not statistically significant. However, because I 
include interactions of bureaucrat-lobbyist policy agreement and institutional capacity measures, the 
coefficient in the top row means only that the estimated effect of agreement is not significant when 
the values of the other variables it interacts with—agency capacity and legislative capacity—are at 
their average values. The interactions of legislative capacity and agency capacity with bureaucrat-
lobbyist agreement are both statistically significant. Thus, the effect of bureaucrat-lobbyist 
agreement should properly be interpreted in the context of these interactions. I return to Hypothesis 
1 in the context of the tests of Hypotheses 3 and 4, discussed below.
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Interest Group Type and Party Control (H2)
I now turn to Hypothesis 2: Bureaucrats are more likely to request the help of provider 
groups than consumer advocacy groups, except where at least one house of state legislatures is  
controlled by Democrats. The interaction of group type and party control of state legislatures is 
(minimally) statistically significant, indicating that group type matters depending on party 
control. In column (1) of Table 5.2 I show the variables relevant to Hypothesis 2, excerpted from 
the estimate of the full model (Table 5.1). To more easily interpret the interaction term I reverse 
the coding of party control and re-estimate (column (2)), again using the full model and showing 
only the relevant variables for this hypothesis in Table 5.2. 
Table 5.2: Logit model of group type (truncated results from estimation of full model)
parameter (1) p-value (2) p-value




consumer group 0.62(0.24) 0.22
2.67
(1.95) 0.18
Dem. leg.* consumer group   4.32
+
(3.59) 0.08 ---
Republican legislature --- 1.42(0.63) 0.43





Coefficients are odds ratios. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered by state. 
***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05; +p<.10. 
Table 5.2 indicates that the effects of interest group type and party control do depend on 
each other, but does not reveal more than that since all main effects are statistically insignificant. 
This may be due to lack of power.1 I estimate an abbreviated model in order to further explore 
1 Although the variance inflation factor (VIF) is high (over 10) for gubernatorial power and for the interaction of 
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the possible effects of these variables. The risk of omitted variable bias means that the results of 
this analysis are not definitive, but estimating the reduced model is worthwhile for the sake of 
exploration. Suggestive results here might indicate that more or better data could yield 
significant results with the full model. 
I estimate the following model and present results in Table 5.3: 
( ) { }εββββ +⋅+⋅+⋅+== ).*(.).()(Logit 3210 legDemgrouptypelegDemgrouptypeyesrequests
Again, I reverse the coding of party control and re-estimate (column (2)).
Table 5.3: Logit model of group type, abbreviated model
parameter (1) p-value (2) p-value




consumer group  0.49*(0.15) 0.02
2.22
(1.41) 0.21
Dem. leg.* consumer group  4.57*(3.23) 0.03 ---
Republican legislature --- 1.30(0.62) 0.57








Coefficients are odds ratios. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered by state. 
***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05; +p<.10. 
In contrast with Table 5.2, the odds ratio for consumer group in column (1) is statistically 
significant in Table 5.3. This significant main effect enables interpretation of the interaction in 
column (1). This result suggests that the odds of consumer groups being asked for lobbying 
gubernatorial power and governor-bureaucrat agreement, most variables in the model have a low VIF and the 
mean VIF is also low (6.49). This suggests that multicollinearity is not driving the lack of significance.
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support by bureaucrats are lower than the odds of provider (or business) groups being asked for 
lobbying support when legislatures are controlled completely by Republicans.2
As expected, party control of legislatures makes no difference in the odds of bureaucrats 
attempting to leverage the lobbying power of provider groups. And the insignificance of the odds 
ratio for consumer group in column (2) means that I cannot conclude that the odds of consumer 
groups being asked for lobbying support by bureaucrats are higher when Democrats control at least 
one branch of state legislatures. Thus, Hypothesis 2 is not fully supported by the abbreviated model
—my prediction is essentially that Democratic control of at least one chamber should make 
lobbying by consumer groups more important and should therefore increase the likelihood that 
bureaucrats ask for help from consumer groups. However, the results do suggest that where there is 
Republican party control, Medicaid bureaucrats are more likely to attempt to leverage provider 
group lobbying power than consumer group lobbying power. While this finding is tentative due the 
risk of omitted variable bias, it is consistent with the prediction in that consumer groups are 
relatively less important for bureaucrats where there are no Democrats in power.
Policy Agreement (H1) and Agency Capacity (H3)
Here I return to the consideration of Hypothesis 1, jointly assessing the test of agreement and 
the test of agency capacity (H3). While the odds ratio for the interaction of agency capacity with 
bureaucrat-lobbyist agreement is statistically significant, it is difficult to interpret because the 
variables are continuous. Therefore, I present a series of marginal effects plots.3 The following 
2 The coefficient on consumer group in column (1) is interpretable as the odds of consumer groups being asked for 
lobbying when the legislature is Republican. The odds ratio is less than 1.0, so the odds of consumer groups 
being targeted with requests are lower than the odds of provider groups being targeted. While the corresponding 
odds ratio in Table 5.2 is not significant, it is in the same direction.
3 I created these plots using the “margins” command in Stata (version 13.1) to get the marginal effect of one 
variable at different levels of the other, then saving the estimates to memory using the “parmest” command, and 
finally plotting them along with confidence intervals using a “twoway” command.
116
discussion adjudicates between Hypothesis 1, which predicts that agreement has an independent 
effect on bureaucrats' behavior regardless of institutional capacity rankings, and Hypothesis 3, 
which predicts that agreement interacts with differences in agency capacity. (Next, I discuss 
Hypotheses 1 and 4 together.)
 Figure 5.1 shows the expected change in the probability of requests for lobbying for a one-
unit increase in agency capacity at each level of bureaucrat-lobbyist agreement, holding all other 
variables at their means. The dashed lines in this and all subsequent marginal effects plots indicate 
95% confidence intervals.
Figure 5.1: Change in probability of Requests for unit increases in 
agency capacity at each level of agreement (values centered at means)
Figure 5.1 shows that the effect of a unit increase in agency capacity is negative at each 
level of agreement, although the estimates at the lowest levels of agreement are not statistically 
significant. It is possible that this insignificance results from the fact that there are fewer 
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the observations at higher agreement, where I detect an effect; the overall trend of the 
distribution is fairly uniform.4 The plot also shows that the estimated negative change in the 
probability of requests for lobbying for each unit increase in agency capacity is very small. This 
effect increases slightly in magnitude as agreement increases (the average marginal effect of an 
increase in agency capacity is -0.009, with a standard error of 0.001 and a p-value of 0.00).
As expected, Figure 5.1 shows that bureaucrats are less likely to lobby indirectly as 
agency capacity increases, and slightly more likely to lobby indirectly as agency capacity 
decreases. For example, then, in states with low agency capacity like New Jersey or Tennessee, I 
would expect to see more indirect bureaucratic lobbying than in states with high agency capacity 
like Michigan or Florida, assuming high levels of agreement between bureaucrats and lobbyists 
and holding all other variables equal. This result presents an interesting contrast with the findings 
of other scholars on the positive effect of agency capacity on bureaucrats' direct influence on 
legislators (Nicholson-Crotty and Miller 2012). When held up against those findings, my result 
suggests that state agency leaders can leverage interest group power as a way of circumventing 
the political limitations imposed by lower agency reputation.
Figure 5.1 also shows that the negative effect of agency capacity increases as agreement 
increases. The fact that the negative effect of increasing agency capacity becomes slightly 
stronger at higher levels of bureaucrat-lobbyist agreement provides partial support for 
Hypothesis 3: Bureaucrats are more likely to solicit interest group lobbying in states where  
agency capacity is low, but this effect is conditional on high bureaucrat-lobbyist agreement. 
However, Figure 5.1 also shows that the expected negative effect of agency capacity is also 
present and statistically significant—although small—at medium and medium-low levels of 
4 See Appendix B for plots of the distribution of average bureaucrat-lobbyist agreement.
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agreement. Thus the hypothesis seems to be only partially correct, since high agreement is not 
strictly required for the expected effect of agency capacity. I summarize this result in Table 5.4: 











By extension, if the effect of agency capacity depends to some degree on policy 
agreement, then the effect of agreement should also depend on agency capacity. In order to look 
at this interaction a different way, I also plot the marginal effect of bureaucrat-lobbyist agreement 
at different levels of agency capacity (Figure 5.2).
Figure 5.2: Change in probability of Requests for unit increases in 
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The marginal effect of agreement is statistically insignificant at all levels of agency capacity. 
However, the marginal effects shown in Figure 5.2 hold legislative capacity (and all other 
covariates) at its mean value. Since the effect of bureaucrat-lobbyist policy agreement depends on 
both agency capacity and legislative capacity, it may be that the plot looks different at other values 
of legislative capacity. Indeed, I find that this is the case (Figures 5.3 and 5.4).5 
Figure 5.3: Change in probability of Requests for unit increases in agreement at each level of 
agency capacity (legislative capacity at lowest value; other variables centered at means)
Figure 5.3 plots the marginal effects of agreement at different levels of agency capacity 
and with legislative capacity at its lowest value. Here, the marginal effect of agreement is 
negative and is statistically significant at all but the lowest levels of agency capacity. This means 
that where legislative capacity is very low, increases in agreement result in a lower probability of 
indirect bureaucratic lobbying. The negative effect of agreement increases as agency capacity 
increases. So, for example, if a state had very low legislative capacity, like New Hampshire, 
5 I also plotted the marginal effects of agency capacity at each level of policy agreement, as in Figure 5.1, holding 
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increases in bureaucrat-lobbyist policy agreement would reduce the probability of indirect 
bureaucratic lobbying; this effect would become stronger if New Hampshire increased its agency 
capacity. The discussion of Hypothesis 4, below, sheds some light on this unexpected result.
Figure 5.4: Change in probability of Requests for unit increases in agreement at each level of 
agency capacity (legislative capacity at highest value; other variables centered at means)
Finally, Figure 5.4 plots the marginal effects of agreement at different levels of agency 
capacity and with legislative capacity held at its highest value. Here, the marginal effect of 
agreement is positive and statistically significant at all levels of agency capacity. This means that 
where legislative capacity is very high, increases in agreement result in a higher probability of 
indirect bureaucratic lobbying at all levels of agency capacity. For example, then, if a state had 
very high legislative capacity, like California, increases in bureaucrat-lobbyist policy agreement 
would increase the probability of indirect bureaucratic lobbying; this effect would become weaker 




















-3 0 -2 0 -1 0 0 10 2 0
a g e n c y  c a p a c i ty
To summarize, the expected negative effect of agency capacity depends on the existence of 
some policy agreement between bureaucrats and lobbyists, although very high agreement is not 
required for the negative effect. This result provides partial support for Hypothesis 3. In addition, I 
see different marginal effects for agreement when I hold legislative capacity at low, mean, and 
high values. The estimates of the effect of increases in agreement are negative for low legislative 
capacity, insignificant for mean legislative capacity, and positive for high legislative capacity. The 
strength of these effects also changes as agency capacity changes. That the effect of agreement 
depends on institutional capacity casts doubt on Hypothesis 1: Bureaucrats are more likely to  
solicit interest group lobbying on a particular policy if bureaucrats and interest groups agree on  
that policy. This effect will hold regardless of legislative capacity or agency capacity. I continue to 
explore the results related to Hypothesis 1 below.
Policy Agreement (H1) and Legislative Capacity (H4)
Next, to compare Hypotheses 1 and 4, I plot the marginal effect of increases in legislative 
capacity at different levels of bureaucrat-lobbyist policy agreement, holding all other variables at 
their means (Figure 5.5). Again, Hypothesis 4 is: Bureaucrats are more likely to solicit interest  
group lobbying in states where legislative capacity is low, but this effect is conditional on high  
bureaucrat-lobbyist agreement. In general, I expect there to be more indirect bureaucratic 
lobbying where legislative capacity is low because bureaucrats should be interested in leveraging 
lobbying networks to help fill legislators' information gaps about Medicaid. 
122
Figure 5.5: Change in probability of Requests for unit increases in 
legislative capacity at each level of agreement (values centered at means)
Figure 5.5 shows that the effect of legislative capacity is different at each level of 
agreement, but that the estimates at the middle values of agreement are not statistically 
significant.6 Where there is high bureaucrat-lobbyist agreement, the effect of increases in 
legislative capacity is positive—in other words, there is a higher probability of indirect lobbying 
as legislative capacity increases, and a lower probability of indirect lobbying as legislative 
capacity decreases. This is the reverse of my prediction. As an example, given a high level of 
bureaucrat-lobbyist policy agreement, and holding all else equal, there should be more indirect 
bureaucratic lobbying in Ohio than in Utah since legislative capacity is high in Ohio and low in 
Utah. At the other end of the agreement scale, where bureaucrats and lobbyists disagree on 
policy, bureaucrats are slightly less likely to lobby as legislative capacity increases, and slightly 
6 Because agreement interacts with both legislative capacity and agency capacity, I conducted a robustness check 
on this result by replicating Figure 5.5 but with agency capacity held at its highest and lowest values rather than 
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more likely to lobby as legislative capacity decreases. To flip the example, I would expect more 
indirect lobbying in Utah than Ohio if there is very low policy agreement.
This result suggests that agreement is not a prerequisite for the expected effect of 
legislative capacity—increases in legislative capacity lead to a lower probability of indirect 
bureaucratic lobbying only at low levels of bureaucrat-lobbyist agreement. Does this suggest that 
the persuasion theory of lobbying describes indirect bureaucratic lobbying where legislative 
capacity is relatively low? On one hand, Figure 5.5 suggests that bureaucrats may be so 
interested in providing information to low-capacity legislatures that they target non-ally interest 
groups to convince them to change their policy preferences. On the other hand, the conventional 
definition of persuasive lobbying is that information from lobbyists serves to change the 
preferences of uncertain legislators (Hansen 1991; Wright 1996/2003). If persuasion were the 
correct model for indirect bureaucratic lobbying (at least where legislative capacity is low), I 
would expect to see significant estimates for the middle values of agreement, indicating that 
bureaucrats sometimes attempt to convert fence-sitting lobbyists in addition to those lobbyists 
who strongly disagree with them. The fact that the only significant estimates are at low levels of 
agreement is also a curious result because lobbyists tend to hold strong, well informed opinions 
compared to legislators—it should be difficult for bureaucrats to convince them to change their 
minds and to lobby on that basis. In any case, this test alone is not definitive. I speculate further 
on the issue of persuasion later in this section, and I return to the question of the correct lobbying 
model in Chapter 6.
Another way to look at this interaction shown in Figure 5.5 is to plot the marginal effect 
of agreement at different levels of legislative capacity (Figure 5.6):
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Figure 5.6: Change in probability of Requests for unit increases in 
agreement at each level of legislative capacity (values centered at means)
Figure 5.6 shows the same dynamics in reverse. There is a statistically significant effect 
of agreement only at the lowest and highest levels of legislative capacity. Where legislative 
capacity is very low, increases in policy agreement result in a lower probability of indirect 
bureaucratic lobbying. Again taking Utah as an example of a state with low legislative capacity, I 
would expect to see that there is more indirect bureaucratic lobbying at low levels of bureaucrat-
lobbyist policy agreement—perhaps consistent with persuasive lobbying, although this is unclear
—and less indirect bureaucratic lobbying as agreement increases. Conversely, where legislative 
capacity is high, higher policy agreement between bureaucrats and lobbyists increases the 
probability of indirect bureaucratic lobbying. In a high legislative capacity state like Ohio, then, I 
would expect to see more indirect bureaucratic lobbying as bureaucrat-lobbyist agreement 
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legislators already have high information levels. High agreement between bureaucrats and 
lobbyists may represent a key opportunity for bureaucrats to weigh in on legislative decision-
making—via indirect bureaucratic lobbying—where legislators are high capacity. These data do 
not reveal whether, in this scenario, bureaucrats are providing information subsidies to their 
interest group allies or simply activating them. I return to the issue of information subsidies later 
in this chapter.
So far, the marginal effects shown in Figures 5.5 and 5.6 are inconsistent with Hypothesis 
4: Bureaucrats are more likely to solicit interest group lobbying in states where legislative  
capacity is low, but this effect is conditional on high bureaucrat-lobbyist agreement. If the data 
supported Hypothesis 4 then I would expect to see that high agreement and low legislative 
capacity combine to increase the probability of indirect lobbying. Instead, agreement and 
legislative capacity combine in unexpected ways. I summarize these results in Table 5.5.











Table 5.5, however, does not take agency capacity into account. Because the effect of 
agreement depends on both legislative and agency capacity, I conduct robustness tests by 
replicating Figure 5.6 but with different levels of agency capacity. Whereas Figure 5.6 holds 
agency capacity at its mean, Figure 5.7 holds agency capacity at its lowest level and Figure 5.8 
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holds agency capacity at its highest level.
Figure 5.7: Change in probability of Requests for unit increases in agreement at each level of 
legislative capacity (agency capacity at lowest value; other variables centered at means)
Figure 5.8: Change in probability of Requests for unit increases in agreement at each level of 
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These plots help to make sense of Figures 5.5 and 5.6, which hold agency capacity at its 
mean value. Figures 5.7 and 5.8 each reflect one part of the two-part result illustrated by Figure 
5.6. In Figure 5.7, where agency capacity is held at its lowest value, there are significant 
estimates for the positive effect of agreement where legislative capacity is high. Hypothetically, 
then, in a state where agency capacity is very low and legislative capacity is very high, 
agreement has a positive effect. If agency capacity is very low and legislative capacity is also 
low, there is no significant effect of agreement. 
This series of plots suggest that bureaucrats in very low-capacity agencies (which may 
be, by extension, low-reputation agencies) who want to influence high-capacity legislatures are 
more likely to approach lobbyists who agree with them than they are to approach lobbyists who 
disagree with them. Bureaucrats working in low-capacity or low-reputation agencies may need 
the existence of alignment in order to ask interest groups for help because their information 
levels or reputations make it difficult to effectively target lobbyists who disagree. Put simply, 
persuasion may be especially difficult for bureaucrats in low-capacity agencies. Where 
bureaucrats are in low-capacity agencies in states with low-capacity legislatures, agreement 
makes no difference—bureaucrats may request lobbying help where there is alignment, for the 
reasons I speculate on above, and may also attempt to persuade non-aligned interest groups if 
bureaucrats are sufficiently concerned about information gaps in low-capacity legislatures.
In Figure 5.8, where agency capacity is held at its highest value, there are significant 
estimates for the negative effect of agreement at low levels of legislative capacity. In other 
words, in a hypothetical state with very high agency capacity and very low legislative capacity 
there is a negative effect of agreement. In a hypothetical state with very high agency capacity 
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and high legislative capacity, there is no effect of increases in agreement. 
Figure 5.8, then, suggests that bureaucrats working in strong agencies attempt to persuade 
interest groups who do not agree with them to assist them with low-capacity legislators, perhaps 
because they can—these bureaucrats are better able to persuade in this way than bureaucrats 
working in low-capacity agencies. Bureaucrats working in strong agencies may be equally likely 
to lobby directly at the same time that they lobby indirectly, because their agency reputation 
facilitates both. This is speculative since I do not have systematic data on direct lobbying. It may 
also be the case that these same bureaucrats are less likely to request help as bureaucrat-lobbyist 
agreement increases because they do not need to request it—the combination of high agency 
reputation and agency – interest group alignment (meaning that any interest group lobbying is 
already consistent with bureaucrats' policy preferences) is enough to sway low-information 
legislatures. Where agency capacity and legislative capacity are both high, bureaucrats are able 
to wield direct influence as well as to persuade or ask for favors from allies equally—their 
likelihood of indirect lobbying does not depend on agreement. 
It is also worth noting here that although this section is ostensibly about the marginal 
effects of legislative capacity, the plots in Figures 5.7 and 5.8—specifically, the differences 
between the estimated effects of agreement and legislative capacity at low and high levels of 
agency capacity—are also consistent with my overall prediction that we should see more indirect 
bureaucratic lobbying where agency capacity is low because these bureaucrats need an 
alternative to direct lobbying. 
Finally, before moving on to Hypothesis 5 and consideration of governors, I summarize the 
results presented so far with respect to Hypothesis 1 (Bureaucrats are more likely to solicit interest 
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group lobbying on a particular policy if bureaucrats and interest groups agree on that policy. This 
effect will hold regardless of legislative capacity or agency capacity). The effect of agreement varies
—it depends on the levels of legislative and agency capacity as discussed above. If Hypothesis 1 
were correct, we would see a positive effect of agreement at every level of legislative capacity and 
agency capacity. Furthermore, there is an unexpected but striking finding that decreases in 
agreement sometimes produce a higher likelihood of indirect bureaucratic lobbying. This suggests 
that I should rule out the simple relationship between agreement and indirect bureaucratic lobbying 
set out in Hypothesis 1. At the same time, changes in the probability of indirect bureaucratic 
lobbying for each unit increase in agreement are generally much larger than the marginal effects of 
agency capacity or legislative capacity. Furthermore, as explained in Chapter 4 (and discussed below 
in the context of Hypothesis 5), I do not have a direct measure of agreement for reported Requests 
on all observations in this analysis. For these reasons—and given the importance of agreement for 
the applicability of various lobbying theories—I conduct further tests on the effect of agreement in 
the next chapter.
Gubernatorial Power and Governor-Bureaucrat Agreement (H5)
I now turn to the estimates relevant to Hypothesis 5: Bureaucrats are more likely to  
solicit interest group lobbying if gubernatorial power is low and bureaucrats agree with  
governor. Again, because the variables in the interaction term are continuous and the meaning of 
the odds ratio is difficult to interpret, I use the full model to find the effects of unit increases in 
governor-bureaucrat disagreement at each level of gubernatorial power, holding all other 
variables at their means (Figure 5.9). 
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Figure 5.9: Change in probability of Requests for unit increases in gubernatorial 
power at each level of governor-bureaucrat agreement (values centered at means)
Figure 5.9 shows that the estimated effect of increasing gubernatorial power is significant 
at high values of governor-bureaucrat agreement (dropping the single observation with the 
lowest agreement does not change these estimates). Estimates at the middle and low values of 
agreement are not significant. Where agreement is high, then, increases in gubernatorial power 
decrease the probability of indirect bureaucratic lobbying. For example, in a state like Michigan, 
which grants governors more formal budget powers than average, I would expect to see less 
indirect bureaucratic lobbying than in a state like Colorado, given similar high levels of 
bureaucrat-governor alignment and ignoring all other variables. This result is consistent with my 
expectation and supports Hypothesis 5. Again, I expect to see more indirect bureaucratic 
lobbying where bureaucrats agree with governors on Medicaid legislation (including but not 
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because bureaucrats can increase support in the legislature for the executive branch position—
where governors have limited bargaining ability—by asking lobbyists for help. I summarize this 
expectation and the corresponding result in Table 5.6:















I note that the “main effect” of gubernatorial power, shown in Table 5.1, is interpretable 
because the other variable in the interaction—governor-bureaucrat agreement—contains zero. To 
take the estimate in the full model in column (2) of Table 5.1 as an example, each unit increase in 
the gubernatorial power score makes the odds of bureaucratic requests for lobbying twenty-nine 
times as high as the odds of no requests when governor-bureaucrat agreement is at zero. This 
effect is unexpected, since it suggests that where agreement is low, increases in gubernatorial 
power increase the likelihood of indirect bureaucratic lobbying. This may mean that Medicaid 
bureaucrats sometimes attempt to subvert policy initiatives under powerful administrations. 
However, there is only one observation in the data that takes a value of zero for estimated 
governor-bureaucrat agreement and this effect does not show up in the marginal effects plot.
Exploration of Dependent Variable Options in Tests of Effects of Governors
I now turn to a discussion of some of the limitations of my data and how these may affect 
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tests of the effects of governors.7 Specifically—as explained in Chapter 4—there are two 
versions of the Requests dependent variable; each version better reflects one variable in the 
interaction of gubernatorial power and governor-bureaucrat agreement. Reported requests for 
lobbying on “this bill” (the bill that was the survey focus) are those for which I have a more 
direct measure of policy agreement. When I include all requests for lobbying, whether on “this 
bill” (the bill that is the survey focus) or “any other bill,” I use bureaucrat-lobbyist policy 
agreement measured with respect to “this bill” as a proxy for agreement on “other bill” 
observations (as in Table 5.1). Agreement scores are less likely to be accurate for “any bill,” but 
“any bill” is more likely to generalize within states. Hence, macro-level explanations like 
gubernatorial power are more likely to be accurate for analyses using “any bill.” 
In order to compare the estimated effects of governors for each of these dependent 
variable versions, I estimate two reduced models and compare the resulting marginal effects 
plots. Although I run the risk of omitted variable bias, this is the best way to explore a 
comparison of the effects of governor-bureaucrat agreement on “this bill” and “any bill.” When I 
estimate the full model shown in Table 5.1 using only Requests on “this bill,” the interaction of 
gubernatorial power and governor-bureaucrat agreement is not significant, meaning that 
comparison of the variable versions is not possible using the results of the full model. Due to the 
risk of omitted variable bias, I present these results only for the sake of exploring the dependent 
variable options and data limitations, rather than to confirm or disconfirm the results of the full 
model.
Once again, I use Requests as a binary indicator, including both implicit and explicit 
requests for interest group assistance, and I center all continuous variables. In Table 5.7, I present 
7 I discuss similar data issues with respect to tests of the effects of agreement in the next chapter.
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the results of the following model:












Table 5.7: Abbreviated logit models of effects of governors
“this bill” “any bill”
(1) p-value (2) p-value









interaction  0.39*(0.17) 0.03
  0.61*
(0.13) 0.02






N 101 101 101 101
Coefficients are odds ratios. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered by state. 
***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05; +p<.10.
Table 5.7 shows that the interaction term is significant in both estimates. Because the 
interaction terms are significant, I calculate the marginal effects of gubernatorial power on 
reported requests for lobbying at each level of governor-bureaucrat agreement. I hold unified 
party control constant at its mean (0.81). First I show marginal effects for “this bill” in Figure 
5.10 and then for “any bill” in Figure 5.11.
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Figure 5.10: Change in probability of Requests for unit increases in gubernatorial 
power at each level of governor-bureaucrat agreement (values centered at means), “this bill”
Figure 5.11: Change in probability of Requests for unit increases in gubernatorial 
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The curve of the effect of gubernatorial power is similar in these plots but the confidence 
intervals shift. For Figure 5.10, the only significant estimate is at low agreement between 
governors and bureaucrats. This suggests that where bureaucrats do not agree with governors, 
they are more likely to lobby indirectly (on “this bill”) as gubernatorial power increases, perhaps 
in an effort to counteract proposals of strong governors they see as unfriendly to Medicaid. If this 
were true, I would expect to see more indirect bureaucratic lobbying in Michigan than in 
Colorado, given equally low governor-agency agreement and ignoring all other variables, since 
bureaucrats may want to subvert a strong governor's position on a Medicaid policy they do not 
like. Conversely, Figure 5.11, which uses “any bill,” shows that the estimated effect of 
gubernatorial power is only significant at the highest levels of agreement on policy, consistent 
with Hypothesis 5. 
I am fairly confident in Figure 5.11 because it matches the plot derived from the full 
model (Figure 5.9). The marginal effects shown in Figure 5.10 may be inaccurate due to omitted 
variable bias and because Requests on “this bill” do not accurately reflect the effect of macro-
level variables like gubernatorial power. At the same time, the effects shown in Figure 5.10 result 
from more direct measurement of agreement, and suggest the existence of a different bureaucrat-
governor dynamic that may be worthy of further investigation with more or better data. 
Following, I discuss illustrative evidence from the survey transcripts related to this.
Illustrative Survey Excerpts on the Subject of Governors
Next to the mechanics of the indirect lobbying process—in particular, how agreement and 
information subsidies work in this context—governors and their effects on the political behavior 
of other actors were the most-mentioned topic in the open-ended survey questions. Two themes 
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emerge. One is that respondents in some states see governors as more effective on legislative 
policy than the Medicaid agencies in those states. The other theme is that strong governors seem 
to have two very different effects on bureaucratic behavior. 
First, lobbyists in certain states tend to avoid discussing the legislative process with the 
Medicaid agency in favor of working directly with governors' offices. Respondents characterized 
this as the more effective strategy, or explained that negotiations about legislation contents are 
above the pay grade of the Medicaid director. In one state, three out of four respondents 
spontaneously mentioned how much more likely it was for the governor's office to be involved in 
the details of Medicaid legislation than Medicaid agency leaders or staff. For example:
Respondent: If the governor of the state is saying we shouldn't take eyeglasses away from 
old people we're going to coordinate our strategy with the governor's staff. 
Interviewer: What about the agency?
Respondent: The secretary is appointed and if that person wants to keep his or her job 
they'll do what the governor says. 
Interviewer: Have you worked more directly with the Medicaid director or senior staff on 
other issues?
Respondent: Not much, it's more efficient to go to the governor's office. 
One reason this is interesting is that we might expect this state to have relatively low agency 
capacity and a relatively high gubernatorial power score, especially since descriptions of the 
dynamics of Medicaid policy development are fairly consistent across respondents in that state. 
In fact, the opposite is true: this state falls in the top quarter of the (cross-agency) administrative 
capacity rankings but only has a two out of five possible points for gubernatorial budget power. 
However, the governor is a Democrat in both states where respondents consistently described 
this dynamic, and for that reason may be seen as Medicaid-friendly.
Second, I consider the effect of strong governors. My hypothesis about weak governors is 
that bureaucrats should be more politically active in support of Medicaid policies where they 
137
agree with governors and where those governors need extra support in the legislative arena. 
Again, I expect that bureaucrats should be motivated to leverage interest group power in order to 
bolster the executive branch position on Medicaid legislation, if that position is one they agree 
with and governors have limited formal bargaining powers relative to legislatures. This 
hypothesis receives fairly robust support from the data. However, I had no expectations about the 
effect of strong governors other than that they would need less political support from bureaucrats 
and the interest group community. Unexpectedly, the survey transcripts provide examples of two 
distinct patterns in agency-governor relations where governors are strong—these are different 
and more vivid than “strong governors just don't need as much help.” 
One of these patterns is consistent with the unexpected findings on high gubernatorial 
power and governor-bureaucrat policy disagreement shown in Figure 5.10—namely, in some 
states with strong governors, respondents reported that Medicaid bureaucrats sometimes subtly 
work to counteract gubernatorial proposals. Specifically, in several survey states respondents 
seem to think of governors as being interested in cutting the Medicaid program, while they see 
Medicaid agency leaders and staff respondents as working to protect it (although this is by no 
means uniformly true across states). Here is an excerpt from one such survey:
Respondent: [...] And even during the budget cycles when [Medicaid] has to present their 
budget to the legislature, they know it's always good when the community is at those 
hearings and speaking in support of not cutting funds. There's always been a history 
among Medicaid leadership to encourage the community—they know they can't do it 
directly—they can't go into the legislature—they make their budget pitch, but they can't 
advocate. [...] It actually is rather explicit. If we're in a meeting with the Medicaid 
director and his staff, and it's a group of advocates, they're pretty clear about asking us, 
saying hey, you all can make a difference by talking to legislators.
While it is true that this is technically the Republican governor's budget proposal the Medicaid 
director is described as fighting for, the legislature is also controlled by Republicans, and it was 
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perhaps not clear to the respondent that the governor would strongly protest budget cuts made by 
the legislature—other respondents described this governor as being ambivalent about Medicaid, 
at best. On the surveyed bill, all respondents in this state gave the governor a 1 for lowest policy 
agreement and the Medicaid director and staff 2s and 3s, leading to a fair amount of estimated 
governor-bureaucrat disagreement in that state. Given this type of scenario, the unexpected 
marginal effects shown in Figure 5.10 begin to seem intuitive—it makes sense that we might see 
more indirect bureaucratic lobbying on behalf of Medicaid programs as gubernatorial power 
increases and where governors are seen as being generally unsupportive of Medicaid programs. 
The second pattern is that, in some states, strong governors make concerted efforts to 
control policy communications and silence bureaucrats. In contrast with the first pattern, above, a 
significant proportion of survey respondents who talked about strong governors did not report 
that bureaucrats engage in more activism to counteract governors' lack of support of Medicaid. 
Instead, in general, very strong governors seem to have a dampening effect on both direct and 
indirect forms of bureaucratic lobbying. For example:
Respondent: In general our agencies try to be very self-contained—our governor has 
issued an edict that agency legislative liaisons can't take positions without clearance. 
There is a heavy hand right now. 
Interviewer: It seems that could go either way—perhaps agencies become more careful in 
that context or perhaps their relationship with you becomes even more important?
Respondent: They're more careful—even in informal conversations they're careful, they 
don't want to lose their jobs.
Other respondents talked about the effect of strong governors on other actors or institutions; by 
extension, this has a dampening effect on bureaucratic activism. These respondents did not say 
specifically that the governors would react poorly to indirect bureaucratic lobbying, but within 
the same conversation they also stated that Medicaid bureaucrats in that state do not typically 
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engage in such behavior. Following are two examples; the first discusses the governor's strength 
with respect to the legislature and the second with respect to interest groups.
Respondent: That has happened with the developmental disabilities agency. But not with 
[Medicaid]. I'm sure there have been times when they've allowed things to go by without 
protest, but they've never [asked for support]. The Medicaid agency here is a lot more 
closed in terms of communication than all other agencies. [...] We had a good 
relationship with [the governor] when he was [in his last political position] but he's very 
controlling as governor. Very controlling of the legislature. 
Respondent: [The lobbying] was spread around, with people working their own 
reimbursement issues. [Hesitates, makes joke about anonymity.] It's unusual for an 
administration to put something out that remains unchanged through legislature. You 
would be hesitant to publicly say that you didn't like something in the bill. This governor 
is very strong. 
Interviewer: That sounds difficult.
Respondent: It's strategic—you want to make sure that there's access, and people just 
made small points, you wouldn't want to be in the newspaper saying you didn't like the 
bill. Even legislature didn't make changes to bill. In fairness, the governor prioritized 
health care in the budget and understands the need for access to care. 
In the second example of a respondent's description of a governor's strength and control over the 
policy development process, it is quite difficult to imagine the possibility of indirect bureaucratic 
lobbying. If both the lobbyist community and the legislature defer to the governor, there is 
neither any way for bureaucrats to try to subvert a gubernatorial proposal they dislike nor any 
need for bureaucrats to support a desirable gubernatorial proposal. These descriptions of 
governors seem to constitute something other than, or in addition to, simple gubernatorial 
political strength—it may be the case that some governors are especially interested in control and 
make a point of acting on that basis. This is clearly not a definitive finding but it does point to an 
avenue for further research. 
Explicitness of Requests (H6)
Finally, also related to governors, I conduct a separate test of Hypothesis 6: Bureaucrats  
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should request interest group support more openly if their preferences are aligned with  
governors' preferences. This hypothesis test explores the possibility (as suggested by Figure 
5.10) that bureaucrats do, occasionally, solicit help from bureaucrats when they do not agree with 
governors, possibly to counteract the executive branch position on a Medicaid policy. If they do 
so, I expect that they should issue these requests for lobbying help in a more implicit way. 
Conversely, I expect that bureaucrats who lobby indirectly in order to support executive branch 
policy positions should issue more explicit requests. 
In all prior analyses of Requests in this chapter, I have treated the variable as binary, 
bundling together any type of request. In this section I use all of the information available in the 
variable, which is coded as 0 for no request, 1 for implicit requests, and 2 for explicit requests. 
First, I use only those observations where there was a request, of either type. I use logistic 
regression to estimate the effect of governor-bureaucrat agreement on type of request, 
conditional on there being a request. Here implicit requests are re-coded as 0 and explicit 
requests as 1, so odds ratios represent the odds of switching from an implicit request to an 
explicit one. I estimate the following model separately for “this bill” and “any bill” and present 
results in Table 5.8: 
( ) ( ){ εββ +⋅+= agreement bureaucrat-governor_logit 10typerequest
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Table 5.8: Logit model of type of request for lobbying











Coefficients are odds ratios. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered by state.
***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05; +p<.10. 
The odds ratio for agreement is more than one for both estimates, which is what I 
expected. This means that switching from an implicit request to an explicit request is more likely 
as agreement increases from 0 to 1, 1 to 2, and so on. However, neither of these estimates is 
statistically significant. For illustration purposes, in Table 5.9 I show the distribution of request 
type by agreement for “this bill,” for which I have a more direct measure of agreement.
Table 5.9: Request type by agreement scores
Table 5.9 shows that there is a high proportion of explicit requests where there is high agreement 
(agreement = 4). Where there is least agreement (=0) the only request is implicit. The table also 




Implicit (0) Explicit (1)
0.0 1 0 1
2.0 0 1 1
2.5 1 0 1
2.6 1 0 1
3.0 0 5 5
3.3 0 1 1
3.6 1 0 1
4.0 3 11 14
Total 7 18 25
Gov.-Bur. 
Agreement
Next, I consider whether including all observations would yield significant estimates of 
the effect of governor-bureaucrat agreement on request type. I use ordered logistic regression to 
account for changes between no requests, implicit requests, and explicit requests. This approach 
requires the assumption that odds of moving from 0-1 are proportional to moving from 1-2. A 
Brant test of the proportional odds assumption indicated that this assumption is correct for the 
following model. Therefore I present estimates in Table 5.10 using both versions of the 
“requests” dependent variable: 
( ) ( ){ εββ +⋅+= agreement bureaucrat-governor_logit Ordered 10typerequest
Table 5.10: Ordered logit model of type of request for lobbying














Coefficients are odds ratios. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered by state. 
***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05; +p<.10. 
The coefficient estimates for the effect of governor-bureaucrat disagreement on request type are 
both in the wrong direction and both statistically insignificant. I also estimated alternative 
models using both ordered logistic regression and generalized ordered logistic regression, but the 
odds ratios remain in the wrong direction and statistically insignificant (not shown). Hypothesis 
6 therefore receives some support from descriptive statistics but not from model estimates.
I suspect that the lack of support from model estimates is at least partly a function of the 
low number of observations for requests of either type, particularly the relatively low 
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observations for implicit requests on “this bill,” which is the version of the dependent variable 
that is most likely to accurately reflect policy agreement. The descriptive data for “this bill” 
show that requests tend to be explicit where there is high agreement, but there are very few 
implicit requests where there is low agreement. Again, this may reflect the fact that there are very 
few implicit requests overall. As discussed in Chapter 4, the low number of implicit requests may 
be a result of the fact that these are difficult for lobbyists to recognize. For example, if 
bureaucrats provide an information subsidy to lobbyists without articulating a request for 
lobbying, lobbyists may not recognize the implied request for what it is. Hence, it makes sense 
that reports of implied requests are relatively few in number. The combination of the descriptive 
data and the descriptive statistics in this section suggest, however, that there may be some truth 
to the hypothesis. More data, with more carefully worded survey questions that probe 
information subsidies, might yield a significant model estimate showing that bureaucrats are 
more comfortable explicitly articulating requests for lobbying where they agree with governors. 
Conclusion
In this chapter I have presented the results of quantitative tests of the factors predicted to 
affect the likelihood of indirect bureaucratic lobbying. I estimate a comprehensive model that 
includes two micro-level variables (bureaucrat-lobbyist agreement and interest group power) and 
three macro-level variables (agency capacity, legislative capacity, and gubernatorial power). I 
find some evidence that each of these matters for bureaucratic behavior, but not always in 
expected ways. I also present a series of marginal effects plots and selected alternative model 
specifications. In addition, I provide illustrative narratives from the qualitative data that bring 
meaning to quantitative results pertaining to governors.
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The strongest support for my theory comes from tests of the effect of agency capacity. The 
data support the idea that we should see more indirect bureaucratic lobbying where agencies are 
low capacity and where there is high bureaucrat-lobbyist agreement (Hypothesis 3). My prediction 
about these dynamics was that bureaucrats working in high capacity agencies should have an 
increased ability to lobby directly; thus, those working in relatively low capacity agencies should 
be more likely to rely on the interest group community to relay their policy preferences to 
legislators. My results are consistent with this prediction. Contrary to Carpenter's (2001) account, 
my findings suggest that a distinguished agency reputation is not a necessary condition for 
politically consequential relationships with private-sector organizations. I also theorized that the 
negative effect of agency capacity should be dependent on the existence of high agreement 
between bureaucrats and lobbyists because it is easier for bureaucrats to ask for help from groups 
with similar policy preferences. Unexpectedly, however, the negative effect of agency capacity 
also shows up at medium levels of agreement (Figure 5.1). Thus it appears that there is some 
lower threshold for agreement that must be exceeded. A more refined measure of agreement—and 
a dependent variable that equally reflects agreement and institutional characteristics—might help 
to pinpoint what this threshold is.
I also find strong support for part of my theory related to governors. The combined effect 
of gubernatorial power and estimated governor-bureaucrat agreement is consistent with my 
expectation: bureaucrats are more likely to lobby indirectly to support governors that have weaker 
formal bargaining powers and with whom they agree (Hypothesis 5). Medicaid bureaucrats who 
agree with gubernatorial goals for Medicaid programs (or at least with the general position on 
Medicaid policy of the executive branch) may be motivated to support those goals by lobbying 
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indirectly where legislators are better able to disrupt executive branch plans. Theoretically, if 
governors have weak bargaining powers relative to legislatures, then bureaucrats may want to 
solicit interest group support for the executive branch position on Medicaid in order to bolster the 
governor's powers and increase the chance of realizing preferred legislative outcomes.
However, a robustness check on this result also suggested the possibility of another 
dynamic: namely, bureaucrats may also sometimes lobby indirectly in order to subvert strong 
governors they do not agree with. While this preliminary finding needs more investigation to be 
considered definitive, primarily because I obtained the result with an abbreviated model, 
illustrative survey excerpts provide a degree of corroboration. Specifically, several respondents 
discussed having been approached for lobbying help in states where the governor is strong and is 
widely seen to be unfriendly to Medicaid.8 Another qualitative theme related to governors is that 
some bureaucrats prefer to work directly with governors on Medicaid legislation and advocacy, 
rather than agencies. Due to the complex effects of governors—and the multiple ways that 
lobbyist survey respondents characterized these effects—I revisit the topic of governors in Chapter 
7 by conducting a more in-depth thematic analysis of the available qualitative survey information 
on governor-agency relationships. I build on my findings related to policy agreement (in this 
chapter and the next) by asking whether bureaucrat-lobbyist agreement and governor-bureaucrat 
agreement should affect the level of bureaucratic activism around different Medicaid policies. The 
analysis in Chapter 7 thus uses the results of quantitative analyses to inform a qualitative analysis 
that focuses more directly on Medicaid.
My theory received mixed support from tests related to interest group power (Hypothesis 
8 In other states, strong governors seem to have a dampening effect on all bureaucratic activism. I return to this 
topic in Chapter 7.
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2). I predicted that Medicaid bureaucrats are likely to ask for help from the most effective 
lobbying organizations, and that group power depends (at least partly) on party control of state 
legislatures. I find support for this general idea but only after estimating an abbreviated model. 
Specifically, I find that Medicaid bureaucrats are more likely to attempt to leverage the lobbying 
power of provider groups than consumer groups where there is Republican party control of both 
legislative chambers. Provider and business associations are well positioned to explain the 
Medicaid “business case” to legislators who are inclined to stress the importance of economic 
policy considerations over humanist ones. This suggestive finding is consistent with my prediction 
that consumer groups are relatively less important for bureaucrats where there are no Democrats in 
power. While my approach to this test risks omitted variable bias, all odds ratios are in the same 
direction as in the non-significant estimates of the full model. Research on indirect bureaucratic 
lobbying is still largely exploratory, and these results suggest an avenue for future research that 
may yield more definitive findings.
My theory received only weak support from the test of Hypothesis 6, which predicts that if 
bureaucrats do ask for interest group assistance in a way that runs contrary to the preferences of 
governors, they should do so in a relatively surreptitious manner. I found no statistically 
significant regression results to support this idea, but descriptive statistics are roughly consistent 
with my expectation. Where governor-bureaucrat agreement is high, requests for lobbying on “this 
bill” are mostly explicit. Where agreement is low, there are few requests at all, but 3 out of 4 
requests at low agreement are explicit. 
Finally, tests of two other hypotheses do not support my expectations. First, the data seem 
to rule out an independent effect of high bureaucrat-lobbyist policy agreement on indirect 
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bureaucratic lobbying (Hypothesis 1). Instead, the effect of agreement depends on both agency 
capacity and legislative capacity. However, due to data limitations, there are reasons to be 
skeptical of the idea that policy agreement is not important overall. As discussed, the main 
analysis in this chapter relies on the “any bill” version of the dependent variable, which reflects 
some indirect (proxied) measurement of agreement. This is because survey respondents assigned 
policy agreement scores only with respect to the bill that was the survey focus (“this bill”). The 
“any bill” version of Requests (all reports of requests, whether for “this bill” or “other bill”) uses 
policy agreement for “this bill” as a proxy for “other bill” observations. For this reason I continue 
to explore the effect of agreement in the next chapter as well as in Chapter 7, as applied to specific 
Medicaid policies.
The data also do not support my prediction that there should be more indirect bureaucratic 
lobbying where legislative capacity is low and agreement is high (Hypothesis 4). I expected to see 
more indirect bureaucratic lobbying where legislatures have low capacity because bureaucrats 
should be interested in using interest groups to fill information gaps for these legislators. I also 
expected to see this negative effect of legislative capacity only where there is high bureaucrat-
lobbyist policy agreement. Instead, legislative capacity and bureaucrat-lobbyist policy agreement 
combine to affect indirect bureaucratic lobbying in unexpected ways (Figure 5.5), and their 
combined effect further depends on the level of agency capacity (Figures 5.6, 5.7 and 5.8). 
The combined results of tests of agency and legislative capacity are complex. I summarize 
these findings as follows: 1) where agency capacity is very low and legislative capacity is very 
high, agreement has a positive effect on the likelihood of indirect bureaucratic lobbying; 2) if 
agency capacity is very low and legislative capacity is also low, there is no significant effect of 
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agreement; 3) where agency capacity is very high and legislative capacity is low there is a 
negative effect of agreement; and 4) where agency capacity is high and legislative capacity is 
high, there is no effect of increases in agreement. I re-state this summary in Table 5.11.
   Table 5.11: Summary effects of agreement on Requests (“any bill”) at different 














No significant effect of agreement 
(Requests equally likely with high 
and low agreement)
Negative effect of increases in 
agreement
High Positive effect of increases in agreement
No significant effect of agreement 
(Requests equally likely with high 
and low agreement)
These findings suggest that bureaucrats behave differently with respect to interest groups 
and legislatures when they work in agencies of different capacity. This may be because capacity, 
or agency professionalism, affects agency reputation or relative agency bargaining strength. I offer 
these possible summary interpretations of the above results: 1) bureaucrats in low-reputation 
agencies need the existence of bureaucrat-lobbyist agreement either to motivate or to enable them 
to ask lobbyists for help in influencing legislatures that already have high information resources; 
2) bureaucrats in low-reputation agencies are equally likely to ask for help from aligned and non-
aligned interest groups if they want to influence low-capacity legislatures, perhaps because they 
want to fill legislators' information gaps; 3) bureaucrats in high reputation agencies may have 
sufficiently high information levels and/or reputation that their opinions are somehow dominant—
these bureaucrats may try to persuade non-aligned interest groups to help them with low-
information legislatures; and 4) bureaucrats in high-capacity agencies are equally likely to ask for 
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help from aligned and non-aligned lobbyists to help them influence high-capacity legislatures. In 
the latter two scenarios, where agency capacity is high, bureaucrats may also be simultaneously 
conducting direct lobbying, consistent with the findings of Nicholson-Crotty and Miller (2012). I 
re-state these interpretations in Table 5.12.













Requests equally likely with high 
and low agreement, perhaps 
because filling legislative 
information gaps is generally 
important
Here, where agency capacity is 
high, bureaucrats may persuade 
lobbyists who don't agree 
(and may also lobby directly)
High
Bureaucrats need existence of 
agreement to be able to ask 
lobbyists for help?
Requests equally likely with high 
and low agreement (bureaucrats 
may also lobby directly) 
Overall, then, it appears that these characteristics of state institutions and the actors who 
inhabit them have more complex, interactive effects on bureaucratic activism than I expected. At 
the same time, I issue a general caveat that I performed all of these analyses with data that may not 
always accurately reflect bureaucrat-lobbyist policy agreement. I present robustness checks on the 
effect of agreement and provide further discussion of this variable in the next chapter.
In conclusion, this chapter tests a theory of indirect bureaucratic lobbying using a novel 
dataset of lobbyist-bureaucrat communications about Medicaid legislation in 25 states. My results 
suggest that both micro-level factors (policies, groups) and macro-level factors (institutional 
capacity, gubernatorial power) matter for indirect bureaucratic lobbying, but not always in 
expected ways. In particular, the interactions among several of these variables show that their 
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effects on indirect bureaucratic lobbying are more complex than anticipated. Due to data 
limitations, all results in this chapter should be interpreted cautiously, particularly where I 
obtained a result using an abbreviated model. However, there is sufficient evidence of 
relationships between most of my hypothesized factors and indirect bureaucratic lobbying to 
suggest that future work (on state-level policy bargaining, bureaucratic behavior, and Medicaid 
outcomes) should take into account bureaucrats' policy preferences, relationships with other 
actors, and relative institutional power.
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Appendix A: Test of Linearity Assumption
As a further robustness check on the results shown in Table 5.1 I explore the possibility 
of non-linear effects of institutional variables on requests for lobbying. It seems possible that unit 
increases in legislative or agency capacity at low levels might have a larger effect on requests for 
lobbying than unit increases at high levels. I took the natural log of agency capacity and 
legislative capacity and re-estimated the full model. I compared post-estimation model fit 
statistics (the area under the ROC curve and AIC/BIC values) after estimating the model with 
original and transformed variables. These statistics indicate that assuming linearity works just as 
well as otherwise, possibly because the number of observations is not large.
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Appendix B: Distribution of Average Bureaucrat-Lobbyist Agreement
Figure 5.12: Distribution of average bureaucrat-lobbyist agreement, 
values centered at mean
The dips in the distribution in Figure 5.12 show that integers are more common than decimals in 
the way the variable is calculated. This is because I take an average of 3-4 agreement scores 
assigned by each lobbyist respondent to different bureaucrats. The average, as explained in 
Chapter 4, represents the overall agreement between a lobbyist and the Medicaid agency about a 
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Figure 5.13: Distribution of average bureaucrat-lobbyist agreement, smoothed,
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Chapter 6: Lobbying Mechanisms in Indirect Bureaucratic Lobbying
The general model of indirect bureaucratic lobbying presented in Chapter 5 and the 
corresponding marginal effects plots provide some, although mixed, support for the idea that 
high bureaucrat-lobbyist agreement increases the likelihood of indirect bureaucratic lobbying. 
Policy agreement has the expected positive effect when interacted with agency capacity, but only 
at the highest levels of legislative capacity. And agreement has a positive effect at high levels of 
legislative capacity, but it has a negative effect at low levels of legislative capacity when agency 
capacity is held at middle and high values. These unexpectedly complex results may reflect some 
of the measurement weaknesses associated with the Requests variable, as discussed in previous 
chapters and reiterated below, or they may mean that policy agreement is not as uniformly 
important as I predicted in Hypothesis 1.
In this chapter, I continue to investigate the effect of policy agreement by conducting 
robustness checks and discussing the limitations of my data. I also address two related questions: 
1) what findings on agreement mean for the applicability of the various lobbying theories 
discussed in Chapter 2; and 2) if agreement is generally important, which helps to rule out the 
idea that persuasion is a common technique for bureaucrats, what is the likelihood that 
bureaucrats provide information subsidies to their interest groups allies when they ask for 
lobbying support? I attempt to answer the first question by first presenting the results of a more 
detailed investigation into agreement using different dependent variable options and by providing 
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illustrative excerpts from the survey transcripts on the topic of policy agreement. I address the 
second question by providing illustrative qualitative information from the original survey on 
bureaucrats' provision of information subsidies to lobbyists. Finally, I present the results of a 
small follow-up survey that asked respondents specifically about information subsidies in the 
context of indirect bureaucratic lobbying.
To briefly recap the lobbying theories discussed in Chapter 2, I summarize three 
theoretical possibilities that might apply to indirect bureaucratic lobbying: 1) persuasion, 2) 
information subsidy, and 3) subsidy-free activation of allies. The first of these possibilities is that 
bureaucrats do not consistently target allies; rather, they request help from interest groups that do 
not already agree with them and attempt to persuade those groups to support their preferred 
policy positions. As suggested by the results in Chapter 5, this may be especially likely to occur 
where legislative capacity is very low and agency capacity is high. However, if that result is an 
anomaly or exception—if other tests show that high agreement is generally important—then one 
of the other two models of lobbying may be a better fit. 
Both of the other two models depend on the presence of agreement between the lobbyist 
and the target legislator, or in this case between the Medicaid bureaucrat and the lobbyist. First, 
the information subsidy theory proposed by Hall and Deardorff (2006) holds that lobbyists target 
legislative allies in order to provide legislators with policy expertise, thereby enhancing the 
ability of legislators to deliver lobbyists' preferred legislative outcomes. Extended to indirect 
bureaucratic lobbying, the theory suggests that we should see Medicaid bureaucrats targeting 
lobbyist allies in order to subsidize them with policy information, after which lobbyists have 
greater expertise to share with their own legislative allies. Second, the idea that Medicaid 
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bureaucrats might instead simply ask interest group allies for help in the legislative arena—
without providing information subsidies—accounts for the fact that some interest groups have 
greater information resources than others, perhaps even greater than those of bureaucrats. These 
two theories both fall under the rubric of “friendly lobbying” since both predict that bureaucrats 
ask for help from lobbyists with whom they agree. Finding more support for the idea that 
agreement matters cannot distinguish between them; therefore, later in this chapter, I also 
consider the available data on the extension of information subsidies.
In conducting these analyses, including those presented in Chapter 5, I make two 
important assumptions about the political dynamics in state health policy arenas. First, as 
explained previously, federal regulation requires Medicaid agencies to gather community input 
on policy changes through meetings of “medical care advisory committees” that include health 
service providers and consumer groups. There is a certain predetermined minimum amount of 
bureaucrat – interest group interaction in every state. Therefore, I assume that access to 
bureaucrats is automatic for interest groups, and vice versa, and I do not control for the decision 
to grant access. The key bureaucratic decision is whether to attempt to leverage interest group 
lobbying power, and the key decision for interest groups is whether to use that power to advance 
common interests. The second assumption is that state-level provider associations move 
independently even if they are state-level chapters of a national association. As discussed in 
Chapter 1, many elements of state Medicaid programs are optional for states, so there is 
significant variation across states in Medicaid benefits, provider reimbursement, population 
groups eligible for coverage, and financing and management strategies. This policy variation 
means that state-level association chapters devote the majority of their attention to state-level 
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policies and independently choose when to lobby on state policy proposals. They may coordinate 
with other states when it comes to national policy, but they operate as stand-alone organizations 
with respect to state Medicaid legislation. Therefore, I do not control for possible non-
independence of provider groups across states.
Robustness Checks on Effect of Agreement
Exploration of Alternative Versions of Requests
I follow up on the results presented in Chapter 5 by conducting additional analyses of the 
effect of agency-lobbyist agreement on bureaucrats' attempts to leverage interest group lobbying 
power. First, I compare model estimates using only those requests for lobbying reported for the 
bill that is the survey focus (“this bill”) to those using all requests for lobbying (“any bill”). To 
reiterate the differences between these two versions of Requests, as explained in Chapter 4, 
reported requests on “this bill” are those for which I have a direct measure of policy agreement. 
When I include all requests for lobbying, whether on “this bill” or “other bill,” I use bureaucrat-
lobbyist policy agreement measured with respect to “this bill” as a proxy for agreement on “other 
bill” observations (as in Table 5.1). Agreement scores are more likely to be accurate for “this 
bill.” But the combined “any bill” version of Requests is more likely to generalize within states, 
so macro-level explanations like legislative capacity are more likely to hold for analyses using 
“any bill.” Thus, each version of the dependent variable is likely to reflect one of the terms in the 
interaction more accurately, making interpretation of the interactions of agreement and 
institutional capacity variables particularly challenging. This measurement issue is a key reason 
for investigating the robustness of the result in Chapter 5 that suggests that persuasion occurs 
(i.e., the result suggesting that bureaucrats target lobbyists who don't agree with them where 
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legislative capacity is low and agency capacity is high).
Here I re-estimate the full model from Chapter 5 using the “this bill” version of Requests. 
While I do not expect state-level variables to be significant explanations for this version of 
Requests, I estimate the full model in order to avoid omitted variable bias while examining the 
effect of agreement. I center all continuous variables at their means in order to facilitate 























































































The “any bill” estimates in Table 6.1 are exactly the same as in Table 5.1; I show them 
here for comparison to “this bill” estimates in the first column.
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   Table 6.1: Logit models of requests for lobbying on recent Medicaid bills 
“this bill” p-value “any bill” p-value
average bureaucrat-lobbyist 
agreement






agency capacity 1.0(0.02) 0.87
     0.96***
(0.009) 0.000








legislative capacity 1.03(0.03) 0.23
0.99
(0.01) 0.66
legislative capacity * bur.-lob. 
agreement
   1.01**
(0.01) 0.29
   1.04**
(0.016) 0.007
H2






consumer group 0.55(0.24) 0.41
0.62
(0.24) 0.22







gubernatorial power    31.64**(71.11) 0.12
   29.13**
(29.46) 0.001
governor-bureaucrat agreement 0.51(0.36) 0.35
0.58
(0.21) 0.14
gubernatorial power * gov.-bur. 
agreement
     0.43**
(0.26) 0.17



















   Coefficients are odds ratios. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered by state.
   ***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05; +p<.10. 
The estimates for “this bill” show that there is a statistically significant main effect for 
bureaucrat-lobbyist agreement. Surprisingly, the interactions of agreement with agency capacity 
and legislative capacity are significant as well. In order to interpret the effect of agreement in the 
160
context of these interactions, I present additional marginal effects plots based on the estimates for 
“this bill.”
Figure 6.1: Change in probability of Requests for unit increases in 
agency capacity at each level of agreement (values centered at means)
Figure 6.1 shows the marginal effect of agency capacity at different levels of bureaucrat-lobbyist 
policy agreement for “this bill.” There is no level of agreement at which there is a significant 
estimate for the marginal effect of agency capacity. Figure 6.1 holds legislative capacity at its 
mean, so I created the same plot at low and high legislative capacity (not shown). There are no 
significant effects for agency capacity in these plots either. This lack of effect of agency capacity 
is not altogether surprising because, as discussed previously, requests on “this bill” are less likely 
to reflect the effect of state-level variables than requests on “any bill.”
However, the effect of agreement may depend on the level of agency capacity. Therefore 
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Figure 6.2: Change in probability of Requests for unit increases in 
agreement at each level of agency capacity (values centered at means)
Figure 6.2 shows that there is a significant positive effect of agreement on Requests for help on 
“this bill” at all but the lowest and highest levels of agency capacity and when I hold legislative 
capacity at its mean value.1 I created similar plots at low and high legislative capacity (not 
shown). There are no significant estimates for agreement at all when legislative capacity is low, 
and there is a very slight positive effect of agreement at middle values of agency capacity when 
legislative capacity is high.
Next, I plot the marginal effects of legislative capacity on Requests for lobbying on “this 
bill” at different levels of agreement in Figure 6.3.
1 Only 9 observations (8.5%) have (centered) agency capacity values of less than -26. The small number of 
observations with low values of agency capacity may be a factor in the lack of significance for those estimates. 
On the other hand, 41.5% of the observations have a value higher than 10, so low numbers are probably not the 
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Figure 6.3: Change in probability of Requests for unit increases in 
legislative capacity at each level of agreement (values centered at means)
Figure 6.3 shows that, like the marginal effects of agency capacity, there are no significant 
estimates for legislative capacity at any level of agreement. In Figure 6.3, agency capacity is held 
at its mean, but I also see no significant effects when I hold agency capacity at its low and high 
values (not shown). Again, since I am primarily interested in the effect of agreement on Requests 
for lobbying on “this bill,” and since the interaction coefficient in Table 6.1 indicated that there 
are some significant effects of at least one of the variables in the interaction, I plot the reverse of 
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Figure 6.4: Change in probability of Requests for unit increases in 
agreement at each level of legislative capacity (values centered at means) 
Figure 6.4 shows that there is a significant positive effect of bureaucrat-policy agreement at the 
middle and high values of legislative capacity, when I hold agency capacity at its mean.2 There 
are no significant estimates when I create the same plot at low and high levels of agency capacity 
(not shown).
Taken together, these plots show the expected positive effect of agreement, but only at 
middle values of agency capacity and middle-to-high values of legislative capacity. Because 
Requests on “this bill” are more likely to accurately reflect the effect of agreement than the 
institutional capacity measures, the positive effect of agreement may be a more reliable result 
than the estimates for the levels of institutional capacity at which the positive effect is apparent. 
These estimates therefore provide strong support for the idea that policy agreement matters.
2 Low numbers are necessarily the cause of insignificant estimates: 29% of the observations have values of less 
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Robustness Checks Using Contacts
Next, using the Contacts dependent variable, I conduct a robustness check on the effect 
of bureaucrat-lobbyist agreement on bureaucrats' attempts to leverage interest group power. This 
dependent variable measures the number of conversations between Medicaid bureaucrats and 
lobbyists about Medicaid legislation during the state legislative session. I expect that higher 
levels of lobbyist-bureaucrat agreement will help to explain more discussions about Medicaid 
legislation between bureaucrats and lobbyists. These conversations do not necessarily reveal 
bureaucratic activism, but the estimated explanations for contacts should support the findings for 
requests.
In the following analysis, I drop 17 observations (4.1% of cases) where the lobbyist 
reported that he or she could not estimate agreement, which yields an n of 396. (For 14 of these 
observations the respondent did not talk to that state actor at all; the other 3 were in the “a few” 
contacts category.) Since each lobbyist respondent reported on contacts with 3 to 4 bureaucrats, 
there are 3 levels of data: contacts are nested within lobbyists and then in turn within 25 states. 
The dataset is on the small side for reliable coefficient estimates with three levels of data. The 
relatively small number of states (25) is the effective sample size at the highest level of data, 
making it difficult to reliably estimate the effect of state-level explanators (Snijders 2005). In 
addition, the small clusters within states (2-7 lobbyists per state) limit my ability to estimate the 
between-state variance (Snijders 2005; Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal 2008). For these reason I 
estimate several reduced forms of the model, cautiously expanding the number of explanators, 
and provide information on model fit using likelihood ratio tests. 
I employ a three-level random coefficient model, estimated using GLLAMM 
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(Generalized Linear Latent And Mixed Models) in Stata because the dependent variable is 
ordered categorical. Contacts is coded as 0 = no contacts, 1 = 1-5 contacts, 2 = 6-10 contacts, and 
3 = over 10 contacts. I cannot include estimated governor-bureaucrat agreement, or its 
interaction with gubernatorial power, because that variable exists only at the lobbyist level. I 











































































   Table 6.2: Maximum likelihood estimates for three-level ordinal logistic random-intercept
   model of Contacts
(1) p-value (2) p-value (3) p-value (4) p-value
β1[agreement]   2.20*
(0.69) 0.01








































β6[Democratic leg.] ---    8.55***
(4.25) 0.000


















































log likelihood -429.46 -417.05 -417.19 -415.94
N 396 396 396 396
   Coefficients are exponentiated. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
   ***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05; +p<.10.
In column (1), I include only the variables directly relevant to tests of the effect of 
agreement. In column (2), I include all variables other than the cross-level interactions. Column 
(3) includes all variables other than the controls, and column (4) shows estimates for the full 
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model. The coefficients in Table 6.2 are exponentiated. The odds of an increase in the Contacts 
category are more than 100% higher for each additional increase in the agreement score in 
columns (1) and (2), and nearly 100% higher in column (3). In column (4), the odds ratio for 
agreement is in the expected direction but is not significant. Neither of the interactions that 
include agreement are statistically significant in any column. This is not altogether surprising 
since both Contacts and Bureaucrat-lobbyist agreement reflect only the bill that is the survey 
focus, which may or may not generalize to all Medicaid bills in each state. 
How much stock should we put in these estimates of the effect of agreement? Likelihood 
ratio tests indicate that each version of the model with explanators results in a better fit than the 
null model, without covariates. These tests also show that the model in column (2) improves on 
the fit of the model column (1), perhaps because of the significant effect of party control of state 
legislatures (this shows, unexpectedly, that lobbyists and bureaucrats are more likely to discuss 
Medicaid legislation when Democrats control at least one chamber of the state legislature). 
However, the likelihood ratio tests also indicate that the models in columns (3) and (4) do not 
result in a better fit than those in column (2). This may be a result of the fact that the effective 
sample size is small (25), and estimating models with high numbers of covariates or with cross-
level interactions may make it difficult to find significant results even where there is a real effect. 
Lack of significance may also result from mulicollinearity: variance inflation factors are high 
(over 10) for the interactions of agreement with agency capacity and legislative capacity. 
Overall, given the limitations of the dataset, this analysis provides partial support for the idea 
that there is a positive effect of agreement on Contacts.
I also note that even in the null (intercept-only) model, state-level variance is very small, 
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suggesting that there is more variance to explain at the lobbyist level. The standard errors for the 
estimates of state-level variance are relatively large, indicating that including the state-level error 
component may not be necessary—this is also true of alternative models that substitute agency 
capacity for legislative capacity (not shown). I estimated two-level models with the same 
covariates but the coefficient estimates and standard errors were very similar.
Next, I model Contacts as a binary indicator. In the models estimated in Table 6.2 I 
assume that the effect of agreement on contacts is the same for each increase in the contacts 
category, but that may not be the case. Agreement may have a different effect on the change from 
no contacts to any contacts than moving from “a few” to “a lot.” Therefore I estimate a 
multinomial logistic regression model of the effect of agreement on contacts, with no other 
covariates, and standard errors clustered by lobbyist (Table 6.3). 
Table 6.3: Multinomial logistic model of contacts
category parameter est. (1) p-value
0 (base) ---



















Coefficients are relative risk ratios. 
Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered by lobbyist.
***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05; +p<.10.
Table 6.3 shows that for each unit increase in bureaucrat-lobbyist agreement there is a 
statistically significant increase in the likelihood of moving from no contacts to 1-5 contacts, as 
well as from no contacts to over 10 contacts. Agreement is not a statistically significant explanation 
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for moving from no contacts to the 6-10 category, although the risk ratio is in the right direction. 
In order to visualize the relationship between agreement and contacts I plot the probability 
of each contacts category for different levels of agreement (Figure 6.5).
Figure 6.5: Average predicted probabilities of Contacts for different values of agreement
This plot is both revealing and confusing. The probability of having over 10 contacts (the 
diagonal line ending at the top right-hand corner) increases as agreement increases, which is 
what I would expect. Similarly, the probability of being in the no-contacts category (the bottom 
line) drops as agreement increases, which is also as expected. However, the positions of the lines 
for the middle two contacts categories are the reverse of what I would expect, since the second 
line from the bottom shows the probability of being in the second-highest contacts category (6-
10 contacts), and the second line from the top (the flattest line) shows the probability of being in 
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as agreement increases. However, there are relatively few observations for this category and 
Table 6.3 shows that its estimated relationship with agreement is less statistically robust.
The shape of the probability lines for the highest contacts category in Figures 6.5 looks 
the most different from the others. Therefore I bundle the three lower categories and estimate the 
effect of agreement on contacts using a logit with clustered standard errors by lobbyist. The odds 
ratio for agreement is 1.36—significantly smaller than the estimates from the multilevel models
—with a robust standard error of 0.18 and a p-value of 0.025. This result indicates that the odds 
of being in the highest contacts category increase by a factor of 1.36 for each unit increase in 
agreement. For the sake of comparison, I also bundle the highest three categories of contacts and 
estimate the effect of agreement on switching from no contacts to any contacts. The odds ratio is 
1.60, with a robust standard error of 0.31 and a p-value of 0.013.
At this point I tentatively conclude that agreement helps to explain higher numbers of 
bureaucrat-lobbyist discussions about Medicaid legislation during state legislative sessions. The 
analysis of Contacts shows that contacts are not linear increasing in agreement—although the 
distribution of the contacts variable makes the 6-10 category less significant—and that 
agreement produces lots of contacts. It does not appear to be the case that agreement is required 
for any contacts, which may be a result of the fact that some (but not all) interest groups meet 
regularly with Medicaid agencies even if they disagree on policy. Medicaid policy is often 
contentious and no policy change makes every interest group happy. However, the fact that 
higher agreement does a good job of explaining many contacts is consistent with my theory that 
higher bureaucrat-lobbyist agreement should make indirect bureaucratic lobbying more likely. 
In summary, alternative methods of modeling the effect of agreement on Requests and 
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Contacts consistently suggest that high agreement matters. I cannot definitively rule out a 
persuasive lobbying story, in which bureaucrats target lobbyists with neutral or opposing 
opinions where legislatures are low capacity and agencies have medium or high capacity. But the 
analyses in this section suggest that the evidence for persuasion, in Table 5.1 and corresponding 
marginal effects plots in Chapter 5, may be due to data limitations: while reported requests for 
lobbying on “any bill” may be a better reflection of both policy-level and state-level explanatory 
factors, average agency-lobbyist-agreement is measured only with respect to the bill that is the 
survey focus. 
Finally, I issue the general caveat that agreement is measured in the same surveys as 
Requests and Contacts, and there is some danger that high agreement in the data is a result of 
previous successful efforts by bureaucrats to persuade lobbyists. Again, however, lobbyists tend 
to have fairly strong, well informed opinions—as I discuss below, lobbyists are not equivalent to 
the relatively low-information, sometimes fence-straddling legislators in traditional lobbying 
research—and it is unlikely that so much shifting of opinion occurs in the course of lobbyist-
bureaucrat conversations that the agreement measure is seriously endogenous.
Illustrative Survey Excerpts on the Subject of Agreement
Survey respondents' descriptions of indirect bureaucratic lobbying support the idea that 
bureaucrats usually ask for lobbying help from interest groups on the same side of an issue, 
rather than attempting to persuade opposed or neutral groups. In the vast majority of cases where 
there was a request for lobbying, survey respondents described situations in which policy 
alignment was a key feature of bureaucrat-lobbyist communication. Following are two examples, 
from different respondents. These are responses to the last (open-ended) survey question, which 
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asked “When you discussed the bill with the Medicaid agency, did you have the sense that they 
wanted to coordinate on advocacy strategy with you, or did they share information in order to 
change your advocacy emphasis?”
Respondent: Yes, we have conversations like that all the time. We may have a bill on 
which we have the same position as the agency, but the legislator sponsoring the bill is on 
the opposite end. We had a bill recently that would enact a safe patient handling program 
and it would have been very costly. The Department of Health had same position as us. 
We were in constant communication strategizing with the department on how we were 
interacting with legislators. 
Interviewer: Was that at your request, or theirs?
Respondent: Both, it was really both, they asked us for help on this. 
Respondent: Yes. When we're on the same page we strategize together, like we 
communicated on the [policy in question]. We had conversations with the administration 
about who had good relationships with legislators. They didn't exactly tell us what to do, 
but we talked about it. 
Interviewer: When you say “administration,” do you mean the Medicaid administration 
or the governor's office? 
Respondent: We have a Medicaid director and [cabinet secretary] that reports to 
governor. We talked to both of them. Medicaid director tends to talk to the [cabinet 
secretary] who then talks to governor. 
Interviewer: So it's fair to say that you had conversations about legislative strategy with 
the Medicaid director?
Respondent: Oh yes. 
Interviewer: And is that typical of other issues that you're aligned on?
Respondent: Yes. 
 Interestingly, in the first example, the lobbyist describes an instance of opposition where 
the legislature is concerned, but the bureaucrat-lobbyist interaction was explicitly a function of a 
high level of agreement. In the second example, the respondent describes coordination on 
strategy where the respondent and Medicaid agency agreed, and further characterizes this as 
business as usual.
Conversely, there were only three cases in which respondents reported that Medicaid 
agencies tried to get groups to back off on policy proposals where there was a distinct lack of 
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alignment. Here is one example of this type of attempt to affect interest group behavior:
Respondent: Yes. That's an interesting question. There was an instance where there was a 
proposed change within the appropriations bill that we advocated for, and the agency 
wanted to have further conversations about the bill. In terms of trying to understand our 
opposition to what the administration was trying to put forward.
Interviewer: So you think they were trying to neutralize your active opposition to this? 
Respondent: Yes, they were. In general, the administration will engage in lobbying on 
their own behalf. 
This example of policy disagreement between the Medicaid bureaucracy and the lobbyist 
respondent could be an example of persuasive indirect bureaucratic lobbying, particularly since 
the respondent notes that “the agency wanted to have further conversations about the bill.” On 
the other hand, the lobbyist and his or her interest group were clearly not fence-sitters on this 
issue—the respondent mentions “our opposition.” It seems possible that the agency was trying to 
understand the group's position without attempting to change it, and in any case was unlikely to 
be able to change it. More important is the fact that there are only three such examples out of 106 
surveys. This further indicates that persuasion, if it occurs, is the exception rather than the norm.
Illustrative Survey Excerpts on the Subject of Information Subsidies
If, at this point, it makes sense to tentatively conclude that indirect bureaucratic lobbying 
usually consists of bureaucrats targeting interest groups that agree with them, it is still unclear 
whether bureaucrats provide information subsidies to their allies or simply activate them. 
Medicaid bureaucrats are well positioned to provide information subsidies on legislation about 
which they have insider information from CMS or governors. And some interest groups may 
have low resources and low information levels. Do information subsidies occur regularly in 
indirect bureaucratic lobbying? 
There are no quantitative data on this topic, but the survey transcripts do contain some 
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illustrative information. The transcripts show that while there is significant variation in how 
respondents talked about information changing hands, there are few clear patterns by group type. 
I note that while the survey question allowed for the possibility of information subsidies (“When 
you discussed the bill with the Medicaid agency, did you have the sense that they wanted to 
coordinate on advocacy strategy with you, or did they share information in order to change your 
advocacy emphasis?”), most respondents answered the first part of the question, framing the 
answers in terms of “coordinating on advocacy.” It is not clear whether this framing is itself 
evidence of activation, or was simply an easier way to conceptualize these communications or 
answer the question. I did not ask follow-up questions specifically about information subsidies.
I categorized and counted respondents' answers to this open-ended survey question. I 
counted 52 instances of no requests at all, 22 requests in which some information appeared to 
flow from the Medicaid agency to lobbyists, 26 requests that consisted only of a request for help, 
and 6 cases in which it was unclear whether information changed hands. Therefore, roughly half 
of the requests appear to accompany obvious information transfers and roughly half did not. 
Medicaid bureaucrats' lobbying requests that did not involve information subsidies seem 
to rely on the presumption of very strong agreement on policy and mutual dependence on the 
continued life of the program. Here are two examples:
Respondent: Medicaid went straight to legislature. They didn't need to avoid visibility. 
Interviewer: So did they not ask for advocacy help on this? 
Respondent: Oh yes, they absolutely did. They came to us and asked us and said 'we need 
your help to support this bill.' Oh yeah. All of the groups. Hospital, medical, we all had to 
support it. The more consumer-type advocacy groups opposed it, and the smaller disabled 
groups opposed it.
Respondent: Yes. When I've seen this happen it's in the hallway, in the lobby at the 
statehouse, certainly at stakeholder meetings, they'll be direct about it—'we're going to 
rely on you guys to do the advocacy and explain the impact of these cuts, put a face on 
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the impact of the cuts.' This is direct but never in writing, if you know what I mean. It's 
clear. But not for public consumption. The legislature would probably string up 
[Medicaid]. They would see this as collusion. 
 
At the same time, some of these apparently subsidy-free requests for lobbying involve 
exchanges of small amounts of political intelligence. If a Medicaid bureaucrat's statement that he 
or she “needs help” constitutes political information, then we might think of this as a small 
information subsidy. As Hall and Deardorff (2006) explain, information subsidies can consist of 
either policy or political information. Hearing a bureaucrat's view that a mutually preferred 
policy is at risk might be helpful information to a lobbyist who cares strongly about a policy 
outcome and would want to know that he or she cannot rely on the Medicaid agency to usher it 
through the legislature or through a particular committee. For example: 
Respondent [in reference to a policy changing coverage of preventative care and 
immunizations]: We're all in lockstep with the [Medicaid agency], so they have called on 
us to explain that to legislators.
Interviewer: What did the request sound like? Was it pretty explicit?
Respondent: Yes, it's a hallway conversation saying 'I need your help, we need to have 
folks testify on this because I'm not going to be able to kill it on my own.'
Respondent: Yes. And they have confidential communications with legislators all the 
time. If it's an issue where we're aligned and they want to get something done and they're 
having a problem with a legislator they'll tell me because we can help. [Medicaid] 
will say, 'if you want to get this done, so and so is a problem, you'd better talk to her.' We 
work very closely with the state. As an advocacy partner on a lot of this stuff.
In a few cases, groups with presumably high levels of technical information clearly 
described information subsidies consisting of political information and they seemed to 
understand that as “information.” For example, one hospital association executive said: “They 
never gave us information that wasn't publicly available, but we do keep each other informed, 
ask each other what have your conversations [with legislators] been like.”
In contrast, several respondents talked about how they have the requisite political 
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intelligence for lobbying, and reacted to the perceived suggestion that Medicaid would tell them 
how to lobby. They described a division of labor in which Medicaid bureaucrats supply technical 
information and the lobbyist relying on his or her presumably greater political expertise in order 
to decide how to use that information most effectively. Following is a straightforward example of 
this, albeit with no details about the information provided, followed by a more complex example:
Respondent: Agency people don't recommend the strategy, but they do provide us with 
information that affects strategy. 
Interviewer: Do you ask for it or do they just provide it?
Respondent: Both. They have scarce [lobbying] resources. They know that we have more 
resources. They use us. 
Respondent: Yes, that does happen, although I'm not sure it happened on [the bill in 
question] because we didn't agree with the agency. On initiatives where we have worked 
with them on legislative initiatives we both supported then it's easier to coordinate. 
Interviewer: Can you give me an example of how the coordination happens? 
Respondent: I think this happens a lot in regulatory areas where they say, if you will go 
advocate for this, for instance when we were opposed to additional licensing on [a 
particular clinical service], and them saying well, we don't have the power to do it 
anyway, like giving us talking points for the legislature. They would say 'FYI, if that 
passed, here are two reasons why that would be bad,' and knowing that would give us a 
talking point; we would then take that information directly to legislators, lobby with it 
because the agency can't, plant the seeds of the idea behind closed doors, and then 
legislators would ask the agency about it point blank, so it's not lobbying for the agency 
to say that in response to the legislators' question. 
The second quote above, which describes the agency using the group's power to open the 
door for the agency to use its own talking point with legislators, was echoed by another 
respondent in a different state. 
In order to see whether there are patterns in the type of request issued (simple request vs. 
information subsidy) by group type, I sort the data in Table 6.4. 
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Table 6.4: Subsidy-free requests for lobbying and
 information subsidies, by group type
Table 6.4 reveals that there are fewer hospital associations that received information subsidies (of 
either policy or political information) than the number that received apparently subsidy-free 
requests for lobbying assistance (5 versus 9). The greater number of subsidy-free activations for 
this high-resource interest group type is consistent with my expectations, yet there is still a 
surprisingly high number of information subsidies. There are slightly more consumer advocacy 
groups that received obvious subsidies than those that did not—11 versus 9—but this is a very 
small difference. This may reflect the wide variation in resources among consumer groups.
Follow-Up Survey on Information Subsidies
Because I did not ask follow-up probes on the topic of information subsidies and the 
available data on this topic are neither systematic nor conclusive, I re-contacted 16 survey 
respondents to ask specifically about information. I chose these respondents because they 
originally affirmed that they received a request for lobbying from a Medicaid bureaucrat and did 
not explicitly describe information subsidies. I also chose these 16 because I had a good rapport 
with them during the original survey and thought some might be willing to speak with me again. 
Of these 16, I had follow-up survey conversations with nine. I organize excerpts from these 
conversations and the original survey in Table 6.5.
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Group Type Requests Information
hospital association 9 5
community health centers 3 3
medical society (physicians) 1 3
other provider group 3 0
consumer advocacy group 9 11
business association 1 0
Total 26 22
   Table 6.5: Conversations on Information Subsidy by Type of Group




“So if they get a sense that they're 
having trouble with a committee or 
issue there have been instances 
where they've said this particular 
item of shared interest is falling, or 
on the other side, we want to help 
support you, what can we do, 
because we have a shared interest.”
“[...] when and if they do ask for assistance they typically give us 
information that you, know, a) might give us a reason to do that and 





“[Medicaid] understand[s] our role 
with the legislature and they seem to 
appreciate how we're trying to 
elevate the conversation about 
Medicaid, so they just ask for 
support broadly.” (As opposed to 
asking for help with a particular 
legislator.)
“[...] [I]f it's something at the time that we weren't as aware of, 
they're very helpful with explaining it, and we have extended 
conversations. […] [T]hey will offer that kind of information. If it's 





“Yes. […] I can just hear 
[Medicaid] saying 'we are going to 
need your support on this with the 
legislature'.”
“Asking us for help like that is not something they do a lot, since 
it's behind the scenes, they also advocate directly on their own. We 
asked what the money would be used for, and [Medicaid told us]. 
[…] We felt better knowing what it was for and it definitely helped 
us talk to legislators about it.”
Yes, policy information, 





“[Medicaid] came to us and asked us 
and said 'we need your help to 
support this bill'.”
“No, we talked in broad terms. […]The support came because we'd 
been involved almost from the beginning. So we knew what was in 
it. Because they are a partner we had to support them. […] [Y]ou're 
either a good partner or you're an adversary.”
No particular information/ 
details required. But 
information subsidy could 





“Yes, [the agency said] things like 
'You know who the people are, we're 
this close to a budget agreement, the 
governor isn't going to budge on 
this, please help explain this'.”
“[...] We supported the policy broadly. […] We did pretty well on 
our own on this. We figured out as an organization that we 
supported this on the front end. [Medicaid] provided that 
[descriptive policy] language to everybody.”
No information/ details 
required. However, 
original request could be 
read as political 
information (“the 
governor isn't going to 
budge on this”).
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“[Medicaid] did advise [us] on the 
[policy] issue – in the context of 
meetings that Medicaid did not 
initiate – that advocates should 
pursue certain strategies, [saying] 
'if I were you...'.”
“They didn't supply any additional information. Just insinuating or 
asking or implying that it was going to be a huge lift. I can't think 
of a time we would have worked on something having to do with 
community health centers when they would have supplied us with 
information.”
Appears to be activation 
based on mutual goals, 
but information subsidy 





“If we're in a meeting with the 
Medicaid director and his staff, and 
it's a group of advocates, they're 
pretty clear about asking us, saying 
'hey, you all can make a difference 
by talking to legislators'.”
“They're not necessarily providing details – they will be making 
their [public] presentations – they know they don't need to rely on 
the community to relay that same information. But they do want 
people to show up and speak on behalf of the program and its 
benefits. […] [Q]uite frankly we had enough expertise in the group, 





original request could be 
read as political 
information (“hey, you all 




“Medicaid will] be direct about it – 
[saying] 'we're going to rely on you 
guys to do the advocacy and 
explain the impact of these cuts, 
put a face on the impact of the 
cuts'.”
“I would say most times they kind of are banking on the fact that 
we already have a pretty good sense of the issues, what's at stake. 
[…] To be perfectly blunt, the advocates are way ahead of the 
bureaucrats as far as analyzing the issues and seeing how policy is 
going to impact folks. It seems like we're always ahead of the curve 
on preparing to do advocacy. And the department is a little bit 
behind.”
No information subsidy. 
Characterizes interest 




“[Medicaid] reached out and asked 
the whole provider community, 
ourselves included, to support 
them. We get calls from them to go 
to the [relevant] hearing.”
“[Medicaid] sometimes needed information because one of the 
selling points was [related to hospitals], and they didn't have that 
information. They were open to our data on that issue. Sometimes 
they're open to us knowing that we have certain expertise. Other 
times they think they know best.” (Probe: What about on the 
hearing we talked about last year?) “Yeah that was more a matter 
of going down to the hearing and saying [Medicaid] is efficient, it 
works, blah blah blah. They might have given us a couple of 
talking points but we also use our own.”
No information subsidy. 
Hospitals gave Medicaid 
information.
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Table 6.5 divides the nine responses into three groups, according to whether an 
information subsidy clearly existed, may have existed, or definitely did not occur. The first three 
rows give three clear examples of policy information subsidies (e.g., “they're very helpful with 
explaining”); however, the third respondent describes having asked the agency for the 
information—the extension of information in this case was apparently not a strategy purposefully 
used by bureaucrats. In these three examples the interest group seemed prepared to agree with 
the agency but did not already have opinions strong enough to motivate lobbying in the absence 
of a request for support. I note that this section of the table includes three non-provider groups: 
two consumer advocacy groups and a business association. The fact that there is no high-
Medicaid-information provider group in this section of the table is consistent with the idea that 
information-rich groups are less likely to need subsidies. 
In the middle section, there are four examples of requests for lobbying that did not 
include explicit subsidies of policy information. Indeed, these groups—two provider groups and 
two consumer groups—all disavowed that idea. However, there are still two possible ways to 
look at the four examples this middle category. One is that these are subsidies of political 
information rather than policy information: by informing these interest groups that a policy of 
mutual interest is in some political danger, Medicaid bureaucrats provided an information 
subsidy of a different kind. The other way to read these examples is that the worry expressed by 
bureaucrats (e.g., “we need your help”) is simply the language used to activate the groups in a 
mainly subsidy-free manner. I argue that we should properly interpret these examples as the 
latter, especially since these respondents do not describe bureaucrats as having shared specific 
political information about specific legislators or political problems. Furthermore, in contrast 
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with Hall and Deardorff's (2006) theory, these examples do not appear to shift the interest groups' 
priorities by providing them with details that could make them more effective. Rather, these 
groups were already prepared to lobby on these issues (this is more apparent when reading the 
entirety of the surveys).
The third category includes two examples, both from provider associations.3 Both 
described having received a request for lobbying that did not contain any subsidies at all; both 
further characterized their groups as having more information than Medicaid bureaucrats. The 
fact that both groups that clearly did not receive subsidies are provider groups, combined with 
the fact that all three groups that clearly received an information subsidy are consumer groups, 
suggests that my expectations for group type are correct: higher-resource groups like resource-
rich provider associations are less likely to need information subsidies from Medicaid. 
In summary, the qualitative information available in the original survey and the re-contact 
survey both clearly indicate that information subsidies do occur, even if not in all cases. Where 
they do not occur, bureaucrats seem to rely on high policy agreement or mutual dependence on 
the program as they activate interest groups by simply asking for help. These conclusions are not 
definitive since I do not have reliable systematic data on information subsidies. However, the 
available illustrative survey excerpts highlight the variation in the existence of subsidies and 
suggest that this variation may depend on group type.
As discussed in Chapter 2, the idea that indirect bureaucratic lobbying sometimes fits a 
model of lobbying as “activation” (or “mobilization”) is theoretically challenging because there 
are no existing models that clearly outline a specific mechanism underlying subsidy-free 
3  Unfortunately there is only one hospital association in the set of follow-ups. I requested follow-up phone calls 
from three other hospital associations but did not receive a response.
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activation of interest groups' legislative allies. The idea of activation is also conceptually 
challenging because subsidy-free requests for lobbying assistance appear to entail little 
convincing on the part of bureaucrats—it appears that, in many cases, the interest group was both 
willing and able to lobby before the request. So what do these subsidy-free requests for lobbying 
actually do? I contend that they mainly shift lobbying activity at the margins; that is, these 
requests slightly increase the intensity or type of lobbying even while the group is already 
planning to lobby. Subsidy-free requests can do this in one of two ways. The request can alert 
ally interest groups to a specific opportunity to support a mutually preferred policy, for example, 
by talking to a certain legislator, attending a hearing, or “putting a face on these cuts” as one 
survey respondent said. The request can also alert interest groups to the fact that the agency is 
constrained in its ability to support the mutually preferred policy. Shifting lobbying activity at 
the margins does not mean that the lobbying is not influential—coordinated lobbying, or 
coalitional lobbying, may be necessary to increase the likelihood that legislators support 
mutually preferred policies; this may be especially the case where those policies benefit the poor 
Phinney (2010). 
If this preliminary analysis is essentially correct, then how could we predict when 
bureaucrats are likely to issue requests along with information subsidies versus requests that are 
geared toward coordination of lobbying activity? As suggested above, one answer may be that 
bureaucrats are likely to provide subsidies of policy information if groups have relatively low 
resources. Another possible answer is that lower-capacity agencies are more likely to issue 
subsidy-free requests in general. And another possible answer is suggested by the preliminary 
findings on the effect of group type and party control of legislatures in Chapter 5: if it is true that 
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Medicaid bureaucrats are more likely to ask for help from provider groups than consumer groups 
where there is Republican party control of both legislative chambers, then bureaucrats' requests 
for lobbying in those states may consist primarily of activation attempts rather than the extension 
of subsidies. Both of the latter possibilities mentioned here are questions for future research.
Conclusion
This chapter has presented further quantitative explorations of the effect of agreement on 
Requests and Contacts, a qualitative exploration of agreement, and a qualitative exploration of 
information subsidies from both the original survey and a small follow-up survey. In the first part 
of the chapter, I find further support for the idea that bureaucrats usually ask lobbyists for help 
when they agree with those lobbyists. The results of these tests are not entirely straightforward—
they do not provide statistically significant evidence of a strong effect of agreement on Requests 
on “this bill” at all levels of institutional capacity (Table 6.1) or when I estimate a large multi-
level model of the effect of agreement on Contacts (Table 6.2). Given the data limitations, 
however, all of the tests provide at least partial support for the expected positive effect of 
agreement. 
Taken together with the qualitative illustrations of the importance of agreement, these 
tests suggest that persuasion in indirect bureaucratic lobbying is rare. The evidence in this chapter 
also provides fairly robust support for Hypothesis 1 (Bureaucrats are more likely to solicit interest 
group lobbying on a particular policy if bureaucrats and interest groups agree on that policy. This 
effect will hold regardless of legislative capacity or agency capacity). Given the data limitations, 
better data are necessary to substantiate the findings in Chapter 5 about the interdependence of 
agreement and institutional capacity measures.
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The second section of the chapter goes on to consider whether, if the findings in support 
of agreement are collectively robust and there is comparatively little support for persuasion, 
indirect bureaucratic lobbying is more consistent with an information subsidy model or with an 
activation model. Both the qualitative information contained in the original survey and the 
evidence provided by the follow-up survey suggest that information subsidies consisting of 
policy information do occur, although they are more likely to occur where interest groups have 
relatively low informational resources. Just as commonly (if not more often), bureaucrats simply 
ask for help if they know that interest groups agree with them. 
Why does it matter if bureaucrats ask for help from lobbyists they agree with? One 
reason this is important is that it helps us to understand when Medicaid bureaucrats are likely to 
engage proactively in the legislative process and which groups they are likely to target. If 
Medicaid policies pit agencies and interest groups against each other, as is likely, for example, in 
the case of legislation that authorizes provider reimbursement cuts, then there is little scope for 
indirect bureaucratic lobbying. The analyses in Chapters 5 and 6 have all treated Medicaid 
policies interchangeably, but some policy proposals are more likely to engender bureaucratic 
activism because there is more likely to be agreement. I explore this idea in more detail in the 
next chapter by considering the policy content of the bills that were the focus of the surveys in 
each state. The qualitative analyses in Chapter 7 build on the findings in this chapter (and 
findings on governor-bureaucrat agreement in Chapter 5) by considering specific Medicaid 
policies.
A second rationale for asking whether agreement matters is that the results help to shed 
light on the mechanism(s) bureaucrats use to wield influence. One of the contributions of this 
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study is that it proposes, and finds evidence of, a relatively precise mechanism for bureaucratic 
influence. In contrast with studies that find evidence of perceived bureaucratic influence but are 
more general about the mechanism underlying that influence (e.g., Nicholson-Crotty & Miller 
2012), my research contributes a more specific investigation into bureaucrats' behavior. Seeking 
detailed information about what bureaucrats do when they leverage interest groups' lobbying 
power is consistent with the overall goals of this research.
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Chapter 7: 
Medicaid Legislation Content, Executive Branch Dynamics, 
and Bureaucratic Activism
All analyses presented thus far treat Medicaid bills as interchangeable, since they do not 
account for policy content. In this chapter, I build on my findings related to agreement by 
considering the policies at stake. More specifically, the overall importance of bureaucrat-lobbyist 
policy agreement has implications for the type of behavior we should expect to see around 
certain Medicaid policies. Is there evidence of patterns in bureaucratic behavior according to the 
type of Medicaid policy? And how does bureaucrat-governor alignment on different policy types 
affect the degree of bureaucratic activism? 
I address these questions by investigating whether two factors—policy type and agency-
governor relationships—appear to affect bureaucrats' engagement in the legislative process. As 
measures of governor-agency relations I consider both governor-agency policy agreement, based 
on numeric survey data (discussed in Chapter 4), and a new variable, “perceived agency 
independence,” that emerges from a thematic qualitative analysis of open-ended survey 
responses. I find patterns in agency behavior suggesting that this latter variable matters, alone 
and in combination with policy type. The analyses in this chapter extend my theory and earlier 
findings through qualitative analysis and policy contextualization rather than establish 
explanations for bureaucratic behavior that contradict my earlier findings. Because I have 25 
observations for policy type, more data would be necessary to conduct a comprehensive 
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quantitative analysis that incorporates the variables I consider here.
In the following sections, I outline a set of theoretical predictions for agency behavior 
and describe the qualitative methods I employ. I then discuss policy type, sorting the legislation 
in the study according to whether it expands, manages or cuts Medicaid. Next, I present analyses 
and results in two separate sections. In the first, I explore the data by presenting a series of 
bivariate relationships among the variables of interest: agency activism, policy type, and 
governor-agency relationships. In doing so, I also provide information on governors' political 
parties to determine whether party control is a significant intervening factor. Second, I consider 
how the variables of interest may work in combination to affect agency activism. This second set 
of findings addresses my theoretical predictions. Finally, I summarize the findings and offer 
preliminary conclusions.
Theoretical Predictions
In Chapter 2, I discuss parallels between bureaucrats' indirect lobbying and coalition 
lobbying. In general, if individual Medicaid bureaucrats are motivated to support (or oppose) a 
piece of legislative policy, soliciting private-sector lobbying assistance could strengthen their 
ability to influence the policy outcome. Medicaid policies may differ, however, in how much 
agency activism is necessary to support them and in how amenable they are to public-private 
lobbying coordination. Phinney (2010) argues that diverse lobbying coalitions are important 
where policies expand net benefits to the poor, since legislators may require a diverse set of 
signals in order to support these policies. Bureaucrats may therefore be more likely to solicit 
lobbying support on behalf of Medicaid expansions, or on behalf of program changes that help 
avoid benefit or reimbursement cuts. Conversely, where proposed policies would shrink 
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programs or aggressively manage Medicaid costs, it may be difficult for bureaucrats to solicit 
lobbying support due to interest group opposition to those policies. This idea is underscored by 
my finding that bureaucrat-group policy agreement generally increases the likelihood of indirect 
bureaucratic lobbying1
Earlier quantitative analyses also show that bureaucrats' agreement with governors has 
implications for the likelihood of agency activism (Chapter 5). Consistent with the theory 
elaborated in Chapter 2, my results suggest that Medicaid bureaucrats are more likely to lobby 
indirectly where they agree with the Medicaid policy positions of relatively weak governors. An 
additional analysis that I conduct to explore data limitations also suggests that bureaucrats may 
lobby indirectly to counteract positions of strong governors. And in open-ended survey 
questions, respondents also frequently mentioned governors' positions on Medicaid legislation 
and involvement in the legislative process. The complex nature of the effect of governor-
bureaucrat agreement on bureaucratic behavior (and the frequency of respondents' spontaneous 
references to governors) motivates inclusion of both governor-bureaucrat agreement and 
bureaucrat-lobbyist agreement in this qualitative examination of the effect of policy content. 
Unexpectedly, thematic analysis of governor-agency relationships in this chapter leads to the 
creation of a new “perceived agency independence” variable. I discuss this variable in more 
detail later in this chapter. I theorize in this section only about the effect of governor-agency 
policy agreement since I have no pre-defined expectations for the effect of (or even existence of) 
agency independence from governors.
How might policy type affect agency activism in the legislative process given the 
1 As discussed in Chapter 6; the results in Chapter 5 suggest that the effect of agreement depends on states' 
institutional characteristics.
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importance of bureaucrat-lobbyist agreement and governor-bureaucrat agreement? In making the 
following predictions, I assume that most Medicaid policies originate in the executive branch. 
This is a simplifying assumption that admittedly does not always reflect reality, although I argue 
that there is usually executive branch involvement in major Medicaid policy proposals if not 
outright leadership. In addition, budget proposals always originate in the executive branch. The 
majority of the bills in my survey (22 out of 25) were described as originating with “the 
administration”; the only exceptions were two provider assessment bills initiated by provider 
associations and one Medicaid management initiative led by legislators. 
First, I predict that a proposal to cut Medicaid benefits, eligibility, or reimbursement 
should result in little or no indirect bureaucratic lobbying. It is difficult for bureaucrats to solicit 
private-sector support for cuts to Medicaid: consumer advocates tend to oppose cuts to benefits 
and eligibility, and providers tend to oppose cuts to reimbursement (and cuts to benefits and 
eligibility, for that matter, since these also affect provider income). The surveys support this idea; 
survey respondents were unified in their opposition to legislation that proposed to cut Medicaid, 
with the exception of the respondents in one state. In that state, the bill that was the focus of the 
survey divided the advocacy community: major provider groups supported it but not the 
providers that were the target of specific cuts. As a survey respondent described it, 
[Medicaid] came to us and asked us and said “we need your help to support this bill.” [...] 
All of the groups. Hospital, medical, we all had to support it. The more consumer-type 
advocacy groups opposed it, and the smaller disabled groups [i.e., providers of disability 
services] opposed it.
In general, significant interest group support is not available to bureaucrats when the legislation 
in question cuts Medicaid. If Medicaid bureaucrats agree with a proposal to make cuts, then, they 
may express their support directly to the legislature (either reactively or proactively, through 
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direct lobbying), but are unlikely to ask interest groups for help (prediction 1). 
Second, if bureaucrats do not agree with the proposal to cut the program, they may lobby 
indirectly in a surreptitious manner to counteract the official executive branch position, or they 
may remain entirely silent (prediction 2). While the survey provides several examples of cuts 
supported by Medicaid agencies, such as the one mentioned above, respondents in other states 
described agencies' discomfort with cuts proposed by governors. For example, one respondent 
said of the Medicaid agency, faced with a gubernatorial proposal to cut Medicaid after several 
consecutive years of cuts, “We've had “we know this is bad” conversations, but they're very 
careful.” Previous analyses (in Chapter 5) suggest that agency silence and small amounts of 
surreptitious indirect lobbying are both possibilities in this type of scenario. 
In contrast, where a governor proposes an expansion or management reform and the 
agency agrees with the policy, it seems likely that there will be a relatively large amount of 
indirect lobbying and possibly direct lobbying as well (prediction 3). Again, as Phinney (2010) 
argues, legislators may need a wide range of signals to support expansions. And although 
progressive management reforms may not be precisely equivalent to expansions, such policies 
may improve program services and/or financing and may serve as an alternative to cuts. These 
policies are often complex, requiring a great deal of negotiation and communication. By 
extension, we should be more likely to see proactive bureaucratic communication in these states.
Finally, for a proposed program expansion that the agency supports but the governor does 
not (more likely to originate outside of the governor's office) we should not expect to see 
bureaucratic activism (prediction 4). The reason is that if interest groups or legislators support an 
initiative to expand Medicaid, bureaucrats may be able to stand back from the process. In other 
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words, bureaucrats should rely on the support of legislators and/or lobbyists rather than risk 
angering the governor by engaging in potentially unnecessary activism. 
I summarize these four predictions in Table 7.1.
Table 7.1: Indirect bureaucratic lobbying predictions
Medicaid bureaucrats support 
executive branch position
Medicaid bureaucrats disagree with 
executive branch position
Medicaid policy shrinks or 
aggressively manages 
program  
1: No indirect bureaucratic  
lobbying (no coalition expansion).  
Direct lobbying possible.
2: Surreptitious indirect lobbying—
rarely—or none at all
Medicaid policy expands 
program or manages to 
prevent benefit cuts
3: Indirect lobbying, akin to  
coalition expansion, and possibly  
direct lobbying as well
4: No bureaucratic activism
Methods
I use qualitative research techniques to enhance the completeness of my inquiry into 
bureaucratic lobbying, as well as to expand on quantitative findings in a way that accounts for 
the Medicaid-specific research context. This analysis—like the unstructured interviews I used to 
inform instrument design and the survey excerpts that illustrate the findings in Chapters 5 and 6
—is valuable addition to quantitative hypothesis testing because research on indirect 
bureaucratic lobbying is exploratory. Qualitative analysis is helpful for uncovering unpredicted 
relationships and taking a broad, exploratory view of a research topic. This approach can be 
especially useful in health care contexts due to the complexity of health systems and health 
policy (Cunningham, Felland, Ginsburg & Pham 2011). 
Furthermore, a qualitative approach to portions of the survey data is appropriate because 
several survey questions were open-ended. Taking advantage of the information contained in 
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these responses explicitly entails subjective interpretation. But doing so allows for examination 
of themes and patterns not captured by pre-defined variables (Schutt 2012). In order to enhance 
the validity of analysis based on these themes, I follow established matrix analysis and data 
display procedures, detailed below.2
Matrix analysis enables the researcher to select portions of raw data, organize them, and 
condense them in a way that facilitates analysis (Miles and Huberman 1984). The iterative 
process of data reduction involved in making matrices helps the researcher to see patterns and 
draw conclusions (Marsh 1990). I created several matrices to condense portions of the survey 
data. First, I developed a set of variables that comprise matrix columns. I based my choice of 
column variables on policy-relevant hypothesized explanations for bureaucratic lobbying. Some 
of these variables were not part of the quantitative analyses detailed in Chapter 5, but rather 
represented themes that emerged from commonly discussed topics and observations made by 
respondents. 
Next, I entered raw data from each survey observation into these categories, using 
excerpts in their entirety from each of the 106 respondents. I then collapsed the person-level 
observations to 25 state-level observations, creating a matrix that summarized the person-level 
data across respondents within each state. Finally, I sorted the state-level matrix by the type of 
Medicaid policy, ordering responses according to how much the Medicaid legislation for that 
survey state would cut the program. I include this master state-level matrix in the Appendix.3 
Each row in the master state-level matrix represents a state, and the columns represent the 
variables I discuss in this chapter. (I keep “policy context” in the master matrix for background 
2 I detail the initial data collection procedures in Chapter 3.
3 I removed state names and organization names to protect respondents' anonymity.
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and interest.) For example, reading across the first row shows that the Republican party 
controlled both the legislature and the governor's office in state 1. The legislation in this state cut 
eligibility for an optional Medicaid program; this was the most severe cut among the bills in my 
sample. Surveyed lobbyists agreed with the Medicaid agency's position on this legislation more 
than the governor's, revealing agency-governor disagreement. The last column indicates that the 
agency was not proactively engaged on fighting this policy.
From this master state-level matrix, I made several subsequent sub-matrices (not shown) 
to compare and contrast variables. I also used data clustering and grouping techniques to 
examine relationships among variables (Miles and Huberman 1984). I created several different 
displays of these relationships, which I show and discuss in the two findings sections.
Policy Type
The master state-level matrix shows that of the 25 bills in this study, four were Medicaid 
expansions (states 22 – 25). None of these expansions authorized significant new benefits or 
eligibility. The absence of significant expansions is unsurprising given that the survey asked 
about bills considered by legislatures during the 2012 and 2011 sessions, when states were still 
struggling to deal with the aftermath of the 2008 economic downturn. Legislation in the other 21 
states authorized program cuts, combinations of cuts and minor expansions, management 
reforms, or specific financing arrangements. This set of bills does not lend itself to simple cut-
versus-expand categorization, and therefore makes policy-based contextualization of 
bureaucratic behavior more complicated. I categorized these bills using a three-way 
cut/manage/expand scheme and I rank the bills within those categories. This allows me to treat 
policy type as a continuous variable as well as a three-way categorical variable.
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The “manage” category includes bills that outline quality improvements, payment 
reforms, managed care expansions, and other reforms, in addition to combined cuts and 
expansions in budget bills and bills that address financing issues. A clear example of a “manage” 
bill is one that authorized changes to hospital reimbursement methodology and granted the 
Medicaid agency the ability to expand the portion of the total Medicaid program under managed 
care, among other changes (state 14). Another example of legislation that authorized these types 
of changes instituted new provider payment based on episodes of care instead of fee-for-service 
(state 13). 
A few of the budget bills were more difficult to label as “cut” or “manage.” An example 
of a bill that is close to being a cut but which I ultimately categorized as “manage” is one that 
allowed the Medicaid agency to change provider reimbursement rates (state 8). The state had 
passed a law several years earlier that prevented the agency from changing provider rates. The 
bill that was the survey focus reinstated the agency's ability to change rates without legislative 
approval. It was clear to survey respondents that the end result would be rate cuts, although the 
bill did not actually make those cuts. One provider representative explained that the interest 
group community was resigned to the passage of this bill: 
[The agency's] argument was much more compelling to legislators than ours, their 
position was more compelling – [they said they] need the flexibility to adjust rates as 
budgets change.[...] So for us to go up there and protest would have damaged our 
relationships.
Conversely, where bills authorized program management tools but where respondents 
focused entirely or mainly on the cuts those management tools might result in, I placed them in 
the “cut” group. An example is a managed care expansion that many advocate perceived as a cut 
in disguise (state 3). One said,
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[Proponents] have not proved that it saves money and have not proved that the quality is 
acceptable. We said [the related pilot program] is a failed program, nobody can say this is 
a better model than other models of Medicaid reform. 
Some cuts were easy to categorize. A clear example of a “cut” bill is a state budget bill 
(state 1) described by one respondent as “draconian.” The respondent explained that “the upshot 
of [the bill] was that we lost some optional benefits that really are going to be difficult for us to 
replace. The biggest impact was [the legislature's] decision to eliminate our expanded Medicaid 
population.” Another state established eligibility determination procedures that created barriers 
to enrollment in an optional benefits program that grew more quickly than expected (state 2). 
The agency was seen as generally supportive of this cut. One respondent commented, “I mean I 
think they thought that the opposition was overblown, that they were trying to put into place 
reasonable limitations.”
There are also similarities among some of the financing arrangements that “manage” and 
that “expand.” To distinguish these, I included bills that identify new permanent or semi-
permanent sources of program funding in the “expand” group, and bills that authorize temporary 
financing fixes or that extend previous financing arrangements in the “manage” category. For 
example, states 23 and 24 created new provider assessments, categorized as “expand,” and state 
20, categorized as “manage,” reauthorized an existing provider assessment. As explained in 
Chapter 4, states use provider assessments to increase the amount of money available to pay for 
Medicaid by collecting a tax from providers and using that money to pay for Medicaid services, 
thereby making that money eligible for federal matching Medicaid funds at the state's federal 
medical assistance percentage (FMAP) rate. None of the bills in the survey actually expanded 
eligibility or benefits. I categorized state 25 as the most significant expansion because it would 
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have increased Medicaid enrollment via the establishment of a state health insurance exchange 
(the bill did not pass).
Findings I: Bivariate Relationships
In this section, I present plots of three bivariate relationships: 1) bureaucratic activism 
and policy type; 2) bureaucratic activism and agency-governor agreement; and 3) bureaucratic 
activism and perceived agency independence from governors. My theoretical predictions are 
based on both policy type and agency-governor agreement, so these bivariate relationships do not 
determine the accuracy of the predictions. However, they do shed light on the strength of the 
underlying dynamics. In particular, this section provides a useful comparison of agency-governor 
agreement and perceived agency independence as two different measures of agency-governor 
relationships.
Ia: Bureaucratic Activism and Policy Type
To examine the relationship between policy type and agency activism, I array the state-
level observations along two dimensions: agency activism (X-axis) and type of policy (Y-axis) 
(Figure 7.1). The labels at the top and bottom of the figure indicate the extremes, or poles, of 
policy type, and the labels on the right and left indicate the extremes, or poles, of agency 
activism. I treat both policy type and total reported agency activism in each state as continuous 
variables, using the available qualitative information in the summary matrix to estimate the best 
location for each state in both the vertical and horizontal space of the figure (as I do for the other 
figures of this type). This approach enables visualization of the association between the variables 
for each observation. For example, the first “R” in the upper-left-hand corner represents state 1 in 
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the master matrix (see Appendix). This placement reflects the fact that the bill in this state made 
cuts and there was no bureaucratic activism reported.  Each state in Figure 7.1 is represented by a 
letter indicating the party of the governor. 
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For example, then, quadrant I (the upper left) of Figure 7.1 contains observations for states that 
considered bills that proposed cuts to Medicaid, at the very top, and bills that proposed 
management reforms or combinations of cuts and expansions, closer to the bottom of the 
quadrant. For all of the bills in quadrant I, there was relatively little reported bureaucratic 
activism, whereas in quadrant II there are similar bills that saw more bureaucratic activism. 
In this and the following two figures, “agency activism” includes respondents' 
descriptions of both indirect and direct agency lobbying. While I did not ask specifically about 
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direct lobbying, many responses to my query about indirect lobbying also contain information 
about direct lobbying. I include this information in the master state-level matrix because it allows 
for a more complete assessment of agencies' political activity. 
Figure 7.1 shows that there is little apparent relationship between the party of the 
governor and the type of policy—Republicans and Democrats are approximately equally likely 
to oversee cuts versus expansions. The array also provides a visual representation of the 
information on policy type contained in the master state-level matrix: there is a cluster of bills 
spread out near the top of the figure, where the bills primarily authorize program cuts, and 
another cluster spread around the mid-point of the Y-axis, representing combined cuts and 
expansions and management reforms. Figure 7.1 also shows that there is only a very weak 
relationship between the two variables that comprise the axes, since the data points are spread 
out with little to no clustering in the corners of the figure, with the possible exception of the 
upper-left-hand corner of quadrant I.
Ib: Bureaucratic Activism and Agency-Governor Agreement
Next, I turn to agency relationships with governors. First, I compare estimated agency-
governor agreement on Medicaid policies with the existence of agency activism around those 
policies. Estimated policy agreement is based on agreement scores assigned by lobbyist 
respondents to Medicaid bureaucrats and governors, as described in Chapter 4. Where these 
differ on average, I interpret this to mean that the agency and the governor had different policy 
opinions on the bill in question, as explained in Chapter 5. While the original agreement data are 
numerical scores, numbers can be useful in a qualitative data display (Miles and Huberman 
1984). 
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I compare agency-governor agreement with agency activism in Figure 7.2. The X-axis 
again represents agency activism, and the Y-axis represents agency-governor agreement, where 
high agreement is at the top and low agreement is at the bottom. For example, then, quadrant I 
(the upper left) of Figure 7.2 contains observations for states that had overall high levels of 
estimated agency-governor agreement about Medicaid legislation but little bureaucratic activism.
Figure 7.2: Relationship between agency-governor agreement and agency activism
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Figure 7.2 shows that there is a cluster in the upper left hand of quadrant I, but there are 
also high-agreement bills around which there was more agency activism, in quadrant II, and 
overall the observations are spread out. The lack of a strong overall relationship between agency-
governor alignment on Medicaid legislation and agency activism is consistent with the 
quantitative analysis provided in Chapter 5, which showed that the strength of this relationship is 
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dependent on the intervening effects of gubernatorial power. 
Ic: Bureaucratic Activism and Agency Independence
The numeric agreement scores leave little room for interpretation that could lead to 
deeper understanding of executive branch dynamics. Therefore, I take advantage of other 
information in the survey transcripts to assess the relationship between governors and Medicaid 
agencies. As discussed in Chapter 5, respondents frequently mentioned governors and 
gubernatorial style, even though I did not specifically ask about this. In Chapter 5 I highlight two 
related themes that emerge from these responses: first, lobbyists in some states see governors as 
more effective partners on Medicaid legislation than Medicaid agencies, and second, certain 
governors are so strong or controlling where Medicaid policy is concerned that Medicaid 
bureaucrats are absent in the legislative arena. For the more in-depth qualitative analysis in this 
chapter, I re-examined the survey responses related to these themes, using matrices and 
broadening the scope of analysis to include any characterization of the relevant or central 
executive actor (with respect to a particular Medicaid bill) as either the governor, a senior 
Medicaid leader, or both. Respondents talked about this in the course of explaining their stances 
on policies, the lobbying activity around those policies, and the presence or absence of agency 
involvement in the legislative process. 
I provide several survey excerpts related to these themes in Chapter 5. Here is another 
example of a respondent who sees the governor as dominating the policymaking activity in this 
arena: “[The] governor's office approached us, I helped draft the bills, we helped lobby them. 
The agencies can introduce their own bills, but anything of importance on this level tends to be 
done out of the governor's office.” As an opposing example, a respondent in a different state said, 
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“A lot of what was in the bill was stuff the agency wanted” and “[the governor] is really very 
disengaged on this stuff.” And although it was rare, some respondents explicitly described the 
agency as being aligned with the governor, without necessarily being silenced. For example, in 
answer to my survey question about whether the lobbyist respondent had been approached by the 
agency with a request for lobbying activity: 
The question suggests that there might be a separation between the agency and governor's 
office. They are unified. If there was any separation at all it was very technical, amounts 
and duration. [They are] pretty unified most of the time, on other bills.
Not all respondents provided details about these within- executive branch dynamics, but 
even where they did not, many frequently mentioned either the governor or the agency in their 
descriptions of policymaking activity while the other entity was not mentioned. When I 
considered this frequency-of mention information together with the available detailed 
characterizations of executive branch dynamics, a theme emerged that I call “perceived 
independence of agency.” I used matrix-based data reduction to summarize this theme across 
respondents within each state, allowing me to label states as having Medicaid agencies that are, 
with respect to governors, conjoined, aligned, or independent. Some observations land in a gray 
area between two of these labels. 
I plot perceived agency independence against agency activism in Figure 7.3. Once more, 
the X-axis represents agency activism, and the Y-axis represents agency independence—
conjoined agencies are at the top, aligned agencies are in the middle, and independent or separate 
agencies are at the bottom. For example, then, quadrant I (the upper left) of Figure 7.3 contains 
observations for states where the Medicaid agency is perceived to be controlled by or conjoined 
with the governor and where there was relatively little reported bureaucratic activism around the 
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surveyed Medicaid legislation.
Figure 7.3: Relationship between perceived independence of agency and agency activism
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Figure 7.3 shows the strongest bivariate relationship of any examined thus far. There is a 
cluster in the upper-left-hand corner of quadrant I, and another cluster in quadrant III. The data 
array suggests that where agencies are conjoined with governors' offices they are less likely to 
lobby, even indirectly. Where agencies are perceived as having an independent institutional 
identity, separate from governors, they are more likely to be politically active. Yet “independent 
identity” does not automatically imply agency activism—there are observations in quadrants II 
representing conjoined Medicaid agencies that were nonetheless activist, and observations in 
quadrant IV representing independent Medicaid agencies that were not activist. The party labels 
in Figure 7.3 are interesting as well: all of the agencies in quadrant IV are in executive branches 
203
controlled by the Republican party. These agencies are perceived as more independent from 
governors than not, yet are not engaged in the legislative process.
There is some overlap among “agency-governor agreement” and “perceived agency 
independence,” both conceptually and in terms of the source of the variables in the survey 
transcripts. For example, why should we expect that lobbyist respondents are able to give 
different agreement scores to a governors and an agency if the agency is seen as conjoined, 
without a separate identity within the policymaking process? As an attempt to check the degree 
of overlap, I present counts of both variables in Table 7.2.
 Table 7.2:  Perceived independence of agency compared to 










conjoined 2 6 2
Agency 
aligned 1 2 1
Agency 
separate --- 7 4
Table 7.2 shows that there is a non-trivial number of states for which agency-governor 
agreement and agency independence seem to capture different dynamics. For example, there are 
a number of agencies that are estimated to agree with governors but that are viewed as having a 
separate policymaking identity (shaded cell in middle cell, bottom row). And there are several 
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conjoined agencies whose leaders are estimated to have policy opinions that differ from the 
governors they serve (right-hand and left-hand shaded cells, top row). If these two variables 
measured exactly the same things, I would expect the table to show that all “conjoined” and 
“aligned” agencies were estimated to have the same position on Medicaid legislation as the 
governors in those states, and that all “separate” agencies were estimated to have different 
positions from governors. 
Perceived agency independence may provide a deeper assessment of governor-agency 
relations with respect to policymaking since this variable takes advantage of several types of 
information in the survey transcripts. On the other hand, since I did not specifically ask about 
governors other than when I solicited lobbyist-governor agreement scores, this measure of 
agency independence may also be less reliable than the policy agreement measures. I compare 
these variables in a different way in the next section.
Findings II: Agency Activism, Policy Type, and Governors
At this point, I have explored several bivariate relationships in the data; I now turn to 
combinations of policy information, agency activism, and executive branch dynamics that 
address my theoretical predictions. Table 7.3 shows my original predictions with an added row 
for the “manage” policy category that emerged from analysis of policy type. Table 7.4 sorts the 
state-level summaries of Medicaid agency activism according to the same table design, and is 
explicit about whether these observations include indirect or direct lobbying, or both.
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Table 7.3: Indirect bureaucratic lobbying predictions 
Medicaid bureaucrats support 
executive branch position
Medicaid bureaucrats disagree with 
executive branch position
Legislation cuts program 
1. No indirect bureaucratic  
lobbying (no coalition expansion).  
Direct lobbying possible.
2. Surreptitious indirect lobbying—
rarely—or none at all
Management reforms or 
combined cuts/expansions [not predicted] [not predicted]
Legislation expands 
program  
3. Indirect lobbying, akin to  
coalition expansion, and possibly  
direct lobbying as well
4. No bureaucratic activism
Table 7.4: Actual bureaucratic lobbying by policy type and agency-governor agreement
Medicaid bureaucrats support 
executive branch position
Medicaid bureaucrats disagree with 
executive branch position
Legislation cuts program  None (3)Very little direct (1)
None (1)
Very little indirect (2)
Management reforms or 
combined cuts/expansions
None (2)
Very little indirect (3)
Indirect (1)
Direct (1)
Direct and indirect (2)
Direct (1)
Very little indirect (2)




Very little indirect (1)
None (1)
Very little indirect (1)
In comparing only the boxes for which there are predictions about agency activism in 
Table 7.3 with the results in the same boxes in Table 7.4, the actual results fit the predictions 
rather well, with one major exception. Where I expected to see no or very little indirect 
bureaucratic lobbying, that is what the results show: bureaucrats appear to be much less active 
around legislation that primarily cuts Medicaid. Where I expected to see the most indirect 
bureaucratic lobbying—where legislation authorizes a program expansion and there is also high 
estimated agency-governor agreement—there is very little indirect lobbying at all. But there are 
also only two observations that fall into this category. The boxes in the middle row, representing 
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bills that authorized management reforms or combinations of cuts and expansions, contain the 
majority of observations where there was either type (or both types) of bureaucratic lobbying. 
Medicaid bureaucrats are slightly more likely to engage in lobbying around these policies where 
they are estimated to agree with governors, although it is surprising that both “none” 
observations fall into the higher agreement category. 
Because the bivariate relationship between agency activism and perceived agency 
independence (Figure 7.3) appears to be stronger than the bivariate relationship between agency 
activism and agency-governor agreement (Figure 7.2), I re-sort the observations into a table that 
has the same format but replaces agency-governor agreement with perceived agency 
independence (Table 7.5).
Table 7.5: Actual bureaucratic lobbying by policy type and agency independence
Agency seen as conjoined with 
governor
Agency seen as separate entity
Legislation cuts program  
None (4)
Very little direct (1)
Very little indirect (2)
---
Management reforms or 
combined cuts/expansions
None (1)
Very little indirect (4)
Indirect and direct (1)
None (1)
Very little indirect (1)
Direct (2)
Indirect (1)
Direct and indirect (3)
Legislation expands 
program None (2) Very little indirect (2)
The placement of the observations changes in several ways from Table 7.4. In Table 7.5 
there are no observations at all where legislation primarily cuts Medicaid and agencies are 
perceived as independent; instead, all legislation of this type is in states where agencies are seen 
as conjoined. This finding is suggestive—it may be the case that where governors are more 
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controlling of agencies, they are less willing to rely on agency expertise and agency-lobbyist 
relationships to craft and fight for more complex approaches to Medicaid management. 
Where legislation expands Medicaid and agencies are perceived as conjoined with 
governors, there was no reported agency activism. The survey bill in one of these states was a 
health exchange authorization bill that respondents felt was related to Medicaid but was in fact 
only peripherally so. This observation may or may not be typical for that state and does not help 
to confirm or disconfirm any patterns. The survey bill in the other “conjoined” state was an 
appropriations bill that received attention from many different provider organizations as well as a 
coalition of consumer groups. One respondent in this state described the absence of Medicaid 
activism as fairly typical: 
We advocate for money in the budget. They just let it happen. The Medicaid agency here 
is a lot more closed in terms of communication than all other agencies. I've been doing 
this for 12 years and it's always been like that.
Providers and other interest groups in this state may therefore bear disproportionate 
responsibility for maintaining the size of the program. 
Where legislation expands Medicaid and agencies are perceived as independent, there 
was a very small amount of agency lobbying. These bills were both new provider assessments, 
which increase reimbursement for the provider group in addition to expanding the money 
available for Medicaid operations. These bills were proposed by the provider groups in question 
and lobbied almost exclusively by those organizations. Focused interest group attention may 
allow Medicaid agencies to take a back seat and conserve their own political capital for issues 
where there is not such an active private-sector partner. 
The middle row of Table 7.5 includes the bills that authorize management reforms or 
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combine Medicaid cuts and expansions. In this middle policy category, there are more 
observations for activist agencies where those agencies are perceived as independent, but still a 
fair number of conjoined agencies that conducted at least a small amount of indirect lobbying. 
Overall, the proportion of some agency activism to no reported agency activism is higher for 
bills in this category than the “cut” and “expand” category. This makes sense given that these 
bills were complex and may have required a great deal of communication between agencies and 
interest groups and legislators. Even very controlling governors might endorse small amounts of 
agency activism on behalf of complex bills. 
The outlier for this category of legislation is the “none” observation where the agency is 
perceived as having a separate organizational identity (middle row, right side). This bill for this 
observation was a complex management reform, and it was the only bill in the dataset that 
originated within the legislature. One respondent in this state, a provider association 
representative, described a large amount of communication about this bill between the Medicaid 
director and legislators prior to the legislative session, but characterized the Medicaid director's 
stance as primarily reactive rather than activist. He also indicated that the lobbying community 
felt cut out of the loop: 
There are fewer networking conversations. [The agency had] lots of direct conversations 
with legislators and legislative sponsors. There was a standing meeting for 3 or 4 months 
with sponsors leading up to bill to draft bill and discuss areas of concern. [...] Advocacy 
groups in general were not important in this. We have less access to the legislature. We're 
not taken that seriously.
Although the respondent did not describe the agency's communications during the session, I did 
not ask specifically about direct bureaucratic lobbying during the session, only indirect lobbying. 
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Discussion
The analysis of the specific sample of state Medicaid legislation in this chapter suggests 
that bureaucratic engagement in legislative decision-making varies according to policy content 
and governor-agency relations. The most striking finding is that Medicaid agencies appear to 
conduct more direct and indirect lobbying where bills authorize program management strategies
—rather than cutting or expanding programs—and where agencies have political identities that 
are separate from governors. A second key finding is that there are no observations for bills that 
simply cut Medicaid where Medicaid agencies are perceived as having independent political 
identities. And a third key finding is the emergence of the “perceived agency independence” 
variable itself. This variable suggests a new way to consider the role of agencies in the Medicaid 
policy development process. 
These findings are all suggestive rather than conclusive, and they raise several questions. 
First, what does relative agency independence from governors depend on? Related to that, should 
we expect this measure to extend to other policy areas and other agencies? Finally, what do my 
findings tell us about Medicaid policymaking in general and the expansions authorized by the 
Affordable Care Act (ACA) in particular? I consider these questions in turn and note how my 
findings might inform future research.
The perceived agency independence variable represents a continuum. At one end are 
states in which governors are highly involved in bargaining with legislatures over Medicaid 
policy. At the other end are states in which Medicaid agencies have an institutional identity 
separate from the rest of the executive branch, and tend to play an independent role in policy 
development (regardless of whether they are also activist). What causes a state's placement on 
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this continuum? In states with highly engaged or controlling governors, those governors may 
easily dominate otherwise (or formerly) strong agencies. On the other end of the continuum, 
where Medicaid agencies have a separate political identity, it is not clear from my data whether 
governors cede policy development work to agencies, or whether strong agency leaders are able 
to maintain some policy authority even if the governors they report to are normally controlling. 
Clearly, these factors are interdependent, but to what degree? How much does this dynamic 
depend on governors, and how much on agencies?
Related to those questions, my data do not shed light on whether lack of agency 
independence is usually due to governors' interest in Medicaid in particular, desire to control any 
agency behavior, or both. Future research might consider whether controlling governors are 
motivated by interest in Medicaid outcomes (or budgets), by the desire to compensate for weak 
or low-reputation agencies, or by a desire to dominate interbranch bargaining in general. If 
strong governors prefer all agencies to take a back seat in legislative bargaining, we might expect 
to see conjoined agencies in other policy areas as well. 
Next, does the relative independence of agencies affect Medicaid policy outcomes? What 
difference does it make whether governors exercise a great deal of control over agencies or 
agencies have their own political identities? While there were few outright expansions during the 
survey period, there were many bills that outlined complex management reforms and that 
combined cuts and minor expansions. Many of these bills represent complex policy approaches 
to managing scarce Medicaid resources that help these states to avoid major cuts to eligibility, 
benefits, and provider rates. In states where Medicaid agencies are perceived as being separable 
entities within the executive branch, these bills are the focus of a fairly high degree of agency 
211
activism—including multiple reports of direct lobbying. Combined with the finding that the 
dataset includes no bills that simply cut Medicaid where agencies are perceived as independent, 
this suggests that more politically independent Medicaid agencies may play an important role in 
proposing and supporting complex policy strategies as they move through the policy process. 
As I argue elsewhere in the dissertation, the potential for Medicaid bureaucrats to 
influence policy at all stages of the policy development process—not only during rulemaking 
and implementation—suggests that attention to agency preferences should be important for 
policy scholars. This chapter makes the added suggestion that another reason to pay attention to 
agency preferences is that agencies can provide technical and/or political support for complex 
policy approaches that obviate the need for straight cuts. This may be especially true where 
agencies have institutional identities independent from the rest of the executive branch. Why 
should this be the case? The mechanism at work here isn't clear, but I speculate that independent 
identities may enable agencies to maintain the kind of relationships with other actors that channel 
agency expertise and facilitate productive policy bargaining. This sounds a bit like the idea of 
agency autonomy espoused by Carpenter (2001). Yet I contend that “independent agency 
identity” is conceptually different from autonomy, capacity, or reputation: having a reputation 
that is separable from the governor's does not imply a good reputation, and independent identity 
does not imply the ability to act autonomously with respect to legislatures or interest groups. In 
addition, the degree to which agencies are conjoined with governors depends on both agencies 
and governors.
Finally, I consider what my findings might predict about agency behavior around the 
ACA-authorized Medicaid expansions. There were only four program expansions in the sample, 
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reflecting the fact that state Medicaid programs were under severe budget stress during the 2011 
and 2012 legislative sessions. There was very little or no bureaucrat-lobbyist coordination for the 
four expansion bills in the sample, and there were no great differences in agency activism 
according to agency independence or governor-agency agreement measures. Furthermore, the 
policy changes authorized by three of the four expansion bills were relatively simple—two 
identified a new funding source and one partially reinstated provider rates that had been cut 
previously. The ACA expansions may be more analogous to the bills in the “manage” category in 
the sample, due to their complexity. If so, my findings imply that agencies with independent 
identities should be more proactively involved in crafting and supporting ACA expansion 
authorizations and that these bills may entail more complex and sophisticated policy changes 
than bills in states with conjoined agencies. Additional, more focused research is needed to 
determine whether this is true, and whether agency independence generally explains more 
instances of effective or sophisticated Medicaid policies and fewer instances of ineffective or 
retrenching policies.
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  Appendix: Master state-level matrix, sorted by policy type (Table 7.6)
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State Policy context
Party control Legislation Views on exec branch/Medicaid Bureaucratic activism
expands/ manages/ cuts none/ direct / indirect
1 Several years of cuts R R
2 D D Cuts eligibility Same  
3 R R Same  Conjoined  
4 D D Same  Conjoined  
5 R Medicaid more 
6 R R Cuts – reimbursement
7 Several years of cuts D Cuts – reimbursement Governor
8 R R Separate Fairly direct lobbying
9 D D Same  
10 R R Agency  
11 Bad budget situation R R
12 R R Same  





Agree w agency/ 
gov/ same
viewed as conjoined/ aligned/ 
separate




Conjoined, but Medicaid is 
visible
Not for cuts; more prior to 
Republican governor
Program that was cut 
grew faster than 
expected
Conjoined – agency 
supported though theory  they 
didn't like it
Very little direct; not much on 
other bills either
Very strong 
conservatism. Seen as 
ideological proposal.
Manages (managed care 
expansion), but widely seen 
as harmful
Zero mention of any kind of 
activism
Very bad budget 
situation
Cuts and manages  – reforms 
seen as cuts in disguise
Majority of respondents said 
no indirect; not on other bills 
either








Not much indirect, but 
inconsistent views
Governor lowered 
budget base several 
years ago
Mixed – same on 
average
Coinjoined – Medcaid 
director not visible
Not on this; secretary 




Conjoined, but governor also 
weak
Some indirect lobbying but 
agency seen as weak
Was difficult for groups 
to fight this
Manages/cuts – enables 
agency to change rates
Agency slight edge – 
antipathy toward 
governor
Cut dental year before, 
got small part back
Some cuts, seen as 
reasonable; some small 
expansions
Separate/aligned – Medicaid 
visible, no mentions of 
governor
Yes, very active, mainly 
indirect
Kitchen sink bil l – 
previously failed bil ls 
included
Manages/ cuts –  multiple 
reform components
Separate but not disaligned – 
governor disengaged (though 
Lt. Gov engaged)
Some indirect and some direct 
– agency generally quite 
visible/active
Manages/cuts – managed 
care, other reforms, a few cuts
Agency more; 
governor nonentity
Separate – no mention of 
governor – all  was about 
Medicaid
Agency active – direct and a 
bit of indirect lobbying
Came after years of cuts 
– potentially better 
method of handing 
funding
Manages – payment/quality 
reforms – but also funding 
cap
Separate – governor a 
nonentity in the comments
No, and not much reported on 
other bil ls
Payment reform, budget 
shortfall
Varies – same on 
average
Aligned, but Medicaid 
director was new
Not on this, but agency is 
fairly active on other bills
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State Policy context
Party control Legislation Views on exec branch/Medicaid Bureaucratic activism
expands/ manages/ cuts none/ direct / indirect
14 R R Same  
15 D D Same  
16 D R Same  
17 R R Agency, on average
18 Structural deficit R R
19 R D Same  Aligned/conjoined
20 R R Same  Separate
21 D D Same  
22 R R
23 D D
24 R R A bit of indirect lobbying





Agree w agency/ 
gov/ same
viewed as conjoined/ aligned/ 
separate
New unified gov't, new 
Medicaid director
Manages – program renewal 
and reforms
Separate – Medicaid director 
seen as powerful  entity
Mixed reports – very 




Manages – payment and 
quality reforms
Conjoined/aligned – 
Medicaid was mentioned as 
an entity, but not out front
Yes, but not so much on this 
bi ll, since bill design process 
was collaborative
Bill  associated with 
global waiver 
application
Both cuts and expands – some 
cuts, some small expansions
Conjoined – governor in lead, 
Medicaid not very visible
Not much – more 
operationally focused
Governor proposed very 
large cuts; several 
years of “level funding”
Both cuts and expands – 
small eligbility expansion, a 
few rate increases, also cuts
Conjoined – respondents see 
as separate people but 
hampered politically
Indirect lobbying but very 
subtle
Manages – attempts to retain 
el igibi lity and reimbursement 
status quo
Slight edge for 
governor
Aligned/conjoined – agency 
takes lead from governor
Mixed reports weighted 
toward no activism. Medicaid 
not out in front of secretary or 
governor.
Change from all Dems 
to all  Reps, growing 
deficit
Manages – temporary fix for 
budget gap
Yes, some indirect and one 
report of direct
State has a broad 
waiver
Manages – renewal of 
provider assessment
Some indirect and some 
direct, but very mixed reports
Uncontroversial – 
assessment preexisting
Uses provider assessment to 
fil l budget gaps
Mixed reports leaning toward 
separate
Some direct, and indirect on 
other bills
Enrollment growth, 
many cuts previous 
year
Expansion – partial rate 
reinstatements 
Modal response is 
same, but slight edge 
for governor
Conjoined – agency seems 
irrelevant




Expands – provider 
assessment (new)
Inconsistent reports 
but same on average
Separate – no mention of 
governor – all comments 
about secretary
Yes, indirect, but mixed 
reports
Political fight because 
considered tax
Expands – provider 
assessment (new)
Mixed reports; slight 
edge for agency




Same (but agency 
hard to read)
Aligned/conjoined  - governor 
in lead, Medicaid not visible
No, not on this bill; mixed 
reports for other bills – very 
subtle if any
Chapter 8: Summary and Conclusions
Bureaucratic activism intended to influence legislative decision-making lies outside of 
most models of bureaucrat-legislator relations. Legislators develop statutes and budgets that 
constitute operating instructions for bureaucrats, sometimes granting more discretion for 
administrative decision-making, but always setting the course for bureaucratic action. For that 
reason, most scholarly conceptions of bureaucratic activism focus on bureaucrats' influence on 
policy during the rulemaking and implementation stages of the policy process. Likewise, research 
on political control of the bureaucracy typically focuses on bureaucrats' actions after legislation 
has passed. In this dissertation, I have argued that these models of bureaucrats' behavior are overly 
narrow. Bureaucrats' attempts to influence legislative decisions may exist outside of the 
bureaucrat-politician contract, yet they still exist, and scholars should account for them.
Bureaucrats have multiple reasons to want to influence legislation itself: they have policy 
preferences and expertise, and they may have more influence on ultimate policy outcomes if they 
proactively attempt to shape legislators' decisions instead of waiting for the stages of the policy 
process under their traditional purview. Bureaucrats have multiple tools for influence as well: they 
may carefully craft their advice as they react to legislators' requests for information; they may 
attempt to directly lobby legislators or their staffs; or they may lobby indirectly by asking their 
interest group contacts for lobbying help. I contend that these mechanisms for bureaucratic 
influence in the legislative arena have been understudied and underappreciated, especially the last. 
Any bureaucrat might have personal and professional relationships with interest group 
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representatives that allow them to lobby indirectly. This is particularly true for state Medicaid 
agency leaders and staff, since federal regulations require them to meet regularly with interest 
group members. 
As I argued in Chapter 1, the overly narrow view of bureaucrats' role in the policymaking 
process also pervades the literature on determinants of states' health policy choices. These studies 
tend to examine the influence of legislatures, governors, and other state-level political forces; if 
they consider agencies they restrict this consideration to states' implementation capacity. Even 
recent, prominent research focusing on interest groups' influence on states' health reform choices 
(Gray, Lowery & Benz 2013) considers agency implementation capacity but not how bureaucrats 
may join the interest group community in shaping the policy choices that states make. This lack of 
attention to the potential influence of bureaucrats is startling, given that Medicaid and other 
health-related agencies employ people with health policy expertise, a deep understanding of the 
health policy development process, and long-term working relationships with interest groups.
To my knowledge, this is the first systematic study focused on indirect bureaucratic 
lobbying. This dissertation provides evidence that Medicaid bureaucrats take advantage of interest 
group power in attempts to influence legislation, that this occurs routinely, and that there are 
conditions that make this behavior more likely. This evidence has major implications for both the 
bureaucratic politics and state health policy literatures. First, even if legislatures are ultimately 
dominant over agencies, this dissertation has shown that bureaucrats can and do attempt to 
influence the way that legislatures direct them. Bureaucrats do not merely await legislative 
instructions and then decide whether to rebel against those instructions. My findings call into 
question key assumptions underlying studies of ex ante controls of the bureaucracy, which rely on 
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the idea that legislators move first and bureaucrats are reactive. I argue that there is room for 
additional nuance and conditionality in the conceptual models and empirical approaches in this 
literature. Moreover, my findings have significant implications for the generation and 
dissemination of health services research related to Medicaid. Knowing what bureaucrats think 
about a policy issue and their placement in issue networks can help health policy researchers and 
practitioners target research evidence more effectively.
Summary of Chapters
After introducing my topic in Chapter 1, I developed a theory in Chapter 2 that guides 
much of the subsequent empirical analysis. This theory argues that multiple micro-level and 
macro-level conditions should affect bureaucrats' assessments of the benefits and costs of 
engaging proactively in legislative decision-making. The main benefit of proactive engagement is 
that bureaucrats are more likely to get the policy they want, or avoid the policy they don't want. 
The main cost is that proactive engagement has the potential to anger political principals, 
including both legislators and governors (or other superiors in the executive branch). Thus, the 
likelihood that bureaucrats lobby indirectly depends on conditions that increase the likelihood of 
realizing preferred policies and that decrease the risks to bureaucrats. I developed hypotheses 
about two micro-level conditions (bureaucrats' agreement with interest groups and relative interest 
group power) and three macro-level conditions (agency capacity, legislative capacity, and 
gubernatorial power). I also theorized that governor-bureaucrat agreement should affect the way in 
which bureaucrats issue requests for lobbying help, making more explicit requests where they 
agree with executive branch positions on Medicaid policy.
In Chapter 3, I detailed the process of designing and conducting a systematic survey of 
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bureaucratic behavior that would allow me to test the theory. I presented findings from a set of in-
depth, unstructured interviews of state bureaucrats and lobbyists that informed the survey design, 
and I discussed the process of conducting the survey. The survey asked state health interest groups 
about their communications with Medicaid bureaucrats about Medicaid legislation during the 2011 
and 2012 state legislative sessions. I gathered 106 complete surveys of state health lobbyists in 25 
states. 
I described the survey data in Chapter 4 and the independent variables I use in hypothesis 
testing. I also presented descriptive statistics and showed a set of bivariate relationships between 
dependent variables and other variables. The most important descriptive finding presented in this 
chapter was that about half of the lobbyist survey respondents indicated that Medicaid bureaucrats 
had recently approached them with an implicit or explicit request for lobbying help. In one survey 
state, all respondents reported that they received requests for lobbying help from Medicaid 
bureaucrats. In one other state, no respondents said this happened. In the other 23 states, there was 
within-state variation in perceptions of bureaucratic behavior among lobbyist respondents. The 
finding that indirect bureaucratic lobbying occurs routinely, rather than rarely, is important 
because the overwhelming majority of bureaucratic politics and policy scholars simply do not 
think of bureaucrats this way. This evidence provides a new avenue for research on bureaucrats' 
policy activism and influence on policy.
The results of hypothesis tests in Chapter 5 were consistent with several of my predictions 
but revealed other, unexpected dynamics as well. I found that while bureaucrat-lobbyist policy 
agreement affects the probability of indirect bureaucratic lobbying, this effect is dependent on 
agency capacity and legislative capacity. Tests of the effect of interest group power, the other 
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micro-level factor, provided preliminary support for my predictions. Estimation of an abbreviated 
model showed that bureaucrats are more likely to leverage the lobbying power of provider groups 
than consumer groups when legislatures are controlled by Republicans. It may be that a larger 
sample could clarify whether this effect holds in an estimation of the full model. In any case, this 
preliminary result points to intriguing possibilities for future research on the conditionality of 
interest group power and bureaucrat-lobbyist alliances.
The results of my tests of macro-level factors provided mixed support for my theoretical 
expectations. First, as predicted, agency capacity has a negative effect at high levels of bureaucrat-
lobbyist agreement. Interestingly, agency capacity also has a slight negative effect at medium 
levels of agreement. This result might reflect the fact that bureaucrats working in low-capacity 
agencies are slightly more likely to ask interest groups for lobbying assistance than to lobby 
directly, even if bureaucrat-lobbyist alignment is imperfect. Next, in contrast, legislative capacity 
and policy agreement combine in unexpected ways, and their effects vary based on levels of 
agency capacity. Because the results of these three-way interactions are complex, I repeat the 
summary findings as stated in Chapter 5: 1) where agency capacity is very low and legislative 
capacity is very high, agreement has a positive effect on the likelihood of indirect bureaucratic 
lobbying; 2) if agency capacity is very low and legislative capacity is also low, there is no 
significant effect of agreement; 3) where agency capacity is very high and legislative capacity is 
low there is a negative effect of agreement; and 4) where agency capacity is high and legislative 
capacity is high, there is no effect of increases in agreement. These findings suggest that agency 
capacity may grant bureaucrats different levels of bargaining strength that affect how they interact 
with both interest groups and legislatures. This is an intriguing preliminary finding that requires a 
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more focused investigation and a more refined agreement measure to be considered definitive. 
Finally, the last factor that I examined in Chapter 5 is gubernatorial power. As expected, 
where bureaucrats agree with governors, they solicit more lobbying support as gubernatorial 
power decreases. But a comparison of two versions of the Requests dependent variable suggested 
that bureaucrats may also work to subvert powerful governors they do not agree with. I also tested 
the prediction that there should be more explicit requests for lobbying assistance where 
bureaucrat-governor agreement is high. This prediction received support from descriptive statistics 
but not from regressions. Overall, my findings on the effects of governors are important for 
several reasons. One reason is that few studies that focus on executive branch politics separate 
governors from the agencies under them, either conceptually or empirically. My findings show 
that governors and agencies often have distinguishable policy opinions, and that differences in 
opinion matter for agency behavior. This highlights yet another opportunity for additional fruitful 
research. A second reason these findings are important is that they show that the effects of 
gubernatorial power may be more complex and nuanced than previously realized. I expected 
bureaucrats to be likely to leverage interest group power on behalf of weak governors they agree 
with, but there are also disparate pieces of qualitative evidence suggesting that powerful governors 
both induce bureaucratic activism designed to subvert them and dampen such activism. 
Bureaucrats' ability to ask interest groups for help in opposing a governor's policy position may be 
an unexpected (and previously unexamined) mechanism for agency power, but it appears that 
bureaucrats do not engage in such behavior lightly, and mostly they do not use this strategy at all.
In Chapter 6, I conducted a more in-depth exploration of the effect of bureaucrat-lobbyist 
policy agreement on indirect bureaucratic lobbying and I discussed the implications of these 
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results for the applicability of various lobbying theories. I also presented relevant qualitative 
survey excerpts from respondents' answers to open-ended survey questions, as well as the results 
of a small follow-up survey. Taken together, the information in this chapter suggests that 
bureaucrats usually ask for help from lobbyists with whom they agree. If bureaucrats attempt to 
change the Medicaid policy preferences of lobbyists, consistent with theories of persuasive 
lobbying, they do not do this often. Friendly lobbying is more typical. 
However, the finding that high bureaucrat-lobbyist policy agreement usually characterizes 
indirect bureaucratic lobbying does not answer the question of whether bureaucrats usually 
subsidize lobbyist allies with policy or political information, consistent with Hall and Deardorff's 
(2006) theory, or merely activate them. My analysis of both the original survey and a small 
follow-up survey indicated that both information subsidy and activation occur. These surveys also 
suggest that bureaucrats are more likely to provide subsidies of policy information to groups with 
lower information resources, like consumer advocacy groups, than they are to groups with higher 
information resources, like hospital associations. When activation occurs, it appears to consist of 
simple requests for interest groups' help, made on the basis of fairly strong policy alignment and 
mutual interest in a particular Medicaid policy outcome. Does it matter whether bureaucrats 
provide information subsidies to interest groups or simply activate them? If this or future research 
can shed light on the ways in which policy information travels through bureaucrat-lobbyist policy 
alliances, such knowledge can help health services researchers effectively disseminate evidence.
Lastly, in Chapter 7 I analyzed the survey data in a different way, by accounting for the 
policy content of the Medicaid bills that were the focus of the survey in each state. This focus 
builds on the findings in Chapter 6 on the overall importance of policy agreement, since certain 
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policies are more likely to produce bureaucrat-policy agreement than others. I also extend earlier 
findings on governor-bureaucrat agreement by conducting a thematic qualitative analysis of the 
survey transcripts. This yielded a new variable called “perceived agency independence,” reflecting 
the degree to which interest groups perceive state Medicaid agencies as having a policymaking 
identity distinguishable from the rest of the executive branch. This variable correlates with 
bureaucratic engagement in legislative decision-making more strongly than governor-bureaucrat 
agreement does. The patterns uncovered in this chapter do not invalidate the results of the earlier 
quantitative analyses—they are based on a small sample and should be considered preliminary—
but rather extend them by informing the way I approach the available qualitative data. Like the 
findings in Chapter 5, these patterns also suggest that more research is needed on governors' 
propensities for controlling agencies' political activity, separate from examination of their formal 
policymaking powers.
The main finding in this chapter is that bureaucratic activism varies according to policy 
content and perceived agency independence: Medicaid bureaucrats appear to be more activist 
where bills authorize program management strategies—rather than cutting or expanding programs
—and where agencies have policymaking identities that are separate from governors. In addition, 
all observations for legislation that cuts Medicaid occur in states where agencies are seen as 
conjoined with governors, rather than having a separate institutional identity. I interpret this as 
suggesting that controlling governors are less willing to rely on agency expertise and agency-
lobbyist networks to support more complex approaches to Medicaid management. While I do not, 
in general, make normative claims about bureaucratic activism, this finding suggests that there 
may be value in allowing agencies a voice in the policymaking process and that bureaucrat-
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lobbyist linkages may serve to improve interest groups' effectiveness in fighting for beneficial 
policies. I would need a larger sample of bills, and a comparison to a different overall budget 
environment, to make these claims more definitively.
Contributions
As discussed above, this research contributes to our overall understanding of bureaucrats' 
political power simply by showing that bureaucratic involvement in the legislative process—via 
alliances with interest groups—occurs with some regularity. Rather than sitting back and 
awaiting legislative instructions, Medicaid bureaucrats routinely seek to influence policy 
authorizations and state budgets. This finding has significant implications for research on 
political control of the bureaucracy. It implies, in particular, that ex ante controls may be more 
limited or conditional than previously realized. For example, theories of statutory control, 
whereby legislators seek to constrain agency behavior by increasing the specificity of their 
instructions to those agencies, rely on the idea that bureaucrats do not influence the contents of 
statute. However, my findings show that bureaucrats are interested in influencing legislation and 
that they regularly leverage interest group power in attempts to do so. Similarly, procedural 
control theories rely on the idea that political principals can dictate the terms of bureaucrats' 
interactions with interest groups. My findings cast doubt on this, given that bureaucrats are 
capable of leveraging lobbying power in attempts to influence legislators' decisions prior to 
agency delegation. Furthermore, bureaucrats might be able to stack the decks in their own favor 
during rulemaking, if interest group allies activated to influence legislation remain activated 
throughout the rules process. Building on the findings in this dissertation, a fruitful line of related 
research might clarify whether, and to what extent, bureaucrat – interest group lobbying alliances 
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carry through rule promulgation.
This research also extends, in specific ways, two related lines of inquiry about 
bureaucratic activism. First, my finding that agency capacity has a negative effect on indirect 
bureaucratic lobbying presents an intriguing contrast with recent work by Nicholson-Crotty and 
Miller (2012) that shows a relationship between high agency capacity and direct bureaucratic 
influence on legislative decision-making. Taken together, these studies suggest that bureaucrats 
in both high- and low-capacity agencies are capable of influencing legislators, although the tools 
for doing so are quite different. Individual relationships with members of interest groups may 
enable bureaucrats to circumvent limitations to their political power resulting from lower agency 
reputation.
Second, my findings run counter to Carpenter's (2001) work on sources of agency 
autonomy during the Progressive Era. Carpenter focuses on explaining why particular agencies 
were very influential, arguing that their reputations for expertise and placement in private-sector 
networks caused legislators to defer to them. My research, in contrast, shows that stellar agency 
reputations are not required for indirect influence via interest groups. As discussed above, high 
agency capacity has a negative effect on indirect bureaucratic lobbying. I also show that 
bureaucrats build coalitions with interest groups in order to influence single pieces of legislation. 
These coalitions therefore occur in issue-contingent, short-term ways, over shorter time periods 
than the time it takes, in Carpenter's story, for agencies to become autonomous and therefore 
influential. Indirect bureaucratic lobbying constitutes a common, everyday political strategy that 
is available to most bureaucrats.
This dissertation also contributes to the lobbying literature by examining the applicability 
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of various theories of interest group lobbying to indirect bureaucratic lobbying. My investigation 
into the specific nature of bureaucrats' requests for lobbying support suggests that bureaucrats 
may affect interest group activity both by providing information subsidies to lobbyists and by 
activating interest groups on the basis of mutual policy preferences. It is possible that all of the 
lobbyists in my study would have lobbied in the absence of requests for support from 
bureaucrats. But several respondents talked about how they used information from bureaucrats as 
they lobbied, reflecting one effect of bureaucrats' requests. In addition, this research contributes a 
degree of precision in the conceptualization of lobbying as activation. My preliminary findings 
suggest that bureaucrats may not incentivize lobbying activity per se; rather, they highlight the 
need for coordination or a specific opportunity for lobbying as they point out that a mutually 
desired policy is in political jeopardy. 
Finally, this dissertation contributes to policy research on Medicaid. Medicaid agencies 
are rarely included in political-economic studies of the determinants of Medicaid outcomes, yet 
they are arguably the most important and most central institutions in the Medicaid policy arena. 
This research shows that Medicaid agencies do not merely influence policy outcomes at the 
implementation stage. Instead, their relationships with interest groups give them a way to 
influence legislative policy on Medicaid even (perhaps especially) where agencies are low-
capacity. I show that they use this tool routinely. Furthermore, my findings about the factors that 
influence the likelihood of indirect bureaucratic lobbying (Chapters 5 and 6) and the types of 
Medicaid policies that are likely to create to more opportunities to partner with interest groups 
(Chapter 7) contribute nuance to our understanding of when bureaucrats are likely to attempt to 
influence Medicaid legislation. Medicaid policy studies—especially research on states' policy 
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choices—should consider how Medicaid bureaucrats' activism is likely to be affected by their 
policy preferences, relationships with other actors, and placement in different bargaining 
environments and political regimes. Incorporating this perspective may be especially helpful and 
important where research attempts to predict states' future decisions, or to understand states' 
decision-making processes around Medicaid, rather than focusing only on past determinants of 
policy outcomes (Jacobs & Callaghan 2013).
Future Research
This dissertation leads to multiple questions, in addition to those mentioned above. One 
major question raised by my findings is whether bureaucratic activism makes a difference for 
legislative policy. If indirect bureaucratic lobbying does change legislative outcomes, by how 
much? The current study contributes systematic information about bureaucrats' behavior, but not 
about the ultimate effect of that behavior. The best way to gain leverage on this question might be 
to conduct an in-depth case study of a single piece of legislation, tracing changes to the bill (both 
the draft bill and as introduced) and attempting to discern whether those changes result from 
lobbying activity and/or bureaucrats' engagement in the legislative process.
Another question raised by this research is whether observations of indirect bureaucratic 
lobbying would increase in an expansionist era—that is, when there are more bills that expand 
Medicaid than there were during the timeframe I asked lobbyists about (2011-2012). If interest 
groups do lobby on the basis of bureaucratic requests—and many of the survey responses suggest 
they do—my findings suggest that the mutuality of Medicaid policy goals generates meaningful 
opportunities for bureaucrats to influence legislative policy. This finding is especially striking 
given that the survey asked about legislation in a period when many state Medicaid programs were 
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under severe budget stress and the only major legislation simply cut provider rates. Several 
respondents suggested that this timing exerted downward pressure on bureaucrats' indirect 
lobbying because cuts are contentious and there were corresponding low levels of bureaucrat-
lobbyist alignment. Indirect bureaucratic lobbying may be a more significant factor in policy 
development when state budgets are healthier and mutually desirable policies are more politically 
feasible. One way to investigate this might be to look at bureaucratic activism around the ACA 
Medicaid expansions and compare the findings of that study to my existing findings.
A different set of unanswered questions has been raised by my preliminary findings about 
the applicability of different lobbying theories to indirect bureaucratic lobbying. As mentioned 
above, these findings suggest that bureaucrats sometimes provide information subsidies when they 
request lobbying support, and sometimes simply ask for help in supporting (or fighting) a policy. 
My research also suggests that the type of request may be related to interest groups' information 
resources. If groups have relatively strong resources, like hospital associations, they may not need 
information subsidies, and may in fact provide information to bureaucrats. A survey that asks 
about information subsidies more pointedly and systematically might do more to uncover 
differences in the type and amount of information subsidy by group type, policy type, and policy 
environment. Further research could also shed light on two related questions:1) whether agency 
capacity affects bureaucrats' overall likelihood of providing information subsidies; and 2) whether 
bureaucrats are less likely to provide information subsidies where legislatures are entirely 
controlled by Republicans, due to the preliminary evidence suggesting that bureaucrats are more 
likely to rely on (presumably high-resource) provider groups in those states.
Finally, my research uncovered an unexpected but real puzzle: many state-level actors 
228
consider bureaucratic lobbying to be illegal, but I was unable to locate state laws or regulations 
prohibiting proactive bureaucratic engagement in the legislative process. The widespread view 
that bureaucrats should not attempt to influence legislation appears to result from norms rather 
than laws at the state level. And, as mentioned in Chapter 2, while relevant federal law has been 
interpreted to prohibit federal bureaucrats from conducting “substantial grassroots lobbying,” it 
is not clear that this interpretation extends to bureaucrats' requests for interest group assistance. If 
I were to continue working in this general vein of research, my first priority would be to develop 
a variable reflecting the relative strength of state norms about bureaucratic behavior, and to trace 
the source of those norms to related administrative rules, laws, or legal precedent in each state.
In conclusion, while this dissertation raises several questions worthy of additional 
research, these questions do not undercut the value of the findings that I present and discuss here. 
To the contrary, this research raises interesting and important questions that might have 
otherwise gone unasked, serving as a foundation for multiple new lines of inquiry on 
bureaucratic activism, state institutional capacity, governor-agency relations, and interest group 
power. More importantly, this dissertation tells us much we did not know before. Namely, state 
Medicaid bureaucrats routinely attempt to influence legislators' decisions by leveraging the 
lobbying power of interest groups; multiple state- and group-level conditions affect their 
likelihood of doing so. These findings highlight the need for greater attention to bureaucrats' 
power, role in the policy process, and policy preferences.
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